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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to disentangle the effects of trade liberalisation during the mid-
1980s from the trade liberalisation involved in the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) on exports, imports and the balance of payments in Mexico, at the aggregate and
disaggregated level. The main empirical results suggest that the trade reforms during the
mid-1980s had a significant impact on trade, exports and imports; however, the effects of
NAFTA are negligible. In spite of the fast rate of manufacturing exports, the most dynamic
sector, imports have increased even faster. Therefore, trade liberalisation has worsened the
trade balance. In addition to this, the evidence presented in this thesis shows that more
liberalised trade has not contributed to an improved economic performance in Mexico, as
promised a decade ago, before NAFTA came into effect, by the leaders of Canada, Mexico
and the US. However, NAFTA has locked-in Mexico's trade and foreign investment policy,
easing the access of multinational firms to the country but with minimum forward and
backward linkages to the domestic economy.
It is corroborated that Mexico's economic performance is constrained by the external sector
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation of the Study
The liberalisation of trade is strongly advocated as the means through which economies
can accelerate their economic development. As the World Bank wrote in its latest Global
Economic Prospects "A reduction in world barriers to trade could accelerate growth,
provide stimulus to new forms of productivity-enhancing specialization, and lead to a
more rapid pace of job creation and poverty reduction around the world" (World Bank,
2002, p. xi). The prevailing opinion in trade-policy spheres is that expanded trade leads to
prosperity. Thus, the impact of trade liberalisation on economic performance has been one
of the topical issues of trade and development economics.
In fact, trade liberalisation —meaning any measure taken to reduce export restrictions and
import controls, considering non-tariff barriers (e.g. quantitative restrictions, quotas,
subsidies, local content requirements, etc.) and exchange rate distortions— in Mexico, as
for many other developing economies, has been one of the cornerstones of economic
policy over the last two decades. This period has seen a radical trade policy re-orientation
for the country, from a highly protectionist trade policy, focused on its domestic market,
to an intense deregulation of trade policy. The argument was that trade liberalised
economies appear to fare better than non-trade liberalised countries.'
I Edwards (1997) explicitly declares that several research studies were carried out by the Wold Bank with a
common message: "protectionism distorts relative prices, encourages corruption and slows growth" (p.44).
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Trade liberalisation has represented the opposite development policy to the import
substitution industrialisation (1ST) development strategy applied during the 1950s, 1960s
and 1970s, which was originally proposed by Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950). The ISI
strategy was based on the idea that domestic investment and technological capabilities can
be spurred by providing domestic producers with protection against imports. In fact, ISI
policies seem to have stimulated growth by creating protected home markets for domestic
entrepreneurs to invest in. But after Mexico experienced the debt crisis in 1982 —a crisis
resulting from the combination of adverse domestic factors (e.g. monetary and fiscal
policies incompatible with sustainable external balances) and international factors (e.g.
high interest rates), the economic policy was re-orientated. The intervention of the
government in the economy was significantly reduced; and the free-market model adopted
included drastic trade reforms.
Given the emphasis that Mexican trade policy has given to free trade since the mid-1980s,
the main motivation of this thesis is to disentangle the effects of trade liberalisation on
exports, imports and the balance of payments, between two marked trade reform episodes:
1) the trade reforms launched during the mid-1980s; and, 2) the trade liberalisation that
culminated in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). We are particularly
interested in examining whether NAFTA has had any marked impact on trade
performance as the proponents have exhaustively promoted (Lustig, 1994 and 1997;
Krueger, 2000; NAFTA 2002; Salinas, 2000; 2 Serra, 1991 3). To our knowledge, this is the
first study to do so in a systematic and rigorous way.
2 Carlos Salinas was Mexico's President during the period 1988-1994.
3 Jaime Serra was the Minister of Trade and Industrial Development of Mexico during Salinas'
administration. He led NAFTA's negotiations from the Mexican side; and he still strongly promotes it (see
Serra et al. 2003).
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The thesis makes six important contributions, trying to answer the following questions.
First, what has been the impact of trade liberalisation on export and import growth at the
aggregate and disaggregated level? Second, how have the income and price elasticities of
demand for exports and imports responded to trade liberalisation? Third, has Mexico's
trade structure changed after trade reforms? Fourth, how has the trade balance and the
current account of the balance of payments reacted to trade liberalisation? Have they
improved or deteriorated? Fifth, how has trade liberalisation affected economic growth?
Finally, what are the causal links between liberalised foreign direct investment inflows,
exports and imports? We will try to answer these questions by applying several time
series econometric techniques, such as the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method, Error
Correction Models (ECM), Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) models, rolling
regressions, out-side sample forecasts, the Johansen cointegration method and the Chow
structural break point test.
Studies that have investigated the effect of trade liberalisation on Mexican exports and
imports have considered 1982 as the break point in trade policy, because that was the date
when economic policy was re-orientated, but it was not until mid-1985 that trade barriers
were officially modified. In addition to this, most of the empirical studies so far disregard
the post-NAFTA period, giving an incomplete picture of the recent trade performance of
Mexico. The literature on the early effects of NAFTA on trade is rather scant, but the
work done (based on simulations of Computable General Equilibrium models) seems to
conclude that NAFTA would have large benefits on Mexico's trade. Also, it is relevant to
mention that there are no rigorous studies focusing on the effects of trade liberalisation
either on the trade balance or on the current account of the balance of payments.
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1.2 Trade Liberalisation Theory
The foundations of modern trade theory are at least two centuries old. The benefits of
trade were one of the major preoccupations of all the great classical economists. Adam
Smith, in his major work An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
[1776 (1895)1, claimed that the gains from trade could be obtained from specialisation by
means of division of labour (i.e. one should never attempt to make at home anything that
it will cost more to make than to buy from abroad). Smith stressed the importance of trade
as a means of widening the market, and as an outlet for surplus commodities, which
brings otherwise unemployed resources into employment. Implicitly, Smith also applied
the doctrine of laissez-faire to international trade, when he claimed that all nations would
benefit from free trade, by allowing individual countries to specialise in the goods they
are best suited to produce because of their natural resources and acquired advantages.
Thus, by trading, nations could improve welfare. The next step in the development of
trade theory was the publication of The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation by
David Ricardo [1817 (2002)]. He developed the concept of 'relative comparative
advantage',4 by considering that economies are endowed with different natural resources
and man-made production assets. Thus, the opportunity cost of producing goods varies
from country to country, and this is measured by the marginal rate of transformation
between one commodity and another. He suggested that countries can obtain welfare
gains by specialising in the production of those goods with the lowest opportunity cost
and trading the surplus of production over domestic demand, provided that the
international rate of exchange between goods lies between the two domestic price ratios.
After Ricardo's contribution, the theoretical implications were developed by other
economists. For instance, Mill [1856 (1986)] acknowledged the importance of the
4 The concept of 'relative comparative advantage' remains to this day the central feature of orthodox trade
theory.
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relevance of the dynamic effects of trade. Marshall [1890 (1920)] recognised that the
causes of economic growth are related to the study of international trade. During the 20th
century, one of the most influential developments came with Ohlin's (1933) publication
of Interregional and International Trade. Considering the pioneer work of Eli Heckscher,
Ohlin further developed the proposition that a country exports those goods that use the
country's most abundant factors of production most intensively in their production.
The following are some of the core questions that modern international trade theory has
addressed: What determines the pattern of trade? How are the resources distributed among
the trading partners? What are the implications of trade for the structure of production for
each trading country? Although trade theory demonstrates that trade enables each country
to obtain a higher level of production and consumption than can be obtained under
autarky, and that free trade tends to result in maximum welfare for a country's population,
the assumptions —about the nature of the production functions and consumer tastes, the
stocks of capital and labour, forces guiding the maximizing behaviour of producers and
consumers, and prices in the rest of the world— may not apply similarly for all countries.
If those assumptions are not satisfied, there are circumstances under which free trade will
not maximize welfare. Moreover, in practice, the well promoted effects may work in the
opposite direction to those expected from the theory. Undoubtedly political, economic and
institutional events have influenced international trade, which, at the same time, has often
been conditioned by the demands of special interest groups.
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In relation to trade policy, after the First World War, and the Great Depression of the
1930s, most nations moved sharply towards protectionism. 5 In most countries, tariffs
switched demand from foreign to domestic products in the attempt to increase domestic
employment; tariffs also were used to strengthen the country's position in dealing with
other nations which practiced protectionism. However, after the Second World War, the
claims in favour of free trade were re-invigorated. Following the impulse to promote
trade, in 1947 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was established.
Free trade was institutionalised as the 'new' way to restore economic development. The
agreement was designed to provide an international forum that encouraged free trade
between members by regulating and reducing tariffs on traded goods and by providing a
common mechanism for resolving trade disputes.6
Since the war, many distinguished economists (e.g. Balassa, Bhagwati, Corden, Dixit,
Edwards, Feenstra, Grossman, Haberler, Helpman, Johnson, Kemp, Krueger, Krugrnan,
Little, Ramaswami, Sachs, Scitovsky, Scott, Srinivasan, Warner, among an extensive list)
have entered the free trade versus protectionist debate, mainly on the side of free trade.
Specifically, the theoretical literature has been orientated to determine the best methods of
intervention and the amount of such intervention that could be applied by trade policies,
and to justify the benefits of free trade.
5 Hicks (1959) describes how the unemployment of those days undermined the belief in the doctrine of free
trade:
"The main thing which caused so much liberal opinion in England to lose its faith in [f]ree [tirade
was the helplessness of the older liberalism in the face of massive unemployment, and the possibility
of using import restriction as an element in an active programme fighting unemployment. One is, of
course, obliged to associate this line of thought with the name of Keynes. It was this, almost alone,
which led Keynes to abandon his early belief in [firee [t]rade" (p.48).
6 The GATT is now encompassed by the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), as a result
of the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round negotiations, signed at the Marrakesh ministerial meeting in April 1994.
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The Gains from Trade in Traditional Trade Theory
The neo-classical theory has a well-established proposition that trade liberalisation leads
to improved allocation of resources, and a more efficient allocation of resources will
increase the level of output. This approach focuses on the increase in the value of output
and real income from domestic resources permitted by trade. Specifically, the traditional
trade theory makes a distinction between the static and dynamic gains from trade.
First, there is an initial shock effect of liberalisation on previously protected high cost
domestic products. Induced by comparative advantage, the efficiency of the allocation of
resources to activities where productivity is higher at world prices will increase. Through
specialisation (i.e. division of labour), the maximum to be produced from a given amount
of factor resources is reached. The static gain from trade is the increase in welfare as a
result of saving the excess cost of import substitution. Graphically, improvements in this
type of benefit from trade involve movements along a production possibility frontier with
the consumption possibility curve higher than the production possibility curve.
Second, as export markets widen the total market for a country's producers, the dynamic
effects of trade are associated with the exploitation of large-scale economies. As first
stressed by Adam Smith, market size imposes a constraint on the division of labour, so
that 'more open countries' are better able to exploit increasing returns to scale. On the one
hand, the extension of the size of the market raises the rewards for successful innovators
and foreign investment, and enlarges the scope for knowledge spillovers (Helpman and
Krugman, 1985). On the other hand, the larger size of the firms makes them more
8
efficient (Krueger, 1998). 7 Then, in the long run the acceleration of technical progress and
the trend of investment will rise by means of competition. It is argued that the forces of
competition help to establish a link between international trade and productivity. Trade
liberalisation fosters competition, through the arrival of imports, which may stimulate
producers to achieve greater technical efficiency; and, as open trade regimes force greater
reliance on the market, the scope for rent-seeking for import licenses and corruption
diminish (Krueger, 1998). In other words, this pro-competitive effect of international
trade is one reason why trade liberalisation may raise rates of productivity growth and
increase incentives to innovate (Aghion and Howit, 1998). Technological progress
promotes investment and more competitive exports. 8 Then, aggregate supply expands
more rapidly. Graphically, these improvements are illustrated by an outward shift in the
production possibility frontier by augmenting the availability of resources for production
through increasing the productivity of resources and increasing their quantity.
1.3 Measures of Trade Liberalisation
Overall, countries are considered to be liberalised if their trade policies do not control, by
any means, exports, imports or the exchange rate. By definition, a trade system with no
government interference would be neutral. Some of the most common measures of trade
liberalisation used are: the average import tariff; an average index of non-trade barriers;
an index of effective protection; an index of relative price distortions or exchange
7 Krugman (1987) stresses "[t]tle view that free trade is the best of all possible policies is part of the general
case for laissez-faire in a market economy, and rests on the position that markets are efficient" (p.134).
However, he concludes his defence of free trade as follows: "This is not the old argument that free trade is
optimal because markets are efficient. Instead, it is a sadder but wiser argument for free trade as a rule of
thumb in a world whose politics are as imperfect as its markets" (p.143).
8 Trade liberalisation makes exports more competitive mainly by reducing export duties and other trade
distortions. The neo-classical supply-side model argues that export growth generates externalities and faster
productivity growth, because the export sector is more productive than the non-export sector (see Bernard
and Jensen, 1999).
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rate misalignment; the share of trade subject to non-tariff barriers, export and import
duties, and the average black market exchange rate premium.
Some researchers and organizations have elaborated their own measures of liberalisation
with the intention of having a more accurate measure of trade openness and to overcome
the drawbacks of preceding measures. We mention below some of the most frequently
used trade liberalisation indicators.
The World Bank's 1987 World Development Report broadly defined trade policies as
outward oriented and inward oriented. The former policy provides neutral incentives
between production for the domestic market and the foreign market. Regarding the latter
strategy, by contrast, incentives are biased in favour of domestic production and against
foreign trade. According to these trade policy definitions, the World Bank classified a
group of forty-one developing countries into four categories in the periods 1963-1973 and
1973-1985. The four categories are: 1) strongly inward oriented countries, where the
incentive structures strongly favour production for the domestic market and discriminate
strongly against imports; 2) moderately inward oriented countries, where the overall
incentive structure favours production for the domestic market; 3) moderately outward
oriented countries, where the overall incentive structure is biased towards production for
domestic rather than foreign markets; and, 4) strongly outward oriented countries, where
there are few trade or foreign exchange controls, there is little or no use of direct controls
and the exchange rate is maintained so that the effective exchange rates for imports and
exports are similar. The main conclusion of the World Bank study was that "the evidence
suggests that economic performance of the outward-oriented economies has been broadly
superior to that of inward-oriented economies in all aspects" (p.85).
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Learner's (1988) departing point to determine the degree of trade openness is the trade
intensity ratio (exports plus imports over GNP). He constructs two sets of trade policy
indicators. First, he uses two openness measures, which account for the effects of trade
restrictions: 1) the ratio of actual to predicted trade, and 2) an adjusted trade intensity
ratio, which is the actual trade intensity ratio minus the trade intensity ratio predicted,
—Learner argues that "the adjusted trade intensity ratio is analogous to a measure of
welfare loss indicating the percentage of GNP lost as a result of trade barriers" (p.164).
Thus, the adjusted trade intensity ratio is an indicator of the level of trade barriers.
Second, he proposes trade intervention rates, which measures the extent to which trade is
distorted by policy. Learner also proposes openness measures using a factor-analytic
model, but then he severely criticises the approach by saying that it is "fundamentally
flawed". Alternatively, Learner estimates a model to predict net exports for each product
(using a 1982 three-digit SITC data) for each country (53 countries), which depends on
factor endowments (land, labour, capital, coal, minerals and oil), distance and trade
balance. The estimates based on the model indicate that if the actual trade of a country is
less than what the model predicts, then it has a higher than average level of protection; on
the contrary, a country that trades more has a lower than average protection of trade.
In 1991, Michaely et al. (1991) constructed an index of trade liberalisation. Researchers
involved in such study assigned a value of one (indicating the highest possible degree of
intervention) and a value of twenty (representing that trade policy was completely
liberalised). The criteria used by the authors to determine the value of the index were
based on quantitative data (e.g. nominal and effective rates of protection) or qualitative
information (e.g. a declarative act such as the signing of an agreement with another
country). The authors mention that the index of liberalisation shows strengthening or
weakening of the movement to or from liberalisation.
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Since 1995, the Heritage Foundation has constructed an Index of Economic Freedom
(0' Driscoll et al., 2003). This index uses institutional factors, including information on
trade policy, to classify countries into five categories according to the degree to which
trade is distorted. A trade policy score of 1 to 5 is given to countries based on their
average tariff rate, the extent of non-tariff barriers, and the degree of corruption in the
customs service. Based on this trade policy grading scale, five levels of protection are
determined: very high, high, moderate, low, and very low.
Sachs and Warner (1995) classify countries as open or closed depending on five criteria:
1) an average tariff rate higher than 40 per cent; 2) non-tariff barriers covering more than
40 per cent of imports; 3) a socialist economic system; 4) a state monopoly of major
exports; and, 5) a black market exchange rate that has depreciated on average by 20 per
cent or more relative to the official exchange rate. A country is considered as closed if any
one of the conditions is satisfied; on the contrary, if none of the conditions is satisfied the
economy is regarded as open.
It is important to mention that most of the empirical studies that examine the effects of
trade liberalisation focus on the construction of trade liberalisation indicators, but, as
discussed by many other studies (see Harrison and Hanson, 1999; Rodriguez and Rodrik,
2000), those indicators are surprisingly fragile and questionable.
In order to avoid any inconsistency or inaccuracy in the elaboration of trade liberalisation
indices, we are going to use the ratio of import and export duties to total imports and
exports, respectively; and shift and slope dummies to encompass all the modifications in
trade controls.
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1.4 Empirical Work on Trade Liberalisation and Economic
Performance
Over the last thirty years or so, there has been a substantial amount of research attempting
to measure the costs of protection and the benefits of more liberalised trade regimes.
There are two broad groups of studies. Within the first group, there are large multi-
country studies that thoroughly examine the process of trade policy reform in individual
countries (e.g. Little et al., 1970; Balassa, 1971; Krueger, 1978; Bhagwati, 1978;
Michaely et al., 1991).
In the early 1970s, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) sponsored a series of country studies on industrialisation and trade in seven
developing countries (Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines and
Taiwan). This study9 provides estimates of effective rates of protection m and showed the
extent to which import substitution failed to achieve many of the objectives set for it. It
argued that industry should be promoted rather than protected, and intervention should be
made as close as possible to the point of a distortion, rather than by the general use of
trade restrictions. Another study by the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, coordinated by Balassa et al. (1971), involved comprehensive calculations
of effective rates of protection in another group of countries (Brazil, Chile, Norway,
Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines and West Malaysia). A further study by the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) on exchange control, liberalisation, and economic
development, organised by Bhagwati (1978) and Krueger (1978), included ten country
studies (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Ghana, India, Israel, the Philippines, South
Korea, and Turkey). Each country was analysed through five phases of trade and
9 See Little et al. (1970).
10 The effective rate of protection is the protection of value-added, see in detail in next section.
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payments regimes, in order to trace one type of regime to another. The phases went from
heavy reliance on quantitative restrictions to exclusive use of price interventions. The
World Bank's Latin American and Caribbean Region project, directed by Michaely et al.
(1991), also examined the liberalising trade experience in sixteen countries (Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, the
Philippines, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia). The authors
claimed that the attributes of trade liberalisation are export promoting policies and a
depreciation of the real exchange rate.
Overall, these studies stressed the negative or weak effects of import substitution policies.
Although the benefits from trade liberalisation vary across countries, the authors remark
on the following: industry is provided with new export industries and wider markets;
industries' efficiency increases; exports' structure changes; investment is more
productive; etc.
Within the second group of studies, there are econometric studies using time series
analysis, cross-section analysis, or panel data (using time and cross-country data) that
look at the relationship between trade liberalisation and exports; and, between trade
liberalisation and economic growth.
Empirical evidence on the relationship between trade liberalisation and export growth
gives consistent results. For example, Bleaney (1999) shows improvement in export
performance for ten Latin American countries after they embarked on liberalisation
programmes; and, Ahmed (2002) shows it for Bangladesh. Santos-Paulino (2002a)
applies panel data techniques to estimate an export growth equation for a sample of 22
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developing countries over the period 1972-1997, and shows that trade liberalisation has
increased export growth by between one and two percentage points.
Regarding the empirical evidence on the relationship between trade liberalisation and
economic growth, Edwards (1992) tested the hypothesis that more open economies tend
to grow faster, using a sample of thirty developing countries in the period 1970-1982. He
estimated a conventional growth equation, where the independent variables are countries'
investment ratio, initial level of per capita income (as a proxy for technological
backwardness) and a measure of trade distortion —Learner's (1988) trade openness
indicators. Alternatively, he uses nine proxies for trade intervention and openness. All
except one of the trade distortion indicators have a negative effect on growth
performance. With these results, Edwards suggests that economies with more open and
less distorted commercial policies have tended to grow faster than those with more
restrictive trade policies.
Edwards (1998) also investigates the relationship between total factor productivity growth
and trade liberalisation. He estimates total factor productivity growth separately on nine
indicators of openness —1) the Sachs-Warner openness index; 2) the World Bank's 1987
trade classification; 3) Learner's (1988) openness index; 4) the average black market
exchange rate premium; 5) the average import tariff; 6) the average coverage of non-tariff
barriers; 7) the Heritage Foundation index; 8) the ratio of total revenue from trade taxes to
total trade; and 9) Wolf's (1993) regression-based index of import distortions in 1985—
for 93 developed and developing countries over the period 1960-1990. In the vast
majority of cases the estimated coefficient of the openness indicator has the expected sign
and it is significant. Edwards concludes his study by arguing that "these results are quite
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remarkable, suggesting with tremendous consistency that there is a significantly positive
relationship between openness and productivity growth" (p. 391).
Dollar (1992) also deals with the issue of whether outward oriented countries grow more
rapidly. He considers a sample of 95 developing economies over the period 1976-1985,
and uses two real exchange rate indices, as measures of trade orientation: first an index of
real exchange rate distortion and second an index of real exchange rate variability. The
assumption is that misalignment of the real exchange rate is measured relative to the price
level that corresponds to a country's particular resource endowment, which is indicative
of the extent to which incentives are geared to the home or foreign market. His main
finding is that the distortion in the real exchange rate is negatively related to the per capita
GDP growth, after controlling for differences in the level of investment and exchange rate
variability.
In another comprehensive study, Sachs and Warner (1995) investigate the relationship
between trade orientation and growth for 75 countries over the period 1970-1989. Using
the five criteria that they proposed, mentioned earlier, they give a zero value for closed
economies and a value of one for open economies. They find a strong association between
openness and growth in both groups of countries, developing and developed. Within the
group of open economies, however, the developing countries grew on average by 2.2
percentage points faster than the developed countries.
These studies, however, are not without their critics. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000)
judiciously analyse the most relevant empirical studies, published during the 1990s,
dealing with the relationship between trade liberalisation and GDP growth. The survey
covered studies that use different trade liberalisation indicators but obtain not dissimilar
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results (Dollar, 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1995; Edwards, 1998; Ben-David 1993; Frankel
and Romer, 1999). Rodriguez and Rodrik are sceptical about the results derived from the
studies they analyse, because either they arise from misspecification or from ambiguous
trade liberalisation indicators. On the other hand, Rodriguez and Rodrik argue that there is
"no credible evidence that suggests that trade restrictions are systematically associated
with higher growth rates" (p. 317). They suspect rather that the relationship between trade
liberalisation and growth depends on countries' characteristics and other external
circumstances. Furthermore, the authors warn about the tendency to overstate the
evidence in favour of trade liberalisation, where great expectations of the effect of trade
openness on economic growth are unlikely to be met.
In order to overcome some of Rodriguez and Rodrik's criticisms, Wacziarg (2001)
evaluates the channels through which openness may raise growth, and establishes the
links between these channels and the degree of openness. Wacziarg proposes the
following six channels: 1) a more efficient allocation of resources (measured by the black
market exchange rate premium); 2) capital accumulation; 3) knowledge spillovers
(measured by the ratio of manufactured exports to total merchandise exports); 4) foreign
direct investment (as a proportion of GDP); 5) government policy (measured by an index
that gives equal weight to public debt as a share of GDP, government deficit as a share of
GDP, and growth of M2 in relation to total real output growth); and, 6) the size of
government (measured by the share of public consumption to GDP). In a cross-country
context, taking 57 countries with data averaged over four periods 1970-1974, 1975-1979,
1980-1984, and 1985-1989, the author estimated different specifications for the channel
equations. The most important channel is capital accumulation, which accounts for
approximately 63 per cent of the total effect of trade policy on economic growth.
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There is further evidence that trade liberalisation impacts on growth favourably, but only
with a lag. Greenaway et al. (2002) show that there is a "J curve" type effect, where
growth initially deteriorates but subsequently recovers and then improves.
It is worth mentioning that some of the euphoria over promoting trade liberalisation as a
catalyst to accelerate economic performance has been based on the experience of East
Asian NICs (e.g. Krueger, 1998). However, other economists have analysed the
circumstances under which these countries propelled their economic growth, and
interestingly, the examination shows that the East Asian NICs did not always apply the
extensive liberalisation policies recommended by the Bretton Wood institutions to
developing countries (see Singh, 1990 and Thirlwall, 2003b).
Only a few studies have focused on the effects of trade liberalisation on imports and the
balance of payments. A recent paper by Santos-Paulino (2002b) examines the impact of
trade liberalisation on import growth for a selected group of 22 developing countries.
Using panel data and time series/cross- section techniques, it is found that trade
liberalisation has more than doubled import growth on average across all countries.
Regarding the impact of trade liberalisation on the balance of payments, Michaely et al.
(1991) argue that "[t]he impact effect of liberalization on the balance of payments appears
commonly to be favourable" (p.140). However, recent and up-dated cross-section/panel
studies in this field (e.g. UNCTAD, 1999; Parikh, 2002; and, Santos-Paulino and
Thirlwall, 2002) find that trade liberalisation deteriorates the balance of trade and the
balance of payments, controlling for other factors. In this respect, trade liberalisation can
cause 'negative' effects, which adversely affect countries' economic development.
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis has seven chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the trade liberalisation process in
Mexico, within the context of the macroeconomic reforms of the 1980s. It divides the
macroeconomic context into four phases: 1) Oil Export Boom; 2) Macroeconomic Phase
I: Diversifying Non-Oil Exports; 3) Macroeconomic Phase II: Modernising the Country;
and, 4) Towards Free Trade Agreements.
Chapter 3 analyses the effects of trade liberalisation on export growth, at the aggregate
and disaggregated level —considering three different classifications: classification 1 is
related to Farming, Extractive and Manufacturing sectors; classification 2 refers to
Consumer goods and Capital goods; and, classification 3 deals with the nine
manufacturing sub-sectors: Food Products, Beverages and Tobacco; Textiles and Leather
Products; Wood Products; Paper Products, Publishing and Printing; Chemicals, Rubber
and Plastic Products; Non-Metallic Mineral Products; Basic Metals; Machinery and
Equipment; and, Other Manufactures. For this purpose a standard export growth equation,
in which price competitiveness and world income are assumed as the basic determinants,
is extended with the inclusion of two shift dummies as trade liberalisation indicators: one
for the mid-1980s reforms; the other for NAFTA. The examination of the performance of
exports is supported with descriptive analysis and several econometric techniques.
Chapter 4 analyses first the structure of imports before and after trade reforms, and then
investigates the impact of trade liberalisation on import growth at different levels of
aggregation. The chapter follows a similar structure to chapter 3. In this case, besides
including shift dummies, import duties are considered to account for changes in import
controls. Other studies have investigated the effects of trade liberalisation on import
growth, but they have neglected to analyse in detail the effects of NAFTA.
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The aim of Chapter 5 is twofold. First, it examines the effects of trade liberalisation on the
trade balance and the current account of the balance of payments. The main target is to
evaluate whether these trade accounts have improved or deteriorated as a result of
liberalisation. Traditionally, orthodox theory neglects the impact of trade liberalisation on
the balance of payments and the negative effects this might have on growth if the trade
balance deteriorates. This is the first study that investigates this issue for Mexico. Second,
it investigates the relationship between trade liberalisation and economic growth through
a balance-of-payments-constrained growth model.
Besides trade liberalisation, Mexico has experienced financial liberalisation. The law
relating to foreign direct investment (FDI) has experienced marked changes. Chapter 6
examines the relationship between the liberalisation of FDI inflows, exports and imports.
It explores causal links between FDI and exports, and FDI and imports. The former
relationship has been investigated by others (Alguacil et al., 2002), but there are no
studies referring to the latter.
Finally, Chapter 7 recapitulates the results of previous chapters, and gives the general
conclusions of the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Mexico's Growth and Trade
2.1 Introduction
During the mid-1980s Mexico applied trade reforms as a central lever of the free-market
strategy in combination with structural adjustment policies imposed by the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other multilateral institutions (Edwards, 1993; Skott
and Larudee, 1998). As a consequence of the high internal and external debt in 1982 and
the crisis in the international oil market, the country was largely excluded from
international financial markets. It accepted almost any conditions from the international
institutions in order to obtain financial assistance. The new development strategy involved
diverse actions: the budget deficit was cut dramatically; price controls and subsidies were
removed; the size of the public sector was greatly reduced through wide-ranging
privatisation; foreign investment was encouraged by legislative reforms; and monetary
conservatism was combined with prices and income policies to control inflation. In fact,
during 1985 the main trade reforms started and trade liberalisation' was institutionalised.
The macroeconomic reforms orientated the country to depend heavily on the international
market. Trade and financial liberalisation constituted the substantial reforms that
accelerated the economic change in the country. The participation of the public sector in
the economy changed drastically, public expenditure as a share of GDP fell and the
participation of the state in the economy was reduced. Then, the participation of the
I Cf Weiss (1992a), Krueger (1998) and Greenaway et al. (1998) for different concepts of trade
liberalisation.
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private sector gained prominence in the economy. Privatisation and deregulation were
oriented towards increasing the role of competition in the economy.
In general, the Mexican trade structure has been modified since the 1980s. There has been
a marked shift between oil and non-oil exports (see Szekely, 1989). Specifically, after
1986 manufactures rather than oil became the main proportion of total exports. The bulk
of exports is no longer oil. The proportion of oil in merchandise exports fell from 60 per
cent in 1985 to 32 per cent in 1986; in 2000 the share of oil exports in merchandise
exports was 10 per cent. However, oil imports have not significantly changed during this
period (1980-2000) as a percentage of total merchandise imports (see Table 2.1).
Table 2.1
Oil Exports and Oil Imports
(% of merchandise exports or imports)
Year Exports Imports Year Exports Imports
1980 67 2 1991 29 4
1981 72 2 1992 18 3
1982 77 3 1993 14 2
1983 64 2 1994 12 2
1984 62 3 1995 10 2
1985 60 4 1996 12 2
1986 32 3 1997 10 3
1987 42 4 1998 6 2
1988 32 3 1999 7 2
1989 34 4 2000 10 3
1990 38 4
Source: World Development Indicators (2002).
Despite the changes in trade policy, which influenced changes in the trade structure and
accelerated export growth led by the manufacturing sector, legitimate doubts remain
concerning the overall impact of the liberalisation strategy on the trade sector. At the
same time, GDP growth has been unstable, and has been lower on average since 1985.
The average GDP growth rate during the 1970s was 6.4 per cent, for the 1980s it was 3.1
per cent and for the 1990s it registered 2.9 per cent. Since the trade reforms of the mid-
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1980s took place, the economy's growth record has been relatively poor (see Table 2.2).
The average GDP growth rate pre-1985 was 5.4 per cent and post-1985 it was 2.9 per
cent.
Table 2.2
The Growth of GDP, Exports and Imports (%)
Year GDP Exports Imports
1970 6.50 4.28 7.68
1971 3.76 2.85 -4.29
1972 8.23 13.94 15.44
1973 7.86 10.91 20.79
1974 5.78 -0.22 17.82
1975 5.74 2.27 -3.91
1976 4.42 7.28 -6.06
1977 3.39 18.22 -18.26
1978 8.96 22.76 22.01
1979 9.70 18.70 29.45
1980 9.23 22.20 37.18
1981 8.77 11.37 17.72
1982 -0.63 22.55 -37.85
1983 -4.20 14.23 -33.79
1984 3.61 5.75 17.81
1985 2.59 -4.46 10.98
1986 -3.75 4.49 -7.58
1987 1.86 9.49 5.15
1988 1.25 5.76 36.71
1989 4.20 5.66 17.97
1990 5.07 5.31 19.74
1991 4.22 5.07 15.18
1992 3.63 4.98 19.62
1993 1.95 8.09 1.86
1994 4.42 17.80 21.25
1995 -6.17 30.19 -15.04
1996 5.15 18.23 22.88
1997 6.77 10.72 22.75
1998 5.03 12.10 16.56
1999 3.75 12.42 13.80
2000 6.86 15.96 21.37
Source: World Development Indicators, (2002).
The purpose of this chapter is to present an overview of Mexico's growth and trade
performance. A useful way to examine this is to distinguish four periods of analysis.
Therefore, the remaining sections of this chapter are organised as follows. Section two
describes the evolution of economic activity during the phase recognised as oil export
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boom (1976-82). Section three deals with the analysis of the economy during the first part
of the macroeconomic reforms (1983-87), when non-oil exports started to be promoted.
The description of the 1985-86 trade reforms is presented in this section. Section four
outlines the main characteristics of the economy when it experienced a second phase of
macroeconomic reforms (1988-93). Section five examines the economic development for
the six year period (1994-2000) in which Mexico signed several free trade agreements
(FTAs) including NAFTA. Finally, section six draws conclusions from the earlier
sections.
2.2 Oil Export Boom
Economic development in Mexico during the 1950s to 1970s is conventionally referred to
as the import substitution phase (Balassa, 1983; Cardenas, 1996; Lustig, 1992; Skott and
Larudee, 1998), since the internal market provided the main demand for most sectors and
various policy interventions restricted the access to imports. Three main forms of trade
controls were applied: import tariffs, licensing restrictions, and official reference prices.
From 1955 up to the 1970s, these operated with a fixed nominal exchange rate that was
devalued twice during the period, once in 1976 by 25 per cent and again in 1977 by 47 per
cent. However, Mexico was far from being a closed economy, and the effect of the
various trade controls was less protectionist than in a number of other economies that
have been characterised as pursuing import-substitution policies (Weiss, 1992b).
Import licensing was extended in 1957 and the proportion of imported goods subject to
licensing rose steadily, chiefly in response to balance-of-payments difficulties. During
that year, 17.7 per cent of total imports were subject to licences; this rose to 53.8 per cent
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in 1961, reaching 90.4 per cent in 1976 and 100 per cent at the time of the 1982 debt crisis
(see Table 2.3).
Table 2.3
Imports as % of Total Imports Controlled by Licensing System
Year % Year % Year %
1956 17.7 1967 65.2 1978 76.3
1957 35.1 1968 64.4 1979 70.0
1958 42.5 1969 65.1 1980 60.0
1959 43.2 1970 68.3 1981 85.5
1960 37.8 1971 67.7 1982 100.0
1961 53.8 1972 66.3 1983 100.0
1962 52.5 1973 69.6 1984 83.5
1963 63.5 1974 82.0 1985 37.5
1964 65.5 1975 68.4 1986 30.9
1965 60.0 1976 90.4 1987 27.5
1966 62.0 1977 90.0 1988 19.7
Source: Weiss (1992b).
Exports were also subject to some minor taxes, and during this period received relatively
small subsidies through a system of preferential credit and some tax discounts on duties
paid on imported inputs (Balassa, 1983).
In order to have a better understanding of the evolution of trade policy before the 1985
liberalisation let us consider at the same time the macroeconomic context that Mexico's
economy was facing. Three main variables are highlighted through the analysis: the
exchange rate, the trade balance and the growth rate.
In the mid-1970s output growth generated an unsustainable deficit on the trade balance. In
1975, the deficit on the trade balance as a proportion of GDP was 2.7 per cent. In 1976,
the government announced a change in the exchange rate regime, ending 22 years of a
fixed nominal regime. The Mexican peso was devalued by 25 per cent in nominal terms.
This situation, plus the accumulation of huge central government deficit (20.2 per cent of
GDP), led the government to reach an agreement with the IMF in order to adjust the
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external sector. However, it proved to be unnecessary because Mexico became oil rich.
Despite the outstanding increase in oil exports, the balance of payments position had been
deteriorating; and, notwithstanding this deterioration, the international banking
community did not stop lending Mexico ever increasing amounts to finance the deficits.
Singh (1990) has highlighted that while the international bank loans to developing
countries increased by 76 per cent from 1978 to 1981, they rose by 146 per cent to
Mexico, already a large debtor in 1978.
At the end of 1979, President Jose Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) considered the idea of
joining the GATT. However, in March 1980 this idea was dismissed. This decision
marked the beginning of a period of renewed import restrictions. In 1981, the import
licensing system was applied to 85 per cent of imports (see Table 2.3). 2 President L6pez
Portillo was confident that as long as the oil continued to finance the government's
spending, there was no need to pursue the trade liberalisation agenda. Additionally, oil
reserves seemed endless and no one thought that oil prices would change so drastically.
The discovery of substantial oil reserves, and the subsequent increase in petroleum
exports, gave the country easy access to international private borrowing (Lustig, 1992;
Cardenas, 1996). 3 With the increase of petroleum exports, the ratio of the trade balance to
GDP changed from a deficit of 2.7 per cent in 1975 to a surplus of 0.1 per cent in 1977.
These improvements, and the potential for future increases in petroleum exports, allowed
2 The trade policy used the import licensing system to control trade balance deficits, which worked like a
valve to regulate foreign exchange reserves.
3 Mexican Oil Exports (Thousands of barrels per day)
Year Oil Exports Year Oil Exports Year Oil Exports Year Oil Exports
1976 94.4 1979 532.8 1982 1492.1 1985 1438.2
1977 202.0 1980 827.7 1983 1534.8 1986 1289.8
1978 365.0 1981 1098.0 1984 1525.6 1987 1345.4
Source: Szdkely (1989), from Table I.
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a partial relaxation of the trade controls (Balassa, 1983). 4 First, the proportion of imports
subject to licenses was reduced, falling from 90 per cent in 1977 to 60 per cent in 1980
(see Table 2.3). Second, it became easier to obtain licenses (Weiss, 1992b). These factors
were responsible for a significant growth in imports. For instance, in 1978 imports
registered an increase of 22.1 per cent, and in 1980 they increased by 37.1 per cent.
The oil export boom ended in 1981 when a combination of rising international interest
rates, declining international oil prices (which negatively affected the oil export
revenues), diminishing access to international credit and an appreciated real exchange rate
(that created new exchange rate difficulties), plunged the whole Mexican economy into a
major recession. The financial fragility of the economy caused a major capital flight.
Mexico could no longer service its debt commitments. In August 1982, it declared a
moratorium on its external debt. This year the overall budget deficit, as a proportion of
GDP, was five times higher than in 1978. From 1982 to 1987 real GDP decreased on
average by 1.3 per cent per year.
These events were followed by the introduction of major devaluations of the nominal
exchange rate combined with a crawling peg policy and strict exchange controls. The lack
of foreign exchange was met chiefly by the reintroduction of import controls rather than
by a reduction in domestic expenditure (Balassa 1983; Ten Kate, 1992; Weiss, 1992b).
Because the government wanted to generate large trade surpluses quickly so that it could
resume payments on its debt, restrictions on imports were tightened. In other words, it
meant the reversal of liberalisation measures. Licences were extended to cover 100 per
4 Balassa argues that these facts reflected the perception that import liberalisation was necessary in order to
reduce the existing bias against exports and raise levels of efficiency by exposing Mexican industry to
foreign competition.
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cent of imports (see Table 2.3). As a consequence, in 1982 imports fell by 37.8 per cent.
Meanwhile, exports rebounded by 22.5 per cent. 5 During 1982-84 nominal exchange rate
depreciation was substantially below domestic inflation, so that the real exchange rate
appreciated in 1984 (see Table 2.4). Thus, the dynamic behaviour of exports was
gradually lost; and, to keep domestic and export production going, imports were allowed
to grow again. To prevent further deterioration of the trade balance, 6 exchange rate
devaluation was accelerated in 1985, and continued until 1987, registering a large
devaluation of 32.1 per cent in real terms in 1986. The exchange rate was relied upon to
raise the export growth rate back to previous levels. The importance of the exchange rate
in this context is recognised.
Table 2.4
Mexican Nominal Exchange Rate and



































1970 0.06 0.012 100.0 1985	 3.16 0.25 49.7 180.6 -1.7
1971 0.06 0.012 0.0 106.4 6.4 1986	 5.90 0.61 144.0 238.7 32.1
1972 0.07 0.012 0.0 109.6 3.0 1987	 13.68 1.38 126.2 241.9 1.3
1973 0.07 0.012 0.0 116.1 5.9 1988	 29.30 2.27 64.5 193.5 -20.0
1974 0.09 0.012 0.0 129.0 11.1 1989	 35.16 2.46 8.4 180.6 -6.7
1975 0.11 0.012 0.0 141.9 10.0 1990	 44.53 2.81 14.2 174.1 -3.6
1976 0.13 0.015 25.0 183.8 29.5 1991	 54.62 3.02 7.5 158.0 -9.2
1977 0.16 0.022 46.7 141.9 -22.8 1992	 63.09 3.09 2.3 145.1 -8.2
1978 0.19 0.022 0.0 154.8 9.1 1993	 69.25 3.12 1.0 135.4 -6.7
1979 0.23 0.022 0.0 174.1 12.5 1994	 74.07 3.38 8.3 141.9 4.8
1980 0.29 0.023 4.5 132.2 -24.1 1995 100.00 6.42 89.9 206.4 45.5
1981 0.37 0.024 4.3 116.1 -12.2 1996 134.37 7.60 18.4 187.0 -9.4
1982 0.60 0.056 133.3 190.3 63.9 1997 162.09 7.92 4.2 164.5 -12.0
1983 1.21 0.120 114.3 209.6 10.1 1998	 187.91 9.14 15.4 167.7 1.9
1984 2.00 0.167 39.2 183.8 -12.3
Note: * Exchange Rate in pesos per US dollar, increments imply depreciation in the exchange rate.
Source: Own calculations based on data from World Development Indicators (2002).
5 Moreover, a relatively successful restructuring of foreign debt brought the balance of payments back under
control. Randall (1995) considers that as foreign funds were unavailable, this required the postponement of
the payment of interest and amortisation on the debt, so that there would be uncommitted foreign exchange
available.
6 In 1985, the export growth rate decreased 4.5 per cent, while the import growth rate increased 11 per cent.
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The year 1982 marked the end of the economic model based on oil exports. The
administration under President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado (1982-1988) undertook
drastic economic reforms. Besides the implementation of an orthodox stabilisation
program, structural reforms were applied to orientate the economy from a state-led
development and trade protectionist strategy to a private-led growth and trade openness
policy.
2.3 Macroeconomic Phase I: Diversifying Non-oil Exports
After the debt crisis, once it was recognised that the economy should not be mainly
dependent on one product oil- Mexico's economic growth model changed dramatically.
The new development strategy included diverse macroeconomic reforms. Besides the
austere management of monetary policy and the reduction in public expenditure, two new
strategies were followed in order to stabilise the economy: privatisation and deregulation
of public firms and the opening of the economy through trade and financial liberalisation.
The main objective, among others, was to accelerate economic growth. 7 This section
attempts to analyse the main factors that led the economy to embark upon trade
liberalisation.
2.3.1 Macroeconomic Reforms
In 1983, the De la Madrid administration launched an ambitious economic programme
Pro grama Inmediato de Reorientacion Economica (PIRE). The purpose was to stabilise
the macroeconomic indicators in order to recover from the debt crisis. Primarily, the
7 As Parik (2002) argues, a large number of developing countries, Mexico included, turned to economic
liberalisation as a result of different factors: it was a response to economic crisis, it stopped import
substitution strategy, and it was a response to the pressure from multilateral financial institutions to
liberalise their economies.
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intention was to amend public finances. Cutting public expenditure and increasing prices
of public goods and services reduced the budget deficit. Although this economic
programme was successful in turning the trade deficit into a surplus and, more modestly,
in lowering inflation and raising GDP, it collapsed in late 1985: fiscal discipline began to
falter, and the earthquake in Mexico City caused disruption and imposed significant cost.
Furthermore, international oil prices started on a steep decline that was to continue into
1986 and 1987. All this worsened the Mexican economy.
Considering the macroeconomic context, the 1985-88 period was one of falling output
and accelerating inflation. To face these circumstances, policy-makers followed
traditional policy strategies (reduction in the government deficit, a tight monetary policy -
private credit constrained substantially - to curb inflation and an undervalued currency to
restore balance-of-payments stability) in order to reach macroeconomic stabilisation. In
1987, the monetary authorities devalued the domestic currency by 126 per cent in nominal
terms. High inflation during the year caused a drastic decline in real interest rates and a
flow of financial resources into secondary markets (e.g. the Mexican Stock Market). This
rapid growth of investment in the stock market came to a sudden halt in October 1987
with the crash of the New York Stock Exchange. In this situation the application of the
orthodox program was not sufficient to stabilise the main macroeconomic indicators. In
December 1987, the government faced this situation through the implementation of an
heterodox approach, driven by the Pacto de Solidaridad EconOmica (PSE). 8 This
programme was a success in bringing down inflation in a short time. It was based on
austere fiscal policy, implicit and explicit indexation of wages to the price level and the
8 PSE was planned based on the experience of other stabilisation programmes for countries such as Brazil,
Argentina and Israel. For a detailed analysis of PSE, see for example Aspe (1992).
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use of a pre-announced rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. Additionally,
the privatisation of public firms was accelerated and the process of opening up Mexico to
foreign trade and investment was initiated.
As regards the deregulation and privatisation of public firms, in Mexico as in many other
developing countries, it was undertaken for a number of reasons including improving
economic efficiency, reducing the drain on government resources, raising revenues for the
government and to help pay off the foreign debt by raising foreign exchange through the
sale of public assets to foreign firms (Singh, 1999). However, it is recognised that rather
than efficiency reasons, the main motive for privatisation was to reduce budget deficits
which the international institutions demanded to provide financial assistance. It should be
mentioned that while in 1982 the State held 1,155 firms, by the mid-1990s that number
was reduced to 213, due to consolidation, privatisation or closing (see Table 2.5).
Table 2.5
Evolution of the Paraestatar Sector in Mexico, 1982- May 1993
Type of Firm 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Decentralised
Organisms 102 97 95 96 94 94 89 88 82 78 82 82
Majority
Government 744 700 703 629 528 437 252 229 147 120 100 99
Participation
Public Trust 231 199 173 147 108 83 71 62 51 43 35 32
Minority
Government 78 78 78 69 7 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Participation
TOTAL 1 155 1074 1049 941 737 617 412 379 280 241 217 213
Note: 'The state owned industries are called Industria Paraestatal.
Source: Rogozinski (1997).
For instance, almost all the manufacturing enterprises owned by the government, the
commercial banks, the airlines and the telephone service were sold to the private sector.
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The immediate benefit of the privatisation programme was its effect in improving the
public finances.
Meanwhile, trade liberalisation was re-initiated. During the second half of the 1980s,
Mexico's commitments towards trade liberalisation were formalised.
2.3.2 Trade Liberalisation Process
Beyond other macroeconomic reforms, Mexico's trade liberalisation, according to
mainstream economic theory, was necessary in order to increase the competitiveness of
domestic industry (Balassa, 1983; Ten Kate, 1992). The official arguments to justify trade
liberalisation were, among others, the poor growth performance, which was attributed to
inefficient productive structures resulting from protectionist policies, counterproductive
government participation and resistance to foreign investment. Following this underlying
postulate, reiterated by the Baker Plan at the annual meeting of the IMF and the World
Bank during October 1985 in Seoul, the Mexican government confirmed its promise to
liberalise trade:9
...policies should be adopted that attacked (sic) the real causes of poor
economic performance, which implied (sic) trade liberalisation,
privatisation of state companies and a more tolerant attitude toward
private foreign investments...
It was expected that the effects of those reforms were going to make the trade sector the
engine of growth.19
9 Taken from Ten Kate (1992).
10 Trade reforms gave a stimulus to the manufacturing trade sector (see chapters 3 and 4), but GDP growth
did not increase as expected.
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The programme of trade reforms introduced in Mexico in the period 1985-87 was one of
the most far-reaching of any developing economy, 1 " 2 In a relatively brief period, tariff
rates on most products were quickly reduced, referenc e prices were progressively
removed and non-tariff controls were drastically decreased or eliminated. I3 The first stage
of the import liberalisation programme was implemented in June 1985, when licenses
were eliminated on almost 3,600 tariff lines, which left only 908 under control (Ten Kate,
1992). Thus, imports controlled by the licensing system fell from 83.5 per cent in 1984 to
37.5 per cent in 1985. Additionally, it was envisaged that external competition would
contribute to controlling the rate of inflation. Therefore, the Mexican government decided
that the trade liberalisation already in process should be significantly speeded up (Aspe,
1993).
At a first glance, it is surprising that after trade liberalisation the rate of growth of imports
halted. However, there are explanations for this. Ten Kate and de Mateo (1989) explain
that there are two types of protection: trade barriers and exchange rate protection (there
could be a trade-off between them). They adjudge that the decrease in imports was due to
the devaluation immediately after the trade reforms. In other words, the initial impact of
these trade reforms on import-competing products was softened by a 32 per cent real
devaluation of the peso between 1985 and 1986. 14 A complementary explanation is based
II Weiss (1992b) suggests that it appears that a weakening in the performance of non-oil exports was a key
factor in convincing the administration of the need for trade liberalisation. However, the data show a
slowdown of exports of goods and services, which may be explained by the post 1982-debt crisis. Contrary
to Weiss's argument as already mentioned in this chapter, the impetus of trade liberalisation was part of the
structural adjustment programmes recommended by the IMF and WB (Edwards, 1993; Pastor, 1994; Skott
and Larudee, 1998).
12 Edwards (1997) argues that in countries like Colombia, Chile and Mexico, the local authorities were more
fervent believers in free trade than the World Bank staff.
13 As we already mentioned, accelerated trade liberalisation was based on the assumption that competition
from imports would put a ceiling on inflation for traded goods.
14 Ros (1994) also agrees with them, arguing that the high real exchange rate greatly softened the initial
shock of import liberalisation and contributed to policy sustainability in many ways.
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on the direct growth pattern that exists between the growth of GDP and imports. During
that period imports did not pick up, and even decreased, because there was still an
economic recession resulting from the debt crisis.
In 1985, Mexico and the US signed a bilateral agreement on subsidies and countervailing
duties. A reinforcing commitment of Mexico towards trade liberalisation was formalised
with Mexico's entry to GATT. In November the country started negotiating for admission
to GATT, and became a full member in July 1986. The country was committed to
eliminating official prices for most goods by the end of 1987. In the same year Mexico
and the US signed a framework agreement to set up principles and procedures for
resolving controversies on trade and investment. However, most of the reforms required
to enter GATT were already realised or even surpassed with the unilateral liberalisation
programme during 1985. It is important to note that from June to December 1985 the
coverage rate of import licensing fell from 92.2 per cent to 47.1 per cent, so that more
than half of domestic production was no longer protected by import licenses (see Table
2.6). 15 Therefore, Mexico's accession to GATT did not imply an intensification of its
liberalisation process, but rather it was considered a signal by policy makers of their
intention to carry on the trade liberalisation policy (Ten Kate, 1992). An alternative
explanation of this fact is that policy makers launched trade reforms in advance in order to
have access to GATT without any restriction. Less dramatic reductions in import
licensing and tariff coverage of imports continued in subsequent years, so that in 1988
official prices were abolished entirely and in 1989 only 19.8 per cent of imports were
protected by the licensing system and 12.5 per cent by tariff coverage.
15 During the same period the tariff average increased from 23.5 per cent to 28.5 per cent (this reflects the
tariff compensation for license elimination), while the coverage of official prices increased from 18.7 per
cent to 25.4 per cent.
Domestic production value covered by
import licensing
Production-weighted tariff averages
Domestic production value covered by
official import prices
Source: Ten Kate, 1992.
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Table 2.6
Quantitative Indicators of the Mexican
Import Regime during the 1980s (%) 
1985	 1985	 1986	 1987	 1988	 1989
June December December December December December
92.2 47.1 39.8 25.4 21.3 19.8
23.5 28.5 24.5 11.8 10.2 12.5
18.7 25.4 18.7 0.6 0.0 0.0
2.4 Macroeconomic Phase II: "Modernising the Country"
The main target during the Carlos Salinas de Gortari administration (1988-1994) was to
stabilise the macroeconomic performance and to control inflation. Once the country was
subject to the competitive international market and the main economic indicators were not
improving as expected, trade and investment reforms were reinforced.I6
The government focused on fine-tuning the trade liberalisation process. The emphasis was
on reducing the dispersion in tariff rates with the objective of producing a broadly
uniform system of effective protection. Commerce Ministry decrees, in January and
March 1989, raised tariffs for those commodities subject to only 5 per cent tariff rates and
gave positive rates to many goods previously exempt which were registering an import
surge. The reduction of the rest of the import licensing and tariffs were negotiated in the
North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), an issue that is going to be considered
in the next section. In October 1989, a new framework agreement between Mexico and
the US was signed to start global conversations to facilitate trade and investment.
16 According to FitzGerald (1999), NAFTA is about the promotion of inter-sectoral specialisation.
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At this point, an important complement to the deregulation process was the
implementation of trade facilitation programmes, specifically for export industries. The
main instrument in this area is COMPEX (ComisiOn Mixta para la PromociOn de
Exportaciones), a mechanism designed to address particular problems that exporters face
(e.g. bureaucratic inefficiencies) in attempting to sell their goods abroad.
In addition to the COMPEX mechanism there are two specific programmes for the
promotion of exporting industries, known as ALTEX (Empresas Altamente
Exportadoras) and PITEX (Programa de ImportaciOn Temporal para producir articulos
de ExportaciOn). The ALTEX programme recognises the contribution of firms with high
levels of exports, and gives them special administrative, fiscal and financial treatment.
The PITEX programme includes duty drawbacks for firms that have a high level of
imported inputs embodied in exports.17
One major criticism of the export promotion programme, however, is that it has only
supported part of the manufacturing sector, specifically the maquiladora sector. 18 This
sector purchases material inputs in the world market (US), transforming them with
domestic labour into intermediate or final products, and selling the output in the world
market (US). Although the manufacturing sector trade imbalances have been smoothed by
the surpluses on the maquila sector (see Table 2.7), it does not offer substantial net
exports. During 1980-98, total exports grew at an average annual rate of 10.9 per cent,
whereas maquila exports grew at an average annual rate of 18.4 per cent. Consequently,
17 See Mattar (1998) and Ten Kate et al. (2000) for a detailed analysis of export promotion policies.
18 The maquiladora programme consists of special tariff preferences; raw materials can be imported in-bond
duty free, manufactured in the maquiladora base, and then re-exported while paying duty only on the value
added in Mexico.
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maquila exports as a percentage of total exports rose from 14 per cent in 1980 to 45 per
cent in 1998. Also, maquila imports report an average annual growth rate of 19.4 per cent
against a 9.8 per cent growth rate of total imports. The share of maquila imports in total
imports grew from 8.3 per cent in 1980 to 34.5 per cent in 1998.19
Table 2.7
Mexico's Maquila Trade






















1980 2,519,163 14.0 1,747,481 8.3 -3,058,321 771,682
1981 3,205,286 13.8 27.2 2,229,026 8.2 27.6 -3,876,890 976,260
1982 2,825,539 11.7 -11.8 1,974,253 11.6 -11.4 7,044,579 851,286
1983 3,641,094 14.0 28.9 2,822,712 23.8 43.0 14,104,857 818,382
1984 4,904,318 16.9 34.7 3,748,973 23.6 32.8 13,184,153 1,155,345
1985 5,093,498 19.0 3.9 3,826,028 20.8 2.1 8,398,196 1,267,470
1986 5,645,889 25.9 10.8 4,351,347 25.9 13.7 5,019,703 1,294,542
1987 7,105,028 25.7 25.8 5,506,971 29.3 26.6 8,787,089 1,598,057
1988 10,145,670 33.1 42.8 7,808,255 27.8 41.8 2,609,529 2,337,415
1989 12,328,926 35.1 21.5 9,328,090 26.8 19.5 405,054 3,000,836
1990 13,872,504 34.1 12.5 10,321,352 24.8 10.6 -882,324 3,551,152
1991 15,833,065 37.1 14.1 11,782,443 23.6 14.2 -7,279,040 4,050,622
1992 18,680,054 40.4 18.0 13,936,719 22.4 18.3 -15,933,727 4,743,335
1993 21,853,025 42.1 17.0 16,442,963 25.2 18.0 -13,480,576 5,410,062
1994 26,269,246 43.1 20.2 20,466,167 25.8 24.5 -18,463,683 5,803,079
1995 31,103,273 39.1 18.4 26,178,808 36.1 27.9 7,088,485 4,924,465
1996 36,920,320 38.5 18.7 30,504,710 34.1 16.5 6,530,967 6,415,610
1997 45,165,628 40.9 22.3 36,332,102 33.1 19.1 623,590 8,833,526
1998 52,863,648 45.0 17.0 42,556,671 34.5 17.1 -5,742,180 10,306,977
Source: Buitelaar and Padilla (2000) and Banco de Mexico.
Another step towards free-market economic orientation was stimulated by the
liberalisation of Mexico's capital market. Particularly, the need to attract foreign direct
investment (FDI) forced Mexico to create an appropriate legislative context that would
allow the entry of foreign capital. In 1989, the Mexican government announced changes
19 Maquiladora firms benefited from the special tariffs treatment. However, as soon as NAFTA came into
effect those benefits began to be eliminated. The only advantage that Mexico still has is the low labour cost,
but there are other Latin American and Asian countries that compete in this area. Therefore, it is predictable
that niaquiladora firms in Mexico will reduce their output.
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in the Law on Foreign Investment, which consisted of the gradual elimination of some of
the restrictions on foreign investment particularly in the capital -and technological-
intensive industries. Table 2.8 shows the performance of foreign direct investment from
1970 to 2000. On average, it is clear that FDI increased more during the 1990s than
during the 1970s and 1980s. It seems that trade and financial liberalisation have attracted
more foreign capita1.2°
Table 2.8
Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows (% of GDP)
Year FDI Year FDI Year FDI
1970 0.91 1981 0.93 1992 1.21
1971 0.78 1982 0.84 1993 1.09
1972 0.67 1983 0.31 1994 2.59
1973 0.83 1984 0.22 1995 2.62
1974 0.94 1985 0.27 1996 2.60
1975 0.69 1986 1.18 1997 3.57
1976 0.71 1987 2.31 1998 2.60
1977 0.68 1988 1.42 1999 2.90
1978 0.80 1989 1.36 2000 3.10
1979 0.99 1990 1.00
1980 0.96 1991 1.51
Source: World Development Indicators (2002).
In the early 1990s, as negotiations with Chile took place to sign a Complementary
Economic Agreement (CEA), Mexico was also initiating negotiations with Canada and
the US on what would later be the NAFTA.
2.5 Towards Free Trade Agreements
NAFTA started on l st January 1994. It removed most of Mexico's remaining barriers to
trade and investment, either immediately upon its implementation or gradually thereafter
over a fifteen year peiiod. 21 Table 2.9 shows NAFTA's tariff elimination schedule. Goods
20 Particularly, the relationships between foreign direct investment, exports and imports are going to be
analysed in Chapter 6.
21 The full NAFTA text is available at <URL:http:// www.nafta-sec-alena.org/english/index.htm>.
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categorised in group A entered to Mexico duty free as soon as NAFTA took effect; goods
classified in group B entered duty free after 1 st January 1998; goods in category Cl are
duty free since 1 st January 2003; goods classified in group C2 will be duty free from 1st
January 2008; and, goods classified in group D were already duty free before NAFTA.
Two main points should be highlighted. First, the tariff elimination was to be a
progressive process, and around 85 per cent of total goods fall within categories A, B and
CL
Table 2.9
NAFTA's Tariff Elimination Schedule
Group A Duties on Goods of this category shall be eliminated entirely and such goods
shall be duty-free, effective 0 January 1994.
Group B Duties on Goods of this category shall be removed in 5 equal stages beginning
on 1" January 1994, and such goods shall be duty-free, effective 1" January
1998.
Group CI Duties on Goods of this category shall be removed in 10 equal stages
beginning on 1" January 1994, and such goods shall be duty-free, effective 1"
January 2003.
Group C2 Duties on Goods of this category shall be removed in 15 equal stages
beginning on 1" January 1994, and such goods shall be duty-free, effective 1'
January 2008.
Group D Goods shall continue to receive duty-free treatment.
Source: North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
The main function of NAFTA, among other objectives, was to embody the newly-
liberalised regime in a comprehensive international agreement in order to lock-in free
market policies against a future change of government in Mexico, (Skott and Larudee,
1998; FitzGerald, 1999). The argument of the trade sector as the engine of growth was
well promoted in order to achieve NAFTA implementation.
NAFTA involved trade liberalisation on the part of Mexico that went beyond that
achieved during the first phase of serious trade reforms in the mid-1980s. Remaining non-
tariff barriers, mainly those in agriculture and transportation equipment, were to be
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eliminated. Restrictions on foreign investment were to be eased further; most
significantly, US and Canada providers of financial services in Mexico were to be
accorded the same treatment as their Mexican counterparts (Kehoe, 1995). Dispute
resolution mechanisms were established, and, as part of side agreements negotiated after
NAFTA itself, tri-national commissions were established to deal with issues involving
labour rights and protection of the environment.
At the end of the first year of the implementation of NAFTA, notwithstanding the
improvement of some macroeconomic variables, economic activity was vulnerable to
international shocks related to capital flows (which were rapidly depleting the foreign
exchange reserves). Also, the trade balance registered a huge deficit of 4.8 per cent of
GDP. When a new government assumed power in December 1994 (President Zedillo's
administration, 1994-2000), an effort to undertake a 15 per cent devaluation triggered
further capital flight from the Mexican peso into US dollars. The government withdrew
from the foreign exchange market, and the peso depreciated substantially in real terms by
50 per cent (in nominal terms the depreciation reached 90 per cent). After several internal
and external events —political shocks and increases in the US interest rate— there was a
consequent massive decline in Mexican foreign-exchange reserves, which were
insufficient to defend the value of the peso. All this contributed to the devaluation of the
peso when the exchange rate was allowed to float freely on 22 December. In 1995, the
GDP fell by 6.1 per cent. The Mexican crisis was internationally recognised as a financial
crisis. 22
22 It was internationally recognised as the Tequila effect, due to the repercussions in the rest of the Latin
American countries. For a detailed analysis about Mexico's 1994-95 crisis, see, for example, Kregel (1998),
among others. Refer to FitzGerald (1999), Gould (1996), and Neely (1996) for an analysis of the links
between NAFTA and the '1994-95 Mexican peso-crisis'.
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In response to the severe exchange rate crisis, again an orthodox stabilisation package was
introduced, with the focus on cutting domestic absorption. Zedillo's administration
neither applied restrictive trade measures nor attempted renegotiations of NAFTA. The
recovery from the 1995 crisis was fast, in part due to the stabilisation programme and the
financial package engineered by the US Treasury, the IMF, and other multilateral
financial institutions. Indeed, in 1996 the GDP showed a positive rate of growth of 5.1 per
cent. However, these events did not contribute to modifying the structure of Mexico's
growth and development. The trade balance was registering deficits while the domestic
currency was appreciating instead of depreciating (as might have been expected). This
fact leads us to think that not only was there an exchange rate problem, but also some
structural weaknesses, which were probably accentuated with the opening of the
economy.
It can be taken for granted that the real appreciation that took place prior to 1994 and the
subsequent real depreciation affected incentives for both imports and exports.23
Mexico has been a WTO member since 1 January 1995. The binding trade and foreign
investment rules are contained in more than sixty agreements and decisions, which were
formulated as a result of the Uruguay Round 1986-1994 negotiations, signed in
Marrakesh in April 1994 (see Table Al in the Appendix).
Apart from NAFTA, Mexico has signed several other FTAs (see Figure 2.1). After
NAFTA, in 1995 Mexico agreed the G-3 Free Trade Agreement (Colombia, Mexico and
23 The Mexican government imposed a surcharge on all imports entering into Mexico, except those entering
under NAFTA. The tax was subsequently raised when the government encountered revenue losses from oil
when the oil price dropped in 1998 and early 1999 (Krueger, 2000).
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Venezuela), the FTA with Bolivia, and the FTA with Costa Rica. In 1998, Mexico signed
the FTA with Nicaragua; and one year later, in 1999, the CEA with Chile became a FTA.
During 2000, Mexico initiated Free Trade Agreements with Israel and the European
Union; negotiations ended with the so-called North Triangle, which includes El Salvador,
Guatemala and Honduras. The most recent agreement, which came into effect in 2001,
was signed with the European Association of Free Trade, composed of Iceland,
Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. 24 Besides those FTAs, Mexico has signed other
kinds of co-operation agreements relating to trade and investment with various countries
(including South Korea, Australia, New Zealand), and it is currently in talks with Japan.
Furthermore, it is a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), and
Mexico has participated actively in the organisation of the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA). All of Mexico's FTAs contain specific rules of origin. Non-
preferential rules of origin apply to anti-dumping and countervailing duties to prevent
circumvention of such duties. The procedures to apply these rules vary by product and
country of origin.
In spite of these trade agreements with different countries, the reliance of Mexico on trade
with the US became even more pronounced. Mexico's exports to the US have increased
from 64.7 per cent in 1980 to 73.1 per cent in 1990 and to 88.7 per cent in 2000;
meanwhile, imports have increased from 61.5 per cent in 1980 to 70.8 per cent in 1990
and to 73.1 per cent in 2000 (see Table 2.10).





























ON	 n0	 N	 0 000 en NO en r 0 cry
co 00 •-n r-	 r-- N N	 0 CT co r- r-- oo oo co nD.	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .
	  06000666
CT NO tin In cn Cs en en CI Cs In In ".1 n.0 oo	 0 CT 0 m N
CT CT 00 N In VD mt mt	 mt	 mtN VD CT N 00 0 CT 00
	  o 6 6 6 6
Er)
N	 oe) In 00	 N	 1-- Cs 00 In 00 In r--	 N	 V:S)





Ocnenmt NOCsmtencn sOM-r-CtsenCs-I In in .n1- "1- 0
OCNenONCn cor-rn •--I in VD C \ Cn 00 N tn tnVD tn r•-)
E—, ,- In mf: 4 4 •al: er, in k6 .16 4 4 4 en 4 en en cr; en en er, er)
g (S0 „ ,
Om 5 00	 vnkr)ON en	 s r- In cn mt 0 In 00 \ 0 .1- 00 •zr 00 Cr
d VD 4 c:,	
in
OTNO0r-r- -1 -. c:7 --n s.CD oo en. .--k q --,
ent Cst •-• cc) Csi Csi Csi CV cni cni cst .n.1 C4 	
 ON co
00In1 it
CO CT 0 0 r',1 CO N 0 n0 0 In 00 CT In 0 00 VD In cr 00
cd 0 CT Mr CT	 Ccl	 tr) kr) s	 kr) oo	 oo	 en a vD tin r-
c/ In	 mt	 mt In NO NO NO en In en mtInmt 	 mt en en en en
	
in mt 4 0 In VD •el- en	 en r-	 On oo N	 In On en 000
CO 00 00	 In 0 h. 00 CT CT	 Cl	 V:::> h 0	 0) 0'n N 00 0 Cc)
cd	 Csi CI CV	 Csi N 	  (NI	 Csi
Cg on VD VD cl CA 0000 on CD on r- CD In on CT mr CT et CD
V1 00 0 mt on VD 00 vD NO mt co CT cl cl co ken vi 00 mr.	-.
oc; 6 NIn4 4 00 en	 4 In 4 4 4 en.0 .0 In .0 v0 v0 .0 .0 ve N s r- ssss r- r-
00 In CT on 00 cs pi Fri Frl	 4
	
,7)	 4). G,	Q3	 In
N N in CT ^I
en en 4 en	 6 6 6	 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
000n00-0enNCTSCN000VD tr) 77I 0 •--1
ml ON	 oo	 vD kr) cio co ON kD	 vD NO mt. Crk CT 00 No: NO ON
Ctn 06 .6 s: In .6 .6	 si	 6 a 6 0 6 a
In oo	 In VD CA CA 0 0 CI 4 In inin InNen-ja	 In 00 so N ent----	 In	 en	 N
=00-, c;	 6 6 6 6 o 0 6 c; 6 6 6 c; c=3 6
In C'mr vD In on mt vD VD VD CA mt VD CA In In r- In 00 on on
stD CD oo	 CA en on vi ui vi	 cl	 00 VD VD NO VD CN 111 CT
	 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
C) a a en en a a	 ci oo	 4 a •71-	 en. N N — 0' C' e  C' C — en en 0 — - C' - — en'C '.0 —4 In. 	 k, co .0 v6 oo oo o	 en en 00 NO mt en en N N
.2 en 4 4 ri cn	 csi	 ci ci	 6 6 6
,j ,-, r-NOCNNOenNNON/D--,t-- 	 CA In cA r- cA In on Cn VD
cy on CT 00 mt VD r- CT In 'I on CA C.: en VD
at 4 In vi	 .6 .6 in	
r-	 In
	 000
7:3 In	 mt CD en CO CT Cq CI 00 ol r- VD oo -IC' vD In CT tin
1"-- 0 0	 •-n "I-	 cDN	 N cr. Cl h
Fat 6 en	 	  N Cnt Cst csi N cst Cst	 cst
mtr-	 'nIn r- en N	 N	 N r- 'I' 0 N r- N
c3
k-k	 CN	 n.0 VD 0	 M	 kr) 0 .CS.	 csi
4 in .6 In s: 0	 4 6 en	 —n en In cei •;f : In s: 0000
VD In In In In vD vD VD VD I-- r-- C.- 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
CD 4 N on mt In VD N 00 CT 0	 Cq on mr In VD r- 00 CT CD
oo oo oo oo 00 oo 00 oo oo oo CT CT CT CT on cT cn cs CT CT CD





Since the negotiations of NAFTA, the trade volume of Mexico has risen markedly. For
instance, in 1992 the exports/GDP share was 14.4 per cent, which doubled by 1998,
reaching 29.3 per cent. At the same time, import penetration rose from 20.8 per cent to 32
per cent. In addition to the increase in trade volume, trade structure was changing, but the
interpretation of the change was misunderstood by policy makers. The Salinas
administration argued that the Mexican current account deficit was a natural condition for
a developing country that required imports of capital goods to restructure its
manufacturing sector. This was not the case for Mexico's trade at that moment. Although
the largest component of merchandise imports from 1987 to 1994 was intermediate goods,
which were necessary to support the export performance of the Mexican economy, the
fastest growing component of imports throughout the period was consumer goods, which
grew nearly at twice the rate of total imports (see Table 2.11).
Table 2.11
Structure of Merchandise Imports ( go of Total)
1987 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 Growth rate
1987-98
Consumer goods 4.08 12.26 12.46 11.98 7.44 8.86 32.33
Intermediary goods 81.94 71.42 68.94 71.23 80.35 77.32 18.20
Capital goods 13.98 16.32 18.60 16.78 12.20 13.82 19.58
Source: Banco de Mexico.
Table 2.12 shows the composition of Mexican exports. A continuous shift in the
participation of agriculture and mining exports towards manufacturing exports is
observed.
Table 2.12
Structure of Merchandise Exports (% of Total)
1987 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Petroleum 31.27 24.82 17.98 12.15 12.13 6.07
Non-Petroleum 68.73 75.18 82.02 87.85 87.86 93.92
Agriculture 5.59 5.31 4.57 4.40 3.74 3.23
Mining 2.09 1.52 0.77 0.59 0.46 0.39
Manufacturing 61.05 68.35 76.68 82.89 83.65 90.29
Source: Banco de Mexico.
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Another two aspects are important to emphasise. First, GDP growth and exports show
opposite growth patterns since the liberalisation of trade. Second, the growth of GDP and
imports show the same growth pattern. When GDP growth has moved upwards then
import growth has followed it, and vice versa. Then, the ratio of the trade balance to GDP
shows opposite movements in relation to the output growth rate.
In sum, the trade volume has been increasing, but GDP growth has not shown a rising
trend, because imports have expanded by more than exports (Ruiz-Napoles, 2001;
Sarmiento, 1999).
2.6 Conclusions
The Mexican economy has experienced significant changes over the last thirty years. The
economic development up to the 1970s came to a halt when the oil price in the
international market fell in 1982 and caused a debt crisis. Afterwards, the government
firmly decided to change the orientation of its economic growth strategy, from inward to
outward looking. It orientated the growth and development policies towards a free-market
strategy. The degree of state involvement has continued to decline in recent years.
Although Mexico embarked upon the process of economic liberalisation with its unilateral
deregulation of its import licensing system and then strengthened with its accession to the
GATT in 1986, the economy has not reached a higher stable long run rate of growth. The
results of the structural adjustment policies were insufficient to modify the inefficient
productive structure of the economy.
Great expectations and controversy surrounded the decision of the Mexican government
to sign a FTA with Canada and US. The negotiations preceding NAFTA were long and
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difficult, in part because of the uncertainty about the costs and benefits of such a far-
reaching agreement. Although, nowadays, Mexico is pointed out as one of the countries




The Uruguay Round Agreements
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
Agreement on Agriculture
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects on the Reform Programme
on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI (Anti-dumping)
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII ( Customs Valuation)
Agreement on Preshipment Inspection
Agreement on Rules of Origin
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Agreement on Safeguards
General Agreement on Trade in Services
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods
Source: World Trade Organisation (WTO, 1994e).
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Chapter 3
Impact of Trade Reforms on Exports
3.1. Introduction
During the last two decades Mexican exports have been growing relative to output. In
constant prices, exports of goods and services rose from around 10 per cent of GDP in 1980
to 44 per cent in 2000 (see Table 3.1). This performance propelled Mexico to occupy the 13th
position in the list of leading exporters in world merchandise trade in 2000 (WTO, 2001).
Over this period, Mexico has also experienced changes in its trade structure. For instance, the
major proportion of exports shifted from oil exports to non-oil exports.
Table 3.1
Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)
Year Exports Year Exports
1980 10.1 1991 18.0
1981 10.3 1992 18.3
1982 12.7 1993 19.4
1983 15.2 1994 21.5
1984 15.5 1995 30.4
1985 14.4 1996 34.2
1986 15.7 1997 35.4
1987 16.9 1998 37.8
1988 17.6 1999 41.0
1989 17.9 2000 44.5
1990 17.9
Source: World Development Indicators (2002).
Until 1985 the share of the value of oil exports in the total value of exports was not less than
50 per cent (see Table 3.2). From 1985 to 1986 the share of oil exports in total exports
decreased by 29.2 percentage points because in 1986 the price of oil collapsed (from 1980 to
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1986 the annual average oil price was $US 28 per barrel, in 1986 it dropped to $US 12),
which contracted the value of Mexican oil exports.
Table 3.2
Value of Oil Exports
(% of Total Exports)
Year Oil Exports Year Oil Exports
1980 67.3 1991 19.1
1981 72.5 1992 18.0
1982 77.6 1993 14.3
1983 71.8 1994 12.2
1984 68.6 1995 10.6
1985 68.2 1996 12.1
1986 39.0 1997 10.3
1987 41.1 1998 6.1
1988 32.7 1999 7.3
1989 34.5 2000 9.8
1990 37.6
Source: Own calculations base on data from Instituto Nacional de
Estadfstica, Geograffa e Informatica (INEGI).
Exports have always played a significant role in the economy, and particularly after the 1994
peso crisis. They counterbalanced the negative effects of decreasing domestic demand, and
they have provided foreign exchange to finance imports. However, the export sector also
indicates a major weakness of the Mexican economy, in the sense that it does not have strong
backward linkages with domestic industry, which explains a high demand of imports that are
required to produce exports. Also, exports are concentrated in a small group of firms and in
one major market, the US. It is estimated that 70 per cent of Mexican exports are produced by
less than 300 firms (Mattar, 1998), and around 3,130 firms (including maquiladoras i —in
bond industries) produce 93.3 per cent of exports (Dussel, 2000b). In 2000, the US was the
•	 •This industry purchases material inputs in the world market (US), transforming them with domestic labour into
final products, and selling the output in the world market (US). The maquiladora programme has special tariff
preferences; raw materials are imported duty free, manufactured in the nzaquiladora base, and then re-exported
while paying duty only on the value added in Mexico.
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market for over 85 per cent of Mexican exports (Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook,
2001).
During the mid-1980s Mexico initiated a process of serious trade liberalisation.2 In order to
understand the role played by trade liberalisation on Mexico's trade it is our concern to
answer the following questions: What effects have trade reforms had on exports? How much
of the export growth is explained as a result of trade liberalisation?
Previous work has been done on Mexico's export performance (e.g. Graf, 1996; Katz, 1996;
Ocegueda, 2000; Sotomayor, 1997). For instance, Graf (1996) analyses the manufacturing
export performance, focusing on twenty manufacturing sub-sectors, during the 1970-1994
period and one sub-period 1983-1994, applying the OLS method. After specifying an export
equation for each sub-sector —dependent on the real exchange rate, manufacturing
production index, labour productivity, unit labour costs, US imports, a shift dummy which
accounted for the effects of the debt crises, and two slope dummy variables to capture the
joint effects of the change in Mexico's economic orientation after the debt crises on price and
income elasticities—, Graf presents two sets of results. First, the real exchange was the only
variable significant in six sub-sectors and the coefficient of the dummy variable was
significant in five sub-sectors. Second, when the sub-period 1983-1994 was considered, Graf
classifies the sub-sectors into five categories according to the significance of the coefficients
of the variables. The main conclusion of the analysis is that the determinants of the rate of
growth of exports for each sub-sector are not the same.
2 See chapter 2, where an analysis of trade reforms is presented.
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Ocegueda (2000) estimates a non-oil export equation over the period 1960-1997, applying the
Engel and Granger method. He finds no long run relationship between the variables under
investigation in the non-oil export model (i.e. between the level of exports and the real
exchange and output of the US). Thus, he argues that this is evidence of a structural change in
the performance of non-oil exports. In order to test this hypothesis, the sample is divided into
sub-periods (1960-1982 and 1983-1997). Ocegueda considers 1982 as the turning point in
economic policy making. He finds that the income elasticity of demand for exports increases
from one period to the other (from 1.3 to 4.3). Sotomayor (1997) presents a table that
summarises price and income elasticity estimations of six different studies, specifying the
period of analysis and the econometric technique applied. These studies, however, do not
consider the period beyond 1993, and do not highlight the impact on exports of trade reforms
in the mid-1980s.
Regarding the analysis of the impact of NAFTA on Mexican exports, research has been
carried out by means of computable general equilibrium (CGE) models (i.e. Kehoe and
Kehoe, 1994) in order to assess the economic effects of NAFTA in Canada, Mexico and the
US. Such studies mostly anticipated large benefits for Mexico and less significant for Canada
and the US. They are focused on capturing changes in prices, output and welfare from
NAFTA. None of the existing literature analyses the impact of trade liberalisation on export
performance, which is what we are interested in doing in this chapter.
The precise aim of this chapter is twofold. First, we compare export composition by sector
and by manufacturing sub-sector before and after trade reforms. Second, we analyse the
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impact of trade reforms on export performance at the aggregate and a disaggregated level.
The analysis is performed within the framework of the single equation, OLS methodology,
and the analysis is supported by other econometric techniques, such as structural stability
analysis, rolling regressions, outside-sample forecasts, autoregressive distributed lag method
(ARDL) and error correction models (ECM). The remaining sections of the chapter are
organised as follows. Section two describes the export composition during the last two
decades. Section three presents the model and describes the methodology used for the
statistical analysis. Section four carries out the study of the impact of trade reforms on
exports at the aggregate level. Section five analyses the effect of trade reforms on exports at a
disaggregated level. Finally, section six concludes.
3.2 Export Composition
Since 1980 there have been some important changes in Mexico's trade composition, and in
the rate of growth and destination of Mexican exports, as is illustrated by Graph 3.1. Panel a)
shows how non-oil exports have increased their participation in total exports from about 33
per cent in 1980 to 90 per cent in 2000. Panel b) shows a rise in maquiladora exports as a
share of total exports, up from 15 per cent in the early 1980s to about 50 per cent in 2000.
Panel c) illustrates how the dynamics of non-oil exports have performed since 1980. When
the debt crisis occurred in 1982, oil exports reached their highest point and non-oil exports
started to grow vigorously as a result of the devaluation of the Mexican peso. The dynamic
growth of non-oil exports was lost during 1984 and 1985 because of the gradual appreciation
of the real exchange rate during that period. Although in 1986 total merchandise exports
decreased as a result of the collapse of the international oil market, non-oil exports increased,
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manufactures. During the last two decades it is observed that both farming and extractive
sectors have decreased their participation in non-oil exports. In 1980, the farming sector
represented 30 per cent of non-oil exports and in 2000 it was only 2.8 per cent. Likewise, the
extractive sector diminished from 10 per cent to 0.35 per cent in twenty years. Meanwhile,
the share of manufacturing exports rose from 60 per cent in 1980 to 97 per cent in 2000.
Graph 3.2
Share of Main Sectors in Non-Oil Exports, 1980-2000
(% of Total Exports)
Source: Institut° Nacional de Estadistica, Geogratia e Informdtica (INEGI) and Banco de Mexico.
Further examination of export composition is given in Graph 3.3. We observe that the share
of consumer and capital goods in total exports have increased over the period, 1980-2000,
while the share of intermediate goods decreased.3
3 It is necessary to mention that intermediate goods include oil exports. Then, we are referring to the share of
intermediate goods in total exports.
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Graph 3.3
Goods Composition of Exports, 1980-2000
(% of Total Exports)
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadfstica, Geograffa e Informatica (INEGI) and Banco de Mexico.
We now focus on the structure of the manufacturing sector itself. It is composed of nine sub-
sectors: Food Products, Beverages and Tobacco; Textiles and Leather Products; Wood
Products; Paper Products, Publishing and Printing; Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic Products;
Non-Metallic Mineral Products; Basic Metals; Machinery and Equipment; and, Other
Manufactures. Table 3.3 illustrates the distribution of exports by the nine manufacturing sub-
sectors from 1980 to 2000.
We analyse the distribution of manufacturing exports through the comparison of four years
1980, 1986, 1994 and 2000. The first and the last years are the beginning and end of our
sample, respectively; and, we are taking 1985/1986 and 1994 as reference years of trade
liberalisation.
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In 1980, three sub-sectors (Food, Beverages and Tobacco; Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic
Products; and, Machinery and Equipment) represented over 70 per cent of manufacturing
exports. The Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic Products manufacturing sub-sector was the one
with the highest contribution, about 27 per cent.
From 1980 to 1986, there were significant changes among the manufacturing sub-sectors,
especially in the Food Products, Beverages and Tobacco, and the Machinery and Equipment
sub-sectors. The former sub-sector's contribution fell from 22 to 12 per cent, while the latter
sub-sector doubled its contribution during those six years.
From 1986 to 1994, six out of nine manufacturing sub-sectors (Food Products, Beverages and
Tobacco; Wood Products; Paper Products, Publishing and Printing; Chemicals, Rubber and
Plastic Products; Non-Metallic Mineral Products; and, Basic Metals) decreased their
contribution. The Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic Products sub-sector decreased
approximately two-fold during this period. By contrast, the most outstanding increase was
registered by the Machinery and Equipment sub-sector. Its contribution rose from 43 per cent
to 70 per cent.
Between 1986 and 2000, two sub-sectors (Textiles and Leather Products; and, Machinery and
Equipment) continued increasing their participation in manufacturing exports. By contrast,
Food Products, Beverages and Tobacco; Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic Products; Basic
Metals; and, Other Manufactures decreased their participation in manufacturing exports. The
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other sub-sectors (Wood Products; Paper Products, Publishing and Printing; and, Non-
Metallic Mineral Products) remained constant.
A different approach to analyse the performance of manufacturing exports is to examine the
proportion of output that is exported of each manufacturing sub-sector. Table 3.4 shows these
figures.
With regard to trade liberalisation which started in a serious way in 1985, there is no marked
increase in the share of output exported in 1985, but there is in 1986. In that year, almost
every manufacturing sub-sector more than doubled the share of output exported, but mainly
due to a negative GDP rate of growth (-3.75) in 1986. With regard to NAFTA there is no
marked increase in export shares in 1994, but all sectors increased the share of output going
to exports in 1995. Some sub-sectors nearly doubled their share of output exported, for
instance Food Products, Beverages and Tobacco; Wood Products, Chemicals, Rubber and
Plastic Products; Non- Metallic Mineral Products; and, Machinery and Equipment. The
remaining sub-sectors, Textiles and Leather Products; Paper Products, Publishing and
Printing; Basic Metals; and, Other Manufactures more than doubled their share. There are
two plausible explanations for these increases. First, the extraordinary dynamism of
manufacturing exports in 1995 may be related to NAFTA, but with some delay. Second, the
increase of competitiveness linked to the large real devaluation, 45.5 per cent, of the Mexican
peso against the US dollar may be responsible.
6






LI") cA ON 0	 \ 00 00 Ill cA	 kr) en oo	 oo
6 c5 d c5 -4 d c5 4 r6	 c5 06 06 06 v5
r*"1a./ 0
71- C› vD CN	 ON CN CD CD o'N	 4 cA vD r- 71- CD ..7r r- c,
4	 r- CD cV cr. 00 r- 00 ON CN	 rq VD CA VI CN on r- CD 00










rn on Cl vD CD on on vn cA en 4- VD	 r- CD oo	 ,zt	 CNI 00
VD 0) rl ON ON CN .1* —4 —4	 r- CA CD oo r- o) r- ^4
csi 4 oi	 o6 6 6 6 (-4 o6 o6 o6 o6	 vi	 d 6
C*1 O'N 	 C7n 00 en 0 -1- rn kr) tr) S kr) oo vD VD 0 00
rn VD r- oo	 C7N	 Vn 0 CT N fq	 r-	 rn
6 4:3	 o5	 —4 -4 	 csi 4 4 4 4 4 4
01 00	 cf ON rn	 Cg	 vn 4 qD r- on vD	 csi VD
ON ON CD rn r- vD CA CD CD --I 4- cV CD en on CD cA 7t VD 4 vn
















fq ON —4 cA	 In C> r- on c4 vn	 vD oo vn CD cn cn CA vD vDcq	 on on 4 on --I ken oo cl r- cV CD cD	 oo	 cl vn 4 GA
C5 C5 C5 C5 C5 C5 -4 -4	 6	 rei en r6 en 06
h VD .1- 00 CSNSNN C(-1 7r	 co)	 rq c.N 4 4 oo r- on Cp	 cn C1 rq
C5 C5 6 6 c5 c5 6 -4	 C3 CNi	 c•ri Csi 4 Lei vi vi 4 4
cq oo vD el --f r- vp --I 4 4	 4 ken	 csi CD oo on on vn vn
c•1	 cv 4 vn en NC co vn en CD cV	 r- vD vn --I on CA n0
6 6 6 6 6 6	 -4 4 4	 vi vi	 4 v3 tri 4
cq	 en vn r) oo oo cl	 cq cV cV VD vn VD 7h	 C) 7t q) cA
et en vl q)	 fr)	 r,	 oo c) oo 0, c).	oo vc.	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .	 .c5 c5 c5 c5 4D CD	 CD	 CD CD --I --I	 cV
CD	 rA en 7h tr)	 rn 00 ON CD	 rg	 'Tt 141 VD r- 00 ON CD
00 oo oo oo oo 00 00 00 00 00 ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON C)
CA ON ON ON ON CN ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON C\ ON ON ON ON CD
rq
60
From the previous descriptive analysis a main hypothesis is derived. If trade reforms had any
effect at all on exports, it is likely that it was delayed and may be hard to disentangle from
exchange rate changes. However, it is expected that a formal export growth model can
distinguish those effects and can discern break points caused by trade liberalisation.
The next section presents an export growth model, and a brief description of the econometric
techniques that we are going to use in order to evaluate the impact of trade reforms on
exports.
3.3 The Model and Econometric Techniques
Export performance can clearly be affected by trade liberalisation (see Chapter 1). Two
events are identified as being important in this regard. The first one is when trade
liberalisation started in a serious way in 1985-1986. The second event is related to facts
involved in Mexico's accession to NAFTA in 1994. Our primary objective is to see whether
any impact can be discerned from trade liberalisation on non-oil export growth. 4 How much
have exports increased as a result of trade reforms independently of other determinants of
export performance?
We try to answer this question by specifying a complete export growth function starting from
its simple expression and then extending it to include the trade liberalisation indicators. First,
we take a standard export growth function, in which exports are considered to be a function
'The decision to exclude oil is based on two main factors. First, oil exports are influenced by other factors from
those that explain non-oil exports. Second, doing this we isolate the evolution of exports from the fluctuations in
the oil market. Hereafter we treat non-oil exports as exports.
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of price competitiveness measured by the real exchange rate; 5 and international income.6
Assuming that the price and income elasticities of demand for exports are constant, the
function can be expressed as (Thirlwall, 1999):
13,E) 131	,,
X = A(-'-- YUS'	 (3.1)
Pd
where A is a constant, Pd are domestic prices, 131 are US prices, YUS is world income, and E is
the nominal exchange rate; A and 182 denote price and income elasticities, respectively.
Taking logs of the variables in equation (3.1) and differentiating with respect to time, the rate
of growth of exports (including a constant which may pick up supply side factors) is
expressed as:
x = a + fi, (pf + e – pd ) + 132 yus	 (3.2)
It is expected that both elasticities, fii and A, are positive. This model, however, assumes that
exports adjust without a lag to changes in competitiveness and income, so there is no
difference between short and long run elasticities. It is more realistic to assume lagged
adjustment. Assuming that exports adjust partially to the difference between export demand
PUS5 The real exchange rate is defined as RER = E — where E is the nominal exchange rate (quantity of
Pm
pesos per one US dollar), Pus represents US's prices and Pm is Mexico's prices. An increase in the RER
represents depreciation.
6 Since Mexico's main trade partner is the US (see Panel d in Graph 3.1), the GDP of US is taken as world
income.
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in period t and the actual flow of exports in the previous period (t-1), the lag of exports also
becomes an explanatory variable, giving equation (3.3):
x,= a + A pi + A yusi + P3 Xi. I + 11.1 t	 (3.3)
where pi now stands for the rate of change of competitiveness, p , is an error term and t
represents the time period. The short run elasticities are A and A and the long run price and
(  filincome elasticities are given by 	
—163j




Equation (3.3) can then be extended to include the two liberalisation indicators, defined as
shift dummy variables, one for the first period of reforms and the other for the second period
of reforms. Each dummy variable takes the value of zero prior to liberalisation and one
afterwards.7 Tests we done for which of the years showed the most significant impact, and
1986 proved to be the most significant for the first period of trade reforms. For the second
period of trade reforms we tested for 1994, 1995 and 1996; however none of them were
significant. For the purposes of presenting the results of the model we chose 1994, but the
results of using 1995 and 1996 are shown in the Appendix. Thus, the extended export
demand function to be estimated can be expressed as:
x1 = a + fll p, + 132 yust + /32 X t- 1 + fi4 1ib86 t + fi5 lib94 t + p i
	
(3.4)
7 The argument for using a 'continuous' dummy variable is that although serious trade liberalisation started in
the selected year, more reforms continued over the following years, so we are testing for a permanent effect.
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where 1ib86 and 1ib94 are the shift dummy variables. The rest of the variables are as defined
earlier.8
We are going to use different approaches to estimate the export demand function. First, the
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method, as the most standard approach for time series analysis,
is applied. In order to test for structural breaks in the export demand function coefficients we
use different techniques, such as the Chow Test, Rolling Regressions and Outside Sample
Forecasts. Secondly, Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models (ARDL) and Error Correction
Models (ECM) are estimated in order to test for cointegration among the variables and speed
of adjustment of exports after they are affected by an external shock, respectively.
3.4. Impact of Trade Reforms on Non-Oil Exports at the Aggregate Level
i) Ordinary Least Square Estimations
The first technique that we are going to use is the OLS methodology. The time series
properties of the data are presented, followed by the estimations of the export growth
function. We focus our analysis on the shift dummy variables, which represent the trade
liberalisation indicators.
In order to estimate the export demand model, and to avoid the possibility of spurious results,
it is necessary to include only stationary variables. The first step is to apply the Augmented
Dickey Fuller (ADF) test to examine the stationarity properties of the time series considered
in equations (3.3) and (3.4). We use annual data from 1970 to 2000. The data source is the
8 A shift dummy variable for 1991 was included in order to capture a change in the way export data were
compiled since this year. The dummy takes the value of one in 1991 and 0 otherwise.
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World Development Indicators (2002) and the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, IMF
(several issues).
Unit root tests for stationarity are performed on the log levels of the variables and first
differences. Table 3.5 (part A) below presents the results of the ADF test (one lag) under the
assumption of a constant. All the variables are stationary in first differences at the 5 per cent
level of significance. In other words, all the variables we use are integrated of order one, I(1).
Table 3.5
Unit Root Test for Stationarity
PART A	 PART B
with Constant Only,
sample period 1970-2000
with Constant and Time Trend,
sample period 1970-2000
















Notes: 'The critical value for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root is -2.97. 2The critical value for
rejection of hypothesis of a unit root is -3.59. The asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 5 per cent
level.
Table 3.5 (part B) also presents the results of the ADF test (one lag) with a constant and
deterministic time trend for the variables in both log levels and first differences. It can be
seen that all the variables in log levels are non-stationary. In the case of first differences, the
null hypothesis of non-stationarity can be rejected at the 5 per cent level.
As an exercise, we present regressions using the OLS method, which are shown in Table 3.6.
Different specifications were estimated in order to know how each variable behaves when
more explanatory variables are included. We started estimating the simple static model and
we ended with a complete dynamic one, as equation (3.4) defines. Only stationary variables
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are included. Two main factors should be mentioned about the results obtained. First, the
shift dummy variable for 1986 is positive and significant at the 5 per cent confidence level in
equation 3.6.3 and 3.6.5. The shift dummy for 1994, however, is not statistically significant.
Second, concerning income elasticities it can be seen that they are significant at the 5 per cent
confidence level through all equations. The price elasticity has the expected sign and also is
statistically significant through all the estimations (3.6.1 to 3.6.5).
The export growth model has been able to separate the effect of liberalisation and the
exchange rate for 1986. Based on the estimated equations, equation (3.6.5) may be the best
estimation that represents export growth. The effect of liberalisation on exports is positive.
The shift dummy variable for 1986 indicates that for given changes in foreign income and
relative prices, export growth increased by 15 percentage points. This compares with the
average growth of non-oil exports over the sample period of 12.4 per cent, and the rate of
growth of non-oil exports in 1986 of 56 per cent. We do not obtain significant effects for the
second trade liberalisation indicator, 1ib94. It seems that NAFTA by itself did not bring
meaningful incentives to raise the growth of exports significantly. Both income and price
elasticities have the expected sign and are statistically significant. The former is relatively
high, suggesting that a one per cent increase in the US income increases exports by 5.04 per
cent, while the latter is relatively low —a one per cent depreciation in the real exchange rate
increases exports by 0.51 per cent.
66
Table 3.6
OLS Estimation for Export Growth: 1970-2000 9
Dependent variable: Export growth (x)
Regressor
Equations






















0.53 0.52 0.53 0.51 0.55































R2 0.37 0.28 0.49 0.38 0.50
Durbin Watson 2.24 1.72 1.98 2.07 1.95
Diagnostic Tests
Serial Correlation 0.528 0.806 0.965 0.772 0.934
Functional Form 0.659 0.653 0.417 0.754 0.274
Normality 0.041 0.120 0.000 0.020 0.000
Heteroscedasticity 0.066 0.033 0.325 0.144 0.303
Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "t"-statistics. The asterisk (*) for the "t" statistics denotes
significance of the coefficient at the 5 per cent level. The diagnostic tests show probabilities.
In conclusion we can say that although the trade reforms started in 1985, they took time to
take effect, and became significant only in 1986. When 1985 is considered as the structural
break for the first period of reforms the coefficient on the shift dummy is slightly smaller and
less significant. Turning to the second period of reforms, no shift dummy variable shows
meaningful effects, even considering one or two years after 1994 (see Table B1 and Table B2
in the Appendix). This is an important finding since most commentaries in Mexico assumes
9 Income and price slope dummies (i.e. yus*1ib86, yus*1ib94, p*lib86, p*1ib94; designed to capture the effects of
the elimination of trade distortions on the income and price elasticities of demand) were included in the export
equation, but the results showed that the variables were not statistically different from zero (not reported here).
Also, it is important to mention that we did not include export duties as a trade liberalisation indicator due to the
lack of figures for some years during the 1970s; however, export duties are considered in the extended trade
balance equations during the period 1980-2000 (see equations 5.4 and 5.5 in Chapter 5).
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that NAFTA has had a significant impact on growth performance (see Gilemez, 1996;
NAFTA, 2002; Serra, 2003; Authers and Silver, 2003).
ii) Structural Stability, Rolling Regressions and Forecasts
To supplement our previous analysis, we also use additional techniques for analysing whether
or not a structural break in export growth can be identified in 1986 and 1994: structural
stability, rolling regressions and outside-sample forecasts.
First, we apply the Chow breakpoint test to see if there is statistical evidence for structural
stability of the parameters. Selecting 1986 as the breakpoint year, the test leads us to reject
the null hypothesis of structural stability at the 25 per cent level of significance; the p-value
of the test is 0.17. Although, it is a weak test this result confirms our previous findings.
Second, we use the technique of rolling regression to examine parameter variation over time.
In Table 3.7 we present seventeen rolling regressions of the simplest export model (equation
3.2). The sample size is 14 years. As we can observe, the constant does not show drastic














Rolling Regressions for Exports
(window size 14)
Dependent variable: Export growth rate (x)
Period 1971-84 1972-85 1973-86 1974-87 1975-88 1976-89 1977-90 1978-91 1979-92 
Variable
constant -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.10 -0.12 -0.13 -0.04 -0.03
(-1.24) (-1.27) (-1.00) (-1.11) (-1.12) (-1.19) (-1.42) (-0.52) (-0.44)
yus 4.80 4.75 5.31 5.42 6.36 6.84 7.87 6.27 6.66
(2.59)* (2.55)* (2.36)* (2.29)* (2.38)* (2.30)* (2.74)* (2.19)* (2.18)*
P 0.46 0.46 0.74 0.74 0.66 0.71 0.81 0.76 0.73
(1.50) (1.48) (2.21)* (2.17)* (1.93) (2.00)* (2.38)* (2.02)* (1.94)
Period 1980-93 1981-94 1982-95 1983-96 1984-97 1985-98 1986-99 1987-00 
Variable
Constant -0.02 0.03 0.05 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12
(-0.30) (0.33) (0.60) (1.32) (1.56) (1.49) (1.32) (1.78)
yus 6.70 4.80 4.04 1.49 0.97 0.79 0.56 0.42
(2.25)* (1.54) (1.37) (0.46) (0.40) (0.29) (0.18) (0.21)
P 0.71 0.54 0.42 0.62 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.19
(1.92) (1.48) (1.37) (1.98) (2.05)* (2.02)* (2.01)* (0.99)
Note: The asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 5 per cent.
The rolling coefficients constant, yus and p, with their standard errors, are shown in Graph
3.4, (a), (b) and (c), respectively. The estimate of the constant shows a clear upward
tendency. The income elasticity is increasing up to 1990 and then falls. The price elasticity
shows a roughly stable pattern.
Graph 3.4
Rolling Coefficients for Exports
Coefficient of Constant and its two S.E. bands based on rolling OLS




In the next sub-section we are going to test for the existence of a long run relationship among
the variables that explain export performance. Also, we are interested in estimating the speed
of adjustment of the model once it is disturbed by a shock.
iii) Autoregressive Distributed Lag and Error Correction Modelling
The estimation of long run relationships can be approached through the use of an
autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL). The ARDL method is investigated within a
sufficiently dynamic specification, including the lagged dependent and independent variables.
Pesaran and Shin (1995) consider the following general ARDL (p, q) model:
q-1
y,= ao + a i t + E (p i yt. i +	 + Epv A xt.i+	 (3.5)
1=0
Ax, = PI A x t ./ + P2 A X,2 +	 + P, A xr, + E t	 (3.6)
where x, is a k-dimensional vector of 1(1) variables that are not cointegrated among
themselves, u, and Et are serially uncorrelated disturbances with zero mean and constant
variance-covariances, and P i are k x k coefficient matrices such that the vector autoregressive
process in A x, is stable. It is also assumed that there exists a stable unique long-run
relationship between yt and x,. If the disturbances are uncorrelated, then i) the OLS estimators
of the short run parameters are ff -consistent, ii) their covariance matrix is asymptotically
singular, so that the estimators of the short-run coefficients on the I(1) variables are
asymptotically perfectly collinear with the estimators of the coefficients on the lagged
dependent variable, and iii) the ARDL-based estimators of the long-run coefficients are
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`superconsistene. In this case, the ARDL approach to cointegration does not require
knowledge of whether the variables under consideration are I(1) or I(0).
In practice, the ARDL estimation involves two steps. In the first stage the existence of a long
run relationship, as predicted by the theory between the variables under consideration, is
examined. The F-statistic is used to examine the significance of the lagged levels of the
variables in the error correction form of the underlying ARDL model. Pesaran et al. (1997
and 2001) provide the asymptotic critical value bounds for the F-statistic. If the calculated F-
statistic is higher than the upper bound critical value, it suggests veSection of the null
hypothesis of no long run relationship. Then, in the next stage the long and short run
parameters are estimated using the ARDL method.
In this case, the calculated F statistic is 6.59. Comparing it with the interval of critical values
(from 3.79 to 4.85) under the assumption of an intercept and no trend, it is above the upper
critical value, allowing us to reject the null hypothesis of no long run relationship between
the variables at the 5 per cent significance level.
Having tested that the long run relationship between the variables is not spurious, we then
estimated the long run coefficients and the ECM. We start from one lag length, 13 and then the
order of the ARDL model is determined by using the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC).
13 We are constrained to use one lag due to the small sample size considered.
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The long run coefficients, and the ECM derived from the ARDL (1,1,0) approach, are the
following, respectively:14
LX = -4.38 + 0.88 LYUS + 0.85 LP + 0.69 1ib86 + 0.28 1ib94 + 0.77 d91	 (3.7)
(-0.26)	 (1.54)	 (1.77)	 (3.71)	 (1.42)	 (3.00)
x = -2.13 + 4.39 yus + 0.41p + 0.34 1ib86 + 0.13 1ib94 + 0.37 d91 - 0.48 ecm	 (3.8)
(-0.26)	 (3.54)	 (2.41)	 (2.82)	 (1.23)	 (3.76)	 (-3.96)
where the L preceding the variables, in equation 3.7, stands for the logs of the variable; and,
the dependent and the first two independent variables in equation 3.8, which are in lower
cases, represent growth rates.
Only the first trade liberalisation coefficient, 1ib86, of all the long run coefficients (equation
3.7) is significant at the 5 per cent level, suggesting that given changes in foreign income and
relative prices, non oil exports approximately doubled. 15 Meanwhile, the ECM shows the
short run coefficients of the variables (all of them are significant, except 1ib94) and the error
term. The latter tells us that about 48 per cent of the discrepancy between the actual and the
equilibrium value of the rate of growth of exports is corrected within a year.
In sum, there is evidence that the trade reforms in the mid-1980s improved export
performance. The boost in non-oil exports can only be understood through the process of
structural change that followed the trade liberalisation initiated in 1985. But the trade
liberalisation relating to NAFTA did not have a significant impact on export growth. It could
14 Both models satisfy all diagnostic tests.
15 This value is calculated from 0-1, where f3 is the value of the coefficient. This is consistent with the OLS
estimation of a 15 percentage points rise compared with an average growth of 12.4 per cent.
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mean that even without such agreement, exports would have had a similar outcome to the one
observed; significant trade liberalisation had already taken place before NAFTA took effect
(see section 2.5 in Chapter 2).
In addition to this, we have to consider the institutional factors that were behind Mexico's
decision to join NAFTA. As Skott and Larudee (1998) and Ibarra (1999) argue, one of the
main reasons for Mexico joining NAFTA was to overcome the lack of confidence in the
permanence of trade policy reforms.
3.5 Impact of Trade Reforms on Non-Oil Exports at a Disaggregated Level
At the disaggregated level, the existing work that has been done on Mexico's export
performance refers to selected products or sectors. For instance, Dussel (2000a) analyses
trade changes in agriculture and electronics. Those sectors were chosen because the former
includes maize which represents the main food in Mexicans' diet; and, the latter because it is
an export oriented industry attracting multinational firms. His research is descriptive rather
than analytical. He focuses on some trade changes and tendencies during the 1990s,
comparing growth rates over time, the participation of Mexican exports in the US market, and
contrasting Mexican export performance with other countries. Also, in other work Dussel
(2000b) examines some of Mexico's manufacturing sectors. After ranking manufacturing
sectors by the annual average export growth rate, considering nine years (1988-1996), he
concludes that trade liberalisation has generated a strongly export-oriented group of products
(automobiles, electronic equipment, other textile industries, household appliances, machinery
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and electric equipment, and soft drinks and flavourings), but the rest of the manufacturing
sector has not grown significantly.
Garces-Diaz (2000) examines exports at a disaggregated level. He divided exports into
maquila, oil related, and the rest. Basically, he looks for the existence of long run
relationships among the variables included in an export demand function. The main features
of his study is that he works with monthly figures and considers the index of value of US
industrial production as the foreign income. The data sample used goes from 1980 to 2000,
and is split into two, from 1980 to 1989 and from 1991 to 2000. For all types of exports, he
found a stable cointegration vector for the 1991-2000 period which leads him to conclude that
a structural change in Mexican exports during the 1990s did not take place and NAFTA
should not be credited with the performance shown by the trade sector.
However, these studies do not measure how the first period of trade reforms (1985-86) and
NAFTA affected exports. This is the aim of this section, by considering three different
classifications of exports. Classification 1 is related to Farming, Extractive and
Manufacturing sectors. Classification 2 refers to Consumer goods and Capital goods.16
Classification 3 deals with the nine sub-sectors that comprise the manufacturing sector: Food
Products, Beverages and Tobacco; Textiles and Leather Products; Wood Products; Paper
Products, Publishing and Printing; Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic Products; Non-Metallic
Mineral Products; Basic Metals; Machinery and Equipment; and, Other Manufactures.
16 As our analysis is focused on non-oil exports. We do not consider any more Intermediate goods because they
contain oil.
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i) Ordinary Least Square Estimations
In order to estimate the export model at the disaggregated level, and to avoid the possibility
of spurious results, the ADF test was applied to the different classifications of exports. We
use annual data from 1980 to 2000. The data source is the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica
Geograffa e Informatica (INEGI), the Banco de Mexico, and the World Development
Indicators (2002).
Unit root tests for stationarity are performed on the log levels of the variables and first
differences. Table 3.8 presents the results of the ADF test (one lag) under the assumption of a
constant (part A) and with constant and deterministic time trend (part B). All the variables are
I(1).
Table 3.8





with Constant and Time Trend,
sample period 1980-2000
Variables Log Level I	 Differences' Log Level 2 Differences2
yus -0.04 -3.78* -2.23 -3.80*
p -2.00 -534* -2.60 -5.84*
Farming Exports -2.45 -15.51* -4.63* -15.56*
Extractive Exports -1.54 -6.54* -2.66 -6.52*
Manufacturing Exports 0.02 -5.46* -4.00* -547*
Consumer Goods Exports 0.32 -8.72* -2.94 -8.84*
Capital Goods -0.16 -7.50* -2.88 -7.49*
Food Products, Beverages and Tobacco -0.74 -16.31* -3.16 -16.97*
Textiles and Leather Products -0.40 -5.00* -3.08 .5.01*
Wood Products -0.72 -6.06* -3.20 -6.01*
Paper Products, Publishing and Printing -0.72 -5.95* -3.40 -5.92*
Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic Products -0.72 -5.41* -3.15 -5.38*
Non-Metallic Mineral Products -0.51 -6.26* -2.99 -6.21*
Basic Metals -1.00 -5.05* -3.75* -5.03*
Machinery and Equipment -0.27 -5.70* -3.24 -5.67*
Other Manufactures -0.64 -5.37* -2.13 -5.33*
Notes: 'The critical value for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root is -2.89. 2The critical value for rejection of
hypothesis of a unit root is -3.46. The asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 5 per cent level.
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We present regressions using the OLS method for the three different classifications of
exports. Table 3.9 shows the results for exports included in classification 1. Different
specifications were estimated in order to know how each variable behaves when more
explanatory variables are included. We started estimating the simple static model and we
ended with a complete dynamic one. I7 Three main points should be mentioned about the
results obtained. First, the shift dummy variable for 1986 is positive and significant at the
5 per cent confidence level for farming and manufacturing exports (equations 3.9.5 and
3.9.15). Second, concerning income elasticities it can be seen that they are significant at the 5
per cent confidence level in most of the equations but implausibly large. But clearly Mexico's
trade is highly dependent on US demand. In the case of price elasticities, they have the
expected sign and are significant at the 5 per cent confidence level through almost all
equations. Third, the coefficients related to the shift dummy variable for 1991, are always
significant, except for equations 3.9.1 and 3.9.6.
Table 3.9
OLS Estimation for Disaggregated Exports Growth: 1980-2000
Dependent variable : x'
Variable
.x"












































(Table 3.9 continues overleaf)
17 Note again that a shift dummy variable related to 1991, d91, is included in order to capture the change in the
methodology used by INEGI related to non-oil export series. Since 1991 niaquiladora exports are included in
the time series, before this year they were presented as a different variable.
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(Table 3.9 continued)
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Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "t"-statistics. The asterisk (*) for the "t" statistics denotes
significance of the coefficient at the 5 per cent level. See diagnostic test in Table A3 in the Appendix.
Based on the estimated equations, the effect of 1986 trade reforms on farming and
manufacturing exports is positive. The shift dummy variable for 1986 indicates that for given
changes in foreign income and relative prices, farming and manufacturing export growth
increased by 24 and 19 percentage points, respectively. However, the second trade
liberalisation indicator, 1ib94, does not show significant positive results for farming and
manufacturing exports. We do not obtain any impact of 1986 and 1994 trade reforms on
extractive exports.
Even considering other years related to the first period of trade reforms, 1985 and 1987, we
do not obtain more significant results for extractive and manufacturing exports. The results
for farming exports are similar as those for 1986. Regarding the second period of trade
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liberalisation we tested for 1995 and 1996, but none of these years show positive and
significant coefficients (see Table B6 and Table B7 in the Appendix).
The results using OLS for the second classification of exports are presented in Table 3.10.
Three aspects should be mentioned. First, the shift dummy variable for 1986 is positive and
significant at the 5 per cent confidence level for Consumer goods and Capital goods
(equations 3.10.5 and 3.10.10). Second, income elasticities for consumer and capital goods,
although they are not always significant, are extremely high. This again suggests Mexico's
strong dependence on the US market. Third, the coefficients related to tk‘e.. shift CIN.1\-1
variable for 1991 are always significant.
Neither 1985 nor 1987 exhibit significant results for the first period of trade reforms. Also,
when we considered 1995 and 1996 as alternative years for the second period of trade
reforms they do not show positive and significant coefficients (see Table B8 and B9 in the
Appendix).
Table 3.10
OLS Estimation for Disaggregated Exports Growth: 1980-2000
Dependent variable : x'
Variable
x'
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Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "t"-statistics. The asterisk (*) for the "t" statistics denotes significance of
the coefficient at the 5 per cent level. See diagnostic test in Table B4 in the Appendix.
The results from OLS estimations for the third classification of exports are reported in Table
3.11. The shift dummy variable for 1986 is positive and significant at the 5 per cent
confidence level for the Textiles and Leather Products, and for the Basic Metals sub-sectors,
equations 3.11.5 and 3.11.35. Meanwhile, none of the coefficients related to the shift dummy
variable for 1994 is positive and significant. Regarding income and price elasticities, they
show the expected signs. The former exhibits high magnitudes particularly when one or both
of the trade liberalisation indicators are included. It is exceptional that for some
manufacturing sectors (Wood Products; Chemicals, rubber and Plastic Products; and, Other
Manufactures) none of the price elasticities are statistically significant.
For those sectors where 1ib86 has a positive effect on manufacturing export growth, it varies
from 34 to 40 percentage points.
Table 3.11
OLS Estimation for Disaggregated Exports Growth: 1980-2000
De endent variable : xi
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Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "t"-statistics. The asterisk (*) for the I" statistics denotes significance
of the coefficient at the 5 per cent level. See diagnostic test in Table A5 in the Appendix.
Similarly as we did for the other two classifications of exports, we consider two alternative
years for each trade liberalisation indicator, 1985 and 1987 for the first period of trade
reforms and 1995 and 1996 for the second one. However, the results are not significant
enough specifically to claim that NAFTA generated a significant increase in Mexican exports
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(see Table B10 and B11 in the Appendix). These results might be regarded as controversial,
particularly by those who claim that Mexico has derived large benefits from the NAFTA
trade agreement. These claims, however, have not been backed by rigorous statistical
evidence.
ii) Structural Stability and Forecasts
We also use two additional techniques for examining whether or not a structural break in the
growth of each type of exports can be identified in 1986 and 1994: structural stability and
outside-sample forecasts. First, we apply the Chow break point test in order to examine the
statistical evidence for structural stability of the parameters. This test leads us to reject the
null hypothesis of structural stability at the 5 per cent level of significance for exports of the
Manufacturing sector, the Consumer Goods sector, and three manufacturing sub-sectors
(Textiles and Leather Products; Non-Metallic Mineral Products; and, Machinery and
Equipment). We reject the null hypothesis at the 10 per cent for the following manufacturing
sub-sectors: Food Products, Beverages and Tobacco; Wood Products; Chemicals, Rubber and
Plastic Products; and, Other Manufactures. Also, we reject the null hypothesis at the 25 per
cent level for exports of the Farming sector, the Capital Goods sector, and for the Paper
Products, Publishing and Printing manufacturing sub-sector. By contrast, we accept the null
hypothesis of no structural change for exports of the Extractive sector and for the Basic





An important feature when examining graphical plots is the prediction of turning points.
Forecasts that can accurately predict turning points are of great importance. In most cases,
forecasts follow the turning points of actual exports. If actual export performance is greater
than predicted, then there is prima facie evidence of a favourable structural break. From the
above set of graphs, only the Extractive sector exhibits evidence that NAFTA represented a
favourable structural break for 1994; however, five manufacturing sub-sectors (Food,
Beverages and Tobacco; Textiles and Leather Products; Wood Products; Chemicals, Rubber
and Plastic Products; and, Basic Metals) show a structural break with some delay after
NAFTA took place.
We also calculated the root-mean-square (rrns) forecast error, which is expected to be close to
zero, and the Theil inequality coefficient along with its components for these forecasts. These















b 0.127975 0.466250 0.518649 0.338616 0.142735
c 0.156162 0.338096 0.726768 0.167760 0.105472
d 0.123516 0.286113 0.705011 0.069306 0.225683
e 0.126866 0.233084 0.832145 0.029646 0.138209
f 0.113489 0.325406 0.247953 0.444029 0.308018
g 0.161484 0.289591 0.544770 0.009725 0.445506
h 0.252206 0.610163 0.488401 0.013192 0.498406
i 0.190434 0.444147 0.421171 0.128493 0.450336
1 0.153850 0.475049 0.499113 0.016378 0.484509
k 0.220573 0.520138 0.521369 0.068672 0.409959
1 0.250530 0.519140 0.521442 0.458345 0.020213
m 0.234194 0.425504 0.673056 0.218274 0.108670
n 0.197965 0.497675 0.516667 0.400078 0.083250
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iii) ARDL and Error Correction Modelling
We supplement our previous results with two other econometric techniques, ARDL and
ECM. First, we test for the existence of a long run relationship between the variables under
investigation, for each type of exports. The figures are shown in Table 3.13. All equations
were estimated considering 1ib86 and 1ib94 trade liberalisation indicators and the shift
dummy variable for 1991, d91. Since the calculated F-statistic for most types of exports,
except for extractive exports, exceeds the upper bound of the critical value band, we reject
the null hypothesis of no long run relationship between, x i, p, yus, 1ib86, 1ib94 and d91.18
Table 3.13
Testing for Long Run Relationship using F-statistic




Farming 21.06* Food Products, Beverages and Tobacco 8.25*
Extractive 3.80 Textiles and Leather Products 28.33*
Manufacturing 58.33* Wood Products 33.37*
Paper Products, Publishing and Printing 20.51*
Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic Products 6.82*
Consumer Goods 26.57* Non-Metallic Mineral Products 12.45*
Capital Goods 25.91* Basic Metals 5.76*
Machinery and Equipment 28.83*
Other Manufactures 23.34*
Notes: As the underlying regression conta'ns an intercept but no trend, the bounds for the F critical value
at the 5 per cent level are given by 3.79 and 4.85. The asterisk (*) denotes rejection of the null
hypothesis of no long run relationship.
As it is only appropriate to embark on the second stage of the ARDL procedure if the long
run relationship between the variables considered is not spurious, we continue with it for all
the export equations except for the Extractive sector. Therefore, the estimation of the long run
coefficients and the associated ECM are achieved using ARDL. The order of the ARDL
18 Where i denotes the different type of exports.
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model is determined by using the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC), Akaike Information
Criteria (AIC) or determined by ourselves. The estimates of the long run coefficients and the
ECM associated with these long run estimates are presented in Part A and Part B in Table
3.14, respective! y.I9
Table 3.14
Part A: Long Run Coefficients
Variable
X'
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(Table 3.14 continues overleaf)
19 Almost all export equations pass all diagnostic tests, except for the Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic Products,
and the Machinery and Equipment export equations. They fail to pass the functional form test.
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(Table 3.14 continued)
Part B: Error Correction Model
Variable
X'
Constant yus P lib 86 1ib94 d9I ECM
Farming -20.62 1.73 0.25 0.58 -1.48
3.62 * 407 * 1.58 5.55 * -9.83
Manufacturing -53.31 6.02 0.31 0.51 -0.02 1.07 -0.93
(-6.93)* (3.82)* (2.19)* (6.44)* (-0.23) (12.55)* (-11.20)*
Consumer Goods -49.90 3.48 0.22 0.50 0.11 0.85 -0.90
(-5.56)* (5.72)* (1.49) (5.59)* (1.16) (8.65)* (-8.20)*
Capital Goods -78.90 5.29 0.13 0.34 0.10 1.35 -0.94
(-4.96)* (5.06)* (0.53) (2.44)* (0.67) (7.72)* (-7.50)*
Food Products, Beverages -23.36 1.62 0.58 0.24 0.08 0.24 -0.70
and Tobacco (-2.12)* (2.16)* (3.26)* (2.26)* (0.74) (2.51)* (-3.71)*
Textiles and Leather -54.85 3.62 0.19 0.48 0.16 1.23 43.85
Products (-3.94)* (3.94)* (0.70) (3.66)* (1.07) (9.00)* (7.45)*
Wood Products -38.90 8.34 0.25 0.57 -0.21 1.12 -0.94
(-3.40)* (3.89)* (1.08) (4.07)* (-1.54) (8.06)* (-7.40)*
Paper Products, Publishmg -39.18 2.58 0.41 0.69 -0.26 0.92 0.87
and Pnnting (-3.00)* (3.03)* (1.34) (3.60)* (-1.49) (5.92)* (6.39)*
Chemicals, Rubber and -38.76 9.22 0.36 0.11 -0.30 -0.55 -0.89
Plastic Products (-3 06)* (433)' (1.62) (0.83) (-2.19)* (3.84)* (-443)*
Non-Metallic Mineral 4693 7.50 0.77 0.25 0.34 0.66 43.74
Products (-3.82)* (3.69)* (4.53)* (1.81) (-3.25)* (6.33)* (4.55)*
Basic Metals -5.72 5.70 0.19 0.68 0.18 0.36 4174
(-0.34) (2.06)* (0.58) (3.39)* (0.89) (1.97) (-3.84)*
Machinery and Equipment 64.76 8.28 0.59 0.59 -0.20 1.41 -0.89
(-5.14)* (2.95)* (2.50)* (4.26)* (-1.47) (9.06)* (-7.90)*
Other Manufactures 42.68 9.15 0.31 0.32 0.09 2.25 -1.13
(-2.96)* (2.96)* (1.02) (1.76) (0.49) (8.80)* (-8.19)*
Notes: Denotes ARDL selected based on SBC. 2 Denotes ARDL selected based on AIC. 3 Denotes that the ARDL
was arbitrarily chosen. The asterisk (*) denotes significance of the coefficient at the 5 per cent level.
The long run coefficients for the first trade liberalisation indicator, 1ib86, are almost always
significant at the 5 per cent level of significance, except for the Chemicals, Rubber and
Plastic Products, and Other Manufactures sub-sectors; and, as expected, they show a positive
sign. The Non-Metallic Mineral Products manufacturing sub-sector shows the lowest
coefficient (0.34); while, the Basic Metals sub-sector has the highest coefficient (0.92). These
coefficients may be interpreted as that the volume of the Non-Metallic Mineral Products and
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the Basic Metals sub-sectors increased by 40 and 150 per cent, 20 respectively, due to trade
liberalisation in 1986. Comparing these figures with their export growth rates in 1986 we
observe differences between them. The export growth rate of the Non-Metallic Mineral
Products sub-sector in 1986 was about 73 per cent and for the Basic Metals was about 106
per cent. Although these export growth rates are high, we have to consider that export prices
fell by 30.6 percentage points from 1985 to 1986, and this affected the export volume.
The second trade liberalisation indicator, 1ib94, is not generally significant and does not show
the expected sign. It is positive and statistically significant at the 5 per cent level only for
farming exports. Regarding the sign and magnitude of income and price elasticities, they are
as expected. These results support our previous findings.
From the ECM it is relevant to highlight that all the error correction terms are highly
significant and have the correct sign (see Part B in Table 3.14). This suggests that every
export equation has an accelerated speed of convergence to equilibrium, once they are
shocked.
In sum, through different econometric techniques we show evidence which indicates that the
trade reforms launched during the mid-1980s had a positive impact on most of the types of
exports here analysed, but regarding NAFTA the results are contrary to those expected.
20 These values are calculated from e-1, where f3 is the value of the coefficient.
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3.5 Conclusions
This chapter has analysed the effects of trade reforms on Mexico's exports at the aggregate
and disaggregated level. Both levels of analysis, through the application of different
econometric techniques (i.e. OLS method, ECM, ARDL, etc.), suggest that there was a
positive impact of the mid-1980s trade reforms on export performance. However, no positive
effect of NAFTA on export performance is discernable.
The specification of an export growth model that included two trade liberalisation indicators,
one for the mid-1980s period and other for NAFTA, was able to discern the effects of the first
period of trade reforms from exchange rate changes that occurred simultaneously. Regarding
our attempt to disentangle the effects of NAFTA on exports from the exchange rate
devaluation in 1994, no impact of NAFTA on exports was distinguishable.
In addition the results confirm the high dependence of Mexico's trade on growth of the US
economy and on the exchange rate. The income and price elasticities in most of the export




OLS Estimation for Export Growth: 1970-2000
Dependent variable: Export growth (x)
Regressor 1ib94 1ib95 1ib96





















































































R2 0.45 0.46 0.39 0.46 0.39 0.46
Durbin Watson 2.12 2.16 2.05 2.17 2.05 2.15
Diagnostic Tests
Serial Correlation 0.621 0.557 0.827 0.529 0.822 0.580
Functional Form 0.871 0.649 0.479 0.672 0.485 0.825
Normality 0.000 0.001 0.028 0.000 0.030 0.000
Heteroscedasticity 0.440 0.324 0.132 0.343 0.124 0.416
Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "t"-statistics. The asterisk (*) for the "t" statistics denotes
significance of the coefficient at the 5 per cent level. The diagnostic tests show probabilities.
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Table B2
OLS Estimation for Export Growth: 1970-2000
Dependent variable: Export uowth (X)
Regressor
1ib94 1ib95 1ib96






























































R2 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42
Durbin Watson 2,09 2.13 2.13 2.11
Diagnostic Tests
Serial Correlation 0.715 0.640 0.619 0.677
Functional Form 0.615 0.762 0.746 0.631
Normality 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
Heteroscedasticity 0.305 0.161 0.186 0.285
Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "t"-statistics. The asterisk (*) for the "t" statistics





Dependent variable : x'
A-1




B3.1 0.010 0.034 0.316 0.459
B3.2 0.634 0.839 0.001 0.358
83.3 0.343 0.901 0.016 0.191
83.4 0.856 0.549 0.086 0.030




83.6 0.391 0.026 0.907 0.680
B3.7 0.360 0.051 0.416 0.466 
83.8 0.446 0.072 0.344 0.817
83.9 0.419 0.062 0.469 0.507





B3.1 I 0.246 0.509 0.040 0.933
B3.12 0.520 0.150 0.179 0.913
B3.13 0.742 0.393 0.183 0.968
B3. I 4 0.469 0.005 0.735 0.862
B3. I 5 0.648 0.100 0.658 0.994
Note: The diagnostic tests show probabilities.
Table B4
Diagnostic Tests
Dependent variable : x'
Test
x'
Eq. Serial correlation Functional Form Normality Heteroscedasticity
ki
E 4;= 0z 0
g o
u
B4.I 0.137 0.133 0.010 0.930
B4.2 0.436 0.002 0.076 0.997
B4.3 0.932 0.093 0.362 0.663
84.4 0.441 0.001 0.598 0.757




B4.6 0.132 0.073 0.525 0.637
B4.7 0.361 0.068 0.638 0.588
B4.8 0.558 0.695 0.085 0.597
84.9 0.519 0.243 0.825 0.804
84.10 0.671 0.599 0.049 0.566




Dependent variable : xt
.'"\...„:„.....................r eSt
xt
Eq. Serial correlation Functional Form Normality Heterorcedasticity
0
it d6' 1
85.1 0.813 0.848 0.404 0.308
B5.2 0.623 0.896 0.282 0.377
B5.3 0.847 0.608 0.679 0.145
85.4 0.621 0.844 0.688 0.325




85.6 0.643 0.423 0.527 0.700
85.7 0.519 0.513 0.460 0.709
85.8 0.860 0.792 0.848 0.760
85.9 0.614 0.244 0.176 0.806




85.11 0.613 0.571 0.657 0.524
B5.12 0.818 0.580 0.760 0.511
115.13 0.883 0.745 0.720 0.503
85.14 0.932 0.207 0.595 0.691
B5.15 _	 0.822 0.121 0.703 0.413
.4
- e - -
21 7; E
ct	 i
B5. I 6 0.632 0.391 0.479 0.576
B5. I 7 0.581 0.358 0.366 0.599
85. I 8 0.733 0.395 0.538 0.615
B5.19 0.679 0.238 0.872 0.569
B5.20 _	 0.832 0.125 0.797 0.542
,A. -0
..=	 . a• at
(..) ce
B5.2 1 0.423 0.696 0.000 0.636
85.22 0.106 0.689 0.125 0.187
85.23 0.132 0.439 0.809 0.947
B5.24 0.737 0.100 0.811 0.095
B5.25 0.423 0.584 0.789 0.576
, == 7_ e
2 't
B5.26 0.779 0.409 0.809 0.783
B5.27 0.852 0.481 0.785 0.815
B5.28 0.474 0.965 0.508 0.810
85.29 0.541 0.316 0.474 1.00
B5.30 _ 0.803 0.371 0.499 0.918
I .co
85.31 0.562 0.099 0.644 0.893
B5.32 0.213 0.000 0.650 0.647
B5.33 0.147 0.139 0.663 0.878
B5.34 0.209 0.156 0.271 0.821
B5.35 0.764 0.604 0.331 0.934
t^	 11
ki  = .,.C=E-. . 3
i	 5
B5.36 0.307 0.766 0.031 0.910
B5.37 0.504 0.484 0.066 0.930
85.38 0.363 0.172 0.074 0.917
B5.39 0.215 0.001 0.952 0.859




B5,41 0.261 0.955 0.006 0.649
85.42 0.586 0.127 0.063 0.652
B5.43 0.553 0.094 0.165 0.638
85.44 0.548 0.097 0.670 0.604
B5.45 0.605 0.389 0.112 0.644
Note: The diagnostic tests show probabilities.
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Table B6
OLS Estimation for Disaggregated Exports Growth: 1980-2000
Dependent variable : x'
Variable
I

































































































































































































































































































Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "t"-statistics. The asterisk (*) for he "t" statistics denotes significance
of the coefficient at the 5 per cent level. The estimation fails normality test. 2 The estimation fails Functional
Form test. 3 The estimation fails Heteroscedasticity test.
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Table B7
OLS Estimation for Disaggregated Exports Growth: 1980-2000
Dependent variable : x'
Variable
,c1













































































































































































































Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "t"-statistics. The asterisk (*) for he "t" statistics denotes significance
of the coefficient at the 5 per cent level. I The estimation fails normality test. 2 The estimation fails Functional
Form test. 3 The estimation fails Heteroscedasticity test.
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Table B8
OLS Estimation for Disaggregated Exports Growth: 1980-2000
Dependent variable : x





B8.1 1 -0.03 5.37 0.51 -0.21 0.08 0.82 0.50
(-0.24) (1.50) (1.43) (-1.04) (0.66) (3.17)*
138.21 -0.14 8.76 0.74 -0.26 0.17 -0.18 0.90 0.60
-6'0
(-0.90) (2.26) (2.06)* (-1.34) (1.37) (-1.73) (3.66)*
6 lib95
883 1 0.00 7.11 0.55 -0.21 -0.10 0.88 0.51
1





















0.02 6.20 0.44 -0.21 -0.08 0.84 0.50
(0.21) (1.67) (1.23) (-1.05) (-0.74) (3.26)*
B8.61 -0.05 6.34 0.48 -0.26 0.11 -0.10 0.82
1 0.53
(-0.34) (1.69) (1.33) (-1.21) (0.86) (-0.92) (3.16)*
lib94
88.7 0.00 7.40 0.34 -0.22 0.03 1.24 0.63
(0.01) (1.63) (0.77) (-1.24) (0.25) (3.68)*
B8.8 -0.10 10.90 0.60 -0.23 0.13 -0.19 1.32 0.69
.-o
































B8.11 0.04 8.28 0.28 -0.24 -0.10 1.24 0.65
(0.25) (1.81) (0.65) (-1.38) (-0.78) (3.77)*
B8.12 -0.01 8.38 0.32 -0.24 0.06 -0.11 1.24 0.65
(-0.05) (1.77) (0.70) (-1.31) (0.40) (-0.82) (3.63)*
Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "t"-stat stics. The asterisk (*) for the I" statistics denotes
significance of the coefficient at the 5 per cent level. 'The estimation fails Functional Form test.
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Table B9
OLS Estimation for Disaggregated Exports Growth: 1980-2000
Dependent variable : x'
Variable
xi










































































































































Notes: Va ues in parentheses correspond to "t"-statistics. The asterisk (*) for the "t" statistics denotes
significance of the coefficient at the 5 per cent level. 1 The estimation fails Functional Form test.
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Table B10
OLS Estimation for Disaggre ated Exports Growth: 1980-2000
Dependent variable : x'
Vanable
xl





BID 1 -0.12 5.39 0.85 0.12 0.03 0.59 0.49
i
-12




















BI0.3 -0.10 6.04 0.87 0.12 -0.03 0.62 0.49F.,. (-1.08) (1.88) (3.17)* (0.54) (-0.47) (2.95)*
co BIO 4 -0.15 6.40 0.91 0.09 0.05 -0.05 0.61 0.51
i
S'
(-1.14) (1.90) (3.10)* (0.40) (0.54) (-0.62) (2.84)*
lib96
BIOS -0.09 5.29 0.84 0.13 0.00 0.60 0.49
LI
(-1.01) (1.73) (3.11)* (0.60) (0.08) (2.89)*
B!0 6 -0.12 5.39 0.85 0.12 0.03 0.490.00 0.59
(-0.95) (1.69) (3.01)* (0.50) (0.32) (2.74)* (2.74)*
lib94
BIO 7 -0.19 10.69 0.98 0.02 0.02 1.61 0.64(-0.89) (2.28)* (2.01)* (0.12) (0.13) (4.56)*
Bio 83 -0.30 14.10 1.20 -0.00 0.11 -1.18 1.68 0.69
e,
8
(-1.34) (2.68)* (2.39)* (-0.03) (0.67) (-1.30) (4.83)*
11695rt
t B10 9 -0.19 12.30 1.04 0.01 -0.09 1.65 0.66
1 (-1.11) (2.42)* (2.16)* (0.10) (-0.72) (4.75)*
.!
BIO 10
-0.25 12.58 1.09 0.00 0.07 -0.11 1.65 0.66
%
Al=













































BIO 14 -0.04 10.02 0.47 -0.19 -0.03 -0.22 1.23 0.61



















































(Table BIO continues overleaf)
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(Table BI 0 continued)
Variable
x'



























B10.2 I EfillEMOINI 0.86 -0.34 0.62













































































































































































































































1310 762 -0.21 10.08 0.89 -0.31 0.03 0.52 0.37
(-0 86) (1.92) (1.69) (-1.35) (0.19) (1.35)
B10.37 -"I 16.08 1.33 -0.30 0.19 -0.32 0.67 0.56


















B1039 -0.34 14.18 1.16 -0.33 0.13 -0.25 0.62 0.49
-1.41) (2.60)* (2.25)* (-1.52) (0.76) (-1.70) (1.69)
11696
B/04/ 1 1117 12.62 0.76 -0.37 -0.28 0.53 0.53
-1.07) (2.68)* (1.72) (-1.88) (-2.08)* (1.58)
810 42
-0.26 12.79 0.83 -0.36 0.10 -0.30 0.52 0.54
-1.18) (2.65)* (1.78) (-1.73) (0.60) (-2.10)* (1.53)
lib94
8)0 432+ 0.18 5.93 0.52 -0.13 -0.14 1.21 0.65
(0.99) (1.53) (1.34) (-0.75) (-1.07) (4.30)*
a B10442 0.07 10.39 0.79 -0.23 -0.03 -0.23 1.30 0.74
go.
a
(0.41) (2.57)* (2.15)* (-1.44) (-0.30) (-2.10)* (5.12)*
11695
B10452 004 9.34 0.76 -0.20 -0.21 1.27 0.70



















B1047 0.07 7.16 0.56 -0.17 -0.13 1.20 0.65
(0.50) (1.77) (1.48) (-0.95) (-1.08) (4.27)*
BIO 482 0.17 7.04 0.48 -0.18 -0.12 -0.11 1.21 0.67
(0.95) (1.72) (1.22) (-1.00) (-0.89) (-0.91) (4.27)*
lib94
B1049 0.05 5.87 0.25 -0.17 -0.11 1.95 0.80
(0.25) (1.30) (0.57) (-1.39) (-0.74) (5.94)*
L'3
B 8I0.50 -0.05 9.19 0.48 -0.20 -0.03 -0.18 2.03 0.82
4
0
(-0.23) (1.79) (1.03) (-1.62) (-0.18) (-1.28) (6.22)*
lib959
2
8/0 51 -0.08 9.42 0.50 -0.20 -0.22 2.03 0.83
o (-0.54) (2.06)* (1.24) (-1.76) (-1.81) (6.69)*
810 52 -0.05 9.28 0.47 -0.20 -0.03 -021 2.03 0.83
(-0.24) (1.93) (1.07) (-1.69) (-0.20) (-1.57) (6.44)*
lib96
8/0 53 -0.03 8.20 0.24 -0.23 -0.25 1.95 0.84
(-0.25) (1.95) (0.62) (-1.96) (-2.02)* (6.68)*
BIO 54 0.01 8.13 0.20 -0.23 -0.06 -0.24 1.96 0.84
(0.08) (1.87) (0.49) (-1.90) (-0.43) (-1.83) (6.48)*
Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "t"-statistics. The asterisk (*) for the "t" statistics denotes significance
of the coefficient at the 5 per cent level. I The estimation fails Heteroscedasticity test. 2 The estimation fails










OLS Estimation for Disaggregated Exports Growth: 1980-2000









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "t"-statistics. The asterisk (*) for the "t" statistics denotes




Impact of Trade Reforms on Imports
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we examined the effects of trade reforms on Mexican exports at the
aggregate and at a disaggregated level. Unexpected results came out, particularly those
related to the effects of NAFTA on exports. By adopting the same structure and
methodology, the present chapter complements chapter 3 by analysing the effects of trade
reforms on Mexican imports.
One of the most common criticisms of trade liberalisation, particularly in developing
countries, is that it increases import penetration. Indeed, Mexico has experienced a large
increase of imports relative to output, particularly during the 1990s. In constant prices,
imports of goods and services as a proportion of output doubled in twenty years. Import
penetration increased from about 21 per cent of GDP in 1980 to 51 per cent in 2000 (see
Table 4.1). The dynamics of Mexican imports led the country to be ranked 10th in the list of
leading importers in world merchandise trade (WTO, 2001), which is three places above its
ranking position for exports.
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Table 4.1
Imports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)
Year Ratio Year Ratio
1980 20.85 1991 22.89
1981 22.56 1992 26.42
1982 14.11 1993 26.40
1983 9.75 1994 30.65
1984 11.09 1995 27.75
1985 11.99 1996 32.43
1986 11.52 1997 37.29
1987 11.89 1998 41.38
1988 16.05 1999 45.39
1989 18.17 2000 51.55
1990 20.71
Source: World Development Indicators (2002).
In order to elucidate the role played by trade liberalisation on Mexico's imports, a number of
questions are addressed in this chapter: how has the composition of imports changed
following trade liberalisation? What effects have trade reforms had on the volume of
imports? How much of the import growth can be explained exclusively by trade
liberalisation? Did imports react earlier than exports to trade reforms?
Concerning previous studies of Mexico's imports, Alfaro and Salas (1992), Clavijo and Faini
(1990), Galindo and Cardero (1999), Dornbusch and Werner (1994), Ize (1989), Lopez and
Guerrero (1998), Moreno-Brid (2002b), Salas (1982 and 1988), and Sotomayor (1997) have
all analysed the effects of trade restrictions on Mexico's demand for imports, either including
dummy variables or other measures that capture the effect of tariff and non-tariff restrictions
on imports. However, most of these studies focus on the analysis of income and price
elasticities, except Moreno-Brid (2002b). In other words, although they controlled for the
effects of trade liberalisation, they neglected to interpret the results obtained from the trade
108
liberalisation indicators. Also, these studies do not differentiate the impact of NAFTA on
import performance from the trade reforms launched during the mid-1980s.
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, we compare import composition by sector and
manufacturing sub-sector before and after trade reforms. Second, we quantify the impact of
trade reforms on imports at the aggregate and disaggregated level. The analysis is performed
within the framework of the single equation, OLS methodology, and the analysis is supported
by other econometric techniques, such as structural stability analysis, rolling regressions,
outside sample forecasts, autoregressive distributed lag method (ARDL), and error correction
models (ECM).
The remaining sections of the chapter are organised as follows. Section two describes the
import composition over the past twenty years. Section three presents the import model and
the econometric techniques used for the statistical analysis. Section four carries out the study
of the impact of trade reforms on imports at the aggregate level. Section five analyses the
effect of trade reforms on imports at a disaggregated level. Finally, section six concludes.
4.2 Import Composition
In order to have a better understanding of the performance of Mexican imports during the last
twenty years, we look at some important characteristics of Mexico's imports, which are






































1980 6.94 1.59 0.49 3.79 16.07 12.10 2.67 55.73 0.61
1981 4.89 1.83 0.40 3.20 14.20 10.99 2.74 61.14 0.62
1982 5.09 1.99 0.38 3.47 17.16 8.76 2.09 60.49 0.56
1983 7.41 0.66 0.32 4.10 22.44 6.63 1.54 56.62 0.27
1984 4.99 0.98 0.37 3.76 22.82 8.26 2.48 55.96 0.38
1985 4.04 1.14 0.39 3.30 23.35 6.71 3.00 57.56 0.52
1986 4.38 1.21 0.43 3.85 21.43 6.43 1.74 60.09 0.45
1987 3.88 1.45 0.36 5.13 22.51 6.22 1.96 57.97 0.51
1988 6.80 2.50 0.44 4.40 19.41 6.90 2.26 56.56 0.73
1989 8.82 3.56 0.49 4.09 19.49 6.75 2.03 53.66 1.11
1990 9.39 3.67 0.61 3.72 17.33 6.80 1.56 55.78 1.14
1991 5.61 4.76 0.91 3.86 17.12 7.58 1.69 57.28 1.18
1992 5.83 3.53 0.96 3.82 16.66 7.30 1.83 58.93 1.12
1993 5.45 5.73 0.93 3.84 16.61 6.71 1.57 57.94 1.22
1994 5.36 5.60 0.93 4.08 15.89 6.64 1.60 58.43 1.46
1995 3.88 5.36 0.52 4.29 17.54 6.82 1.78 58.83 0.98
1996 3.84 5.67 0.48 3.56 18.15 7.16 1.73 58.50 0.91
1997 3.53 6.06 0.45 3.23 18.15 6.83 1.79 58.82 1.13
1998 3.38 6.39 0.47 3.04 16.95 6.68 1.96 59.85 1.29
1999 3.13 6.55 0.50 2.94 16.64 6.02 1.85 61.16 1.21
Source: Own calculations based on data from Banco de Mexico and Institut° Nacional de Estadfstica, Geograffa e
Inforrnatica (INEGI).
Comparing the distribution of manufacturing imports, from 1980 to 1999, we observe that it
has not changed significantly. On average, two sub-sectors, Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic
Products, and Machinery and Equipment, account for 75 per cent of manufacturing imports.
The import share of the latter sub-sector, however, is by far the largest. The bulk of
manufacturing imports have been concentrated in this particular sector, even before the mid-
1980s trade liberalisation was launched. By contrast, on average, the Wood Products sub-
sector had the lowest share of manufacturing imports.
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A different approach to analyse the performance of manufacturing imports is to study the
proportion of output that is imported of each manufacturing sector. Table 4.3 shows these
figures. We focus our attention on two particular periods, 1984-1986 and 1993-1995, because
trade reforms were launched and accentuated during those periods.
From 1984 to 1986, seven out of nine manufacturing sub-sectors (Food Products, Beverages
and Tobacco; Textiles and Leather Products; Wood Products; Paper Products, Publishing and
Printing; Non-Metallic Mineral Products; Basic Metals; and, Other Products) increased their
share of output imported by less than one percentage point. Only, the Chemicals, Rubber and
Plastic Products, and the Machinery and Equipment sub-sectors increased their share of
output imported by more than one percentage point, 1.34 and 4.62, respectively.
Regarding the variations in the proportion of output imported from 1994 to 1995, seven out
of nine manufacturing sub-sectors (Textiles and Leather Products; Paper Products, Publishing
and Printing; Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic Products; Non-Metallic Mineral Products; and
Machinery and Equipment) increased their share of output imported by more than one
percentage point. The Machinery and Equipment sub-sector had the highest increase, 17.61
percentage points. These figures may be explained by two factors. First, the proportion of
manufacturing imports relative to output increased because output of each sector decreased in
1995. Second, the increase in the share of output imported by manufacturing sub-sectors may
be linked to the trade liberalisation that NAFTA represented.
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Table 4.3
Manufacturing Imports by Sub-Sectors, 1980-1999




























1980 0.97 0.49 0.39 2.77 3.96 5.47 1.98 7.95 0.79
1981 0.79 0.64 0.38 2.66 3.83 5.80 2.32 9.62 0.85
1982 0.74 0.69 0.35 2.72 4.29 4.49 1.86 10.18 0.76
1983 0.64 0.14 0.18 2.03 3.25 2.10 0.84 6.86 0.25
1984 0.52 0.25 0.25 2.20 3.87 3.08 1.50 7.67 0.41
1985 0.51 0.36 0.32 2.22 4.73 2.92 2.25 8.80 0.64
1986 0.65 0.46 0.42 3.11 5.21 3.47 1.62 12.29 0.70
1987 0.61 0.62 0.37 4.39 5.60 3.27 1.73 12.11 0.88
1988 1.30 1.30 0.57 4.41 5.80 4.51 2.32 12.94 1.48
1989 1.87 2.11 0.74 4.45 6.35 5.01 2.43 13.18 2,44
1990 2.26 2.45 1.11 4.45 6.42 5.64 2.06 14.64 2.50
1991 1.96 4.65 2.47 6.67 9.44 9.12 3.52 20.88 3.93
1992 2.18 3.85 2.83 7.13 10.06 9.20 4.19 22.54 3.60
1993 2.01 6.51 2.84 7.42 10.36 8.36 3.54 23.48 4.06
1994 2.41 7.91 3.52 9.63 12.04 9.94 4.28 27.88 5.98
1995 2.28 10.61 2.79 14.39 17.63 15.18 6.00 41.09 5.87
1996 2.39 10.59 2.64 12.84 18.65 16.07 5.36 36.42 5.20
1997 2.35 11.32 2.58 11.44 19.32 16.01 5.49 34.02 6.46
1998 2.45 13.33 2.95 11.77 19.71 17.25 6.72 36.00 7.92
1999 2.29 13.90 3.32 11.39 19.84 16.05 6.64 36.11 7.35
Note: The output of each sub-sector (in constant 1993 prices) was transformed into $US using real exchange rate.
Source: Own calculations based on data from Banco de Mexico, Institut° Nacional de Estadistica Geografia e
Informatica (INEGI) and International Financial Statistics.
The above descriptive analysis shows the difficulty that we are going to face in order to
distinguish and evaluate the effects of trade reforms on imports from those effects related to
the real exchange and income variations. Imports were often affected by recurrent
devaluations and restrictive trade policy in order to control balance of payments problems
(refer to Chapter 2). In the modelling to follow, we attempt to isolate these effects from the
impact of liberalisation in which we are interested.
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4.3 The Model and Econometric Techniques
This section presents the import growth model and describes different econometric
approaches that we are going to use in order to evaluate the impact of trade reforms on
imports (see Chapter 1 for the theoretical arguments of trade liberalisation) in two episodes of
trade reforms, those related to the mid-1980s and to NAFTA.
As in the case of exports (see section 3.2 in Chapter 3), the estimation of a standard import
function requires the inclusion of two shift dummy variables, and in addition we use an
import duty ratio as an indicator of trade distortion. The complete function is built up step by
step.
Initially, we consider a standard import function, where imports are assumed to be a function
of price competitiveness measured by the real exchange rate; 1 and, domestic income (YM).
Assuming that the price and income elasticities of demand for imports are constant, the
function can be written as (Thirlwall, 1999):
M = LPIP )81 YM 82
Pd
( Pf
I The real exchange rate is defined as RER = E l — , where E is the nominal exchange rate (quantity of
Pd)







run elasticities by	 1	 - respectively.
1 — 83 1— 8 3
,
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where L is a constant, Pd are domestic prices, Pi- are US prices, E is the nominal exchange
rate, and YM is Mexico's income; 8 1 and 82 denote the price and income elasticities,
respectively. Taking logs of the variables in equation (4.1) and differentiating with respect to
time, the rate of growth of imports (including a constant) is:
m = X + 81 (pf + e - pd ) + 82 YM
	
(4.2)
It is expected that the price elasticity (8 1 ) is negative and the income elasticity (32) is positive.
Considering the lagged adjustment in a disequilibrium model of import demand, it is assumed
that imports adjust only partially to the difference between import demand in period t and the
actual flow of imports in the previous period (t-1). The dynamic import function is expressed
as:
nit = A + 8 1 pi + 82 ym, + 83 mr-i + et	 (4.3)
where pt is the rate of change of the real exchange rate, Et is the error term and t represents the
time period. The short run price and income elasticities are given by S i and 82, and the long
For the purposes of this section the import demand model, represented by equation (4.3), is
extended with the inclusion of the ratio of import duties to total imports, which captures trade
distortions. Additionally, two shift dummy variables are considered, one for the first period of
trade reforms and the other for the second period of trade reforms. Each dummy variable
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takes the value of zero prior to liberalisation and one afterwards. 2 Tests showed that the most
significant breaks, related to trade reforms, in the case of imports occurred in 1985 and 1994.
Thus, the extended import demand function can be expressed as:
int = 2+ 8, p, + 82 ymi + 83 mt_ i + al nick + gs 1ib85, + c% 1ib94, +	 (4.4)
where md is the import duties ratio, which measures how the degree of distortions on trade
may discourage imports; and, 1ib85 and 1ib94 are the shift dummy variables.
We are going to use different approaches to estimate the import growth function. Ordinary
Least Square (OLS) methodology, as the most standard approach for time series analysis, is
applied. In order to test for structural breaks in the import demand function coefficients we
use different techniques, such as the Chow Test, Rolling Regressions and Outside Sample
Forecasts. Finally, Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models (ARDL) and Error Correction
Models (ECM) are estimated in order to test for cointegration among the variables and speed
of adjustment of imports after they are affected by an external shock, respectively.
4.4 Impact of Trade Reforms on Imports at the Aggregate Level
This section examines the effects of trade liberalisation on Mexican import performance at
the aggregate level through the application of different econometric techniques. We will try
to see whether any impact can be discerned from trade liberalisation on import growth. In
2 The argument for using a 'continuous' dummy variable is that although serious trade liberalisation started in
the selected year, more reforms continued over the following years, and the impact was continuous.
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other words, we are looking for an answer for the following question: How much have
imports increased as a result of trade reforms independently of other determinants of import
performance?
i)Ordinary Least Square Estimations
The first method that we use to investigate the relationship between imports and trade
reforms is the OLS method. The time series properties of the data are shown, followed by the
estimations of the import growth function. We focus our analysis on the shift dummy
variables, as they represent trade liberalisation indicators.
In order to avoid the possibility of spurious results it is relevant to test whether or not the
variables in equation (4.4) are stationary. To test for unit roots of each variable in log levels
and first differences, a standard Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test, one lag, is performed.
Table 4.4 (part A) presents the results. When the ADF test is applied under the assumption of
a constant, all the variables in first differences are stationary.
Table 4.4
Unit Root Test for Stationarity
PART A	 PART B
With Constant Only, sample period 1970-2000 	 with Constant and Time Trend, sample
period 1970-2000
Variables Log Level 1 Differences' Log Level 2 Differences2
m -0.34 -4.20* -2.14 -4.35*
Ym -1.62 -3.05* -2.56 -3.03
P -2.90 -5.37* -2.89 -5.29*
md -0.94 -3.92* -2.50 -3.90*
Notes: 'The critical value for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root is -2.96. 2The critical value for rejection
of hypothesis of a unit root is -3.57. The asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 5 per cent level.
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Table 4.4 (part B) also presents the results of the ADF test (one lag) with a constant and
deterministic time trend for the variables in log levels and first differences. It can be seen that
all the variables in log levels are non-stationary. In the case of first differences, the null
hypothesis of non-stationarity can be rejected at the 5 per cent level for all the variables.
We estimated equation (4.3) using the OLS method, which includes the basic determinants of
an import demand model. After that, we estimated the extended model that includes the shift
dummy variables, and we then end up with a complete import demand model. Table 4.5
shows the results.
The evidence presented in Table 4.5 shows that the trade reforms launched during 1985
influenced positively the growth of imports. Effectively, 1ib85, as an indicator of trade
liberalisation, is statistically significant in all equations at the 5 per cent level. The effect of
1ib85 is to raise import growth by 13 percentage points. The econometric results tell us that
none of the coefficients given by the second indicator of trade liberalisation, 1ib94, are
statistically significant. 3
The import duty ratio coefficients have the correct sign but are not significant in any
equation. This variable seems to have had no independent effect on Mexican imports. The
import demand estimations are characterised by the strong significance of the real exchange
3 We explore an alternative way of measuring the impact of trade liberalisation related to NAFTA, defining in a
different way 1ib85. It takes the value of one from 1985 to 1993, and zero otherwise. 1ib94 takes the value of
zero prior to NAFTA and one from 1994 to 2000. Treating in this way the trade liberalisation indicators, both
coefficients are significant and positive. They show the same magnitude, suggesting that in 1985 and in 1994
imports growth increased by 13 percentage points. This means that NAFTA added nothing.
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rate variable. All the price elasticity estimates fall within the range from -0.61 to -0.91. As
regards the income elasticity, it is not always statistically significant, but it is modestly high
when it is significant. The lagged dependent variable is just significant in two equations
(4.5.2) and (4.5.3), giving long run elasticities slightly higher than the short run elasticities.
Table 4.5
OLS Estimation for Import Growth: 1970-2000'
Dependent variable: Import growth (m)
Regressor
Equations












1.40 0.96 2.61	 1.05 2.0
YM (2.01) 0.43) ! .3) (3.02)* (1 37) (2.66)*
-0.82 -0.89 -0.91 -0.61
P (-4.57)* (-5.23)* (-4.98)* (3.30)* (_5.l2)* (-3.00)*




















R2 0.71 0.75 0.76 0.83 0.78 0.83
Durbin Watson 1.26 1.53 1.54 1.86 1.54 1.86
Diagnostic Tests
Serial Correlation 0.074 0.180 0.207 0.773 0.258 0.776
Functional Form 0.077 0.601 0.463 0.471 0.231 0.456
Normality 0.137 0.546 0.600 0.619 0.581 0.619
Heteroscedasticity 0.243 0.160 0.326 0.104 0.142 0.103
Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "t"-statistics. The asterisk (*) for the "t" statistics denotes
significance of the coefficient at the 5 per cent level. The diagnostic tests show probabilities.
Equation (4.5.6) may be the best estimation that represents import growth. The explanatory
variables account for 83 per cent of the variance of imports, and it passes the diagnostic tests.
4 Income and price slope dummies (i.e. ym*1ib85, ym*lib94, p*lib85, p*1ib94; designed to capture the effects of
the elimination of trade distortions on the income and price elasticities of demand) were included in the import
equation, but the results showed that the variables were not statistically different from zero (results not reported
here).
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This equation shows that the shift dummy variable for 1985 behaves as expected indicating
that the trade liberalisation launched in 1985 increased import growth by 13 percentage
points. This compares with an average growth of imports over the period of 10 per cent. By
contrast, the shift dummy variable for 1994 does not show significant effect of NAFTA on
imports. Income and price elasticities are within the range of the value of other results
(Moreno-Brid, 2002b; Sotomayor, 1997). The income elasticity shows that a one per cent
increase in national income increases imports by 2.6 per cent; while a one per cent
depreciation of the currency reduces imports by 0.61 per cent.
It is important to point out that we tried other dates for the dummy variables, as we did for the
export function. We considered 1986 (1ib86) and 1987 (1ib87) instead of 1985 (1ib85) as the
first trade liberalisation indicator (see Table Cl and C2 in the Appendix). The li.M.6
coefficient is significant through almost all equations, except equation (C1.2). The effect of
1ib86 on imports is similar to 1ib85, which varies from 11 percentage points to 15 percentage
points.
As regards the second trade liberalisation indicator, 1ib94, we considered the two subsequent
years after NAFTA was launched. We substitute 1995 (1ib95) and 1996 (1ib96) for 1994
(1ib94). However, none of them is significant (examine Table Cl and C2 in the Appendix).
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ii) Structural Stability, Rolling Regressions and Forecasts
To supplement our previous analysis, we also use additional techniques for analysing whether
or not a structural break in import growth can be identified in 1985 and 1994: structural
stability, rolling regressions and outside-sample forecasts.
First, we apply the Chow breakpoint test to see if there is statistical evidence for structural
stability of the parameters. In this case, we consider 1985 as a breakpoint. The Chow
breakpoint test leads us to reject the null hypothesis of structural stability in the model of
imports at the 5 per cent level of significance. The calculated value of the F-statistic, 16.01, is
greater than the critical value, 3.01. This result supports the finding that in 1985 there was a
structural change in Mexican import growth.
The second procedure is to use the technique of rolling regression to examine parameter
variation over time. In Table 4.6 we present seventeen rolling regressions of the simplest
import model (equation 4.2). The sample size is 14 years. In general, the constant has been
shifting upwards, from negative to positive values. The income elasticity estimate has been
erratic. The elasticity was falling smoothly for the first eight rolling regressions, and then it
recovers for the next three regressions, and once more decreases for the regression 1982-95.
This elasticity recovered once again for the period 1983-96, but it fell for the next two
regressions, and then, it recovered for the last two regressions. From these results it could be
argued that after the trade liberalisation of 1985 imports became less sensitive to domestic
income, but there is an unclear pattern of what happened once NAFTA was announced.
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Table 4.6
Rolling Regressions for Imports
(window size 14)
Dependent variable: Import growth rate (m)
Period 1971-84 1972-85 1973-86 1974-87 1975-88 1976-89 1977-90 1978-91 1979-92
constant -0.16 -0.12 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.004
(-4.78)* (-3.04)* (-0.89) (-0.76) (-0.23) (0.04) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10)
yin 3.81 3.40 2.36 2.20 1.69 1.79 1.83 1.99 2.12
(6.77)* (4.90)* (2.17)* (2.02)* (1.72) (1.99) (2.01)* (2.19)* (2.23)*
P -0.74 -0.82 -0.76 -0.79 -0.95 -0.99 -0.98 -0.91 -0.90
(-5.19)* (-4.56)* (-2.59)* (-2.71)* (-3.83)* (-4.39)* (-4.25)* (-3.82)* (-3.86)*
Period 1980-93 1981-94 1982-95 1983-96 1984-97 1985-98 1986-99 1985-00
constant -0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08
(-0.07) (0.01) (0.63) (0.43) (3.98)* (4.02)* (3.43)* (3.43)*
ym 2.19 2.32 1.92 3.63 0.84 0.82 0.95 1.00
(2 02)* (1.85) (1.24) (2.55)* (1.06) (1.10) (1.23) (1.37)
P -0.88 -0.84 -0.71 -0.14 -0.55 -0.57 -0.53 -0.54
(-3.65)* (-3.34)* (-2.45)* (-0.43) (-3,12)* (-3.31)* (-3.04)* (-3.10)*
Note: The asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 5 per cent.
The price elasticity has always been significant and more or less stable. There is no big
difference in the parameters if we compare their values for the samples before and after trade
liberalisation took place (i.e. for 1985, compare the periods 1971-84 and 1973-86; for 1994,
contrast 1980-93 and 1982-95).
The rolling coefficients presented in Table 4.6 are plotted in Graph 4.4. We observe
constant, ym and p coefficients in panels (a), (b) and (c), respectively. All the rolling
coefficients are within their standard error band. The changes in the parameters are clearer in




In the next sub-section we are going to test for the existence of a long run relationship among
the variables that explain the import growth model. Also, we are interested in estimating the
speed of adjustment of the model once it is disturbed by a shock.
iii) Autoregressive Distributed Lag and Error Correction Modelling
In this section we estimate the short and long run coefficients of the import demand model
using the ARDL procedure. Also, we present the error correction model.
The ARDL process implies two steps. First, the existence of a long run relationship among
the variables under consideration is examined. The F-statistic is used for this purpose. If the
calculated F-statistic is higher than the upper bound critical value, it suggests rejection of the
null hypothesis of no long run relationship. Then, after testing for the existence of such a long
run relationship, the long and short run parameters are estimated by using the ARDL method.
In this case, the calculated F statistic is 4.57. Comparing with the interval of critical values
(from 3.21 to 4.37), under the assumption of an intercept and no trend, it is above the upper
critical value, allowing us to reject the null hypothesis of no long run relationship between the
variables at the 5 per cent significance level.
Having tested that the long run relationship between the variables is not spurious, we then
estimated the long run coefficients and the ECM. 5 We consider one lag length,6 and then the
5 In the following equations we do not include the import duties ratio as an explanatory variable. In any case it is
not statistically significant, and the remaining coefficients show better results if we do not consider it.
6 
We are constrained to use one lag due to the small sample size considered.
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order of the ARDL model is determined by using the Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SBC).
The long run coefficients and the ECM derived from the ARDL (1,1,1) approach are the
following, respecti vel y:7
LM = -1.58 + 1.04 LYM - 1.06 LP + 0.64 1ib85 + 0.62 1ib94	 (4.5)
(-0.22)	 (3.92)	 (-2.79)	 (2.99)	 (4.41)
m = -0.49 + 2.60 ym - 0.70p + 0.20 1ib85 + 0.19 1ib94 -0.31 ecm . 1	(4.6)
(-0.22)	 (3.98)	 (-3.79)	 (4.05)	 (2.96)	 (-3.43)
where the L preceding the variables, in equation (4.5), stands for the log of the variable; and,
the dependent and the first two independent variables in equation 4.6, which are in lower
cases, represent growth rates.
The two long run trade liberalisation coefficients, 1ib85 and 1ib94, in equation (4.5) are
significant at the 5 per cent level, suggesting that given changes in domestic income and
relative prices, imports increased by approximately 85 per cent in both years.8
The ECM, in equation (4.6), shows the short run coefficients of the variables and the error
correction term. Except for the constant coefficient, the parameters are statistically
significant. The error correction coefficient is statistically significant, has the correct sign and
suggests a moderate speed of convergence (31 per cent) to equilibrium.
7 Both models satisfy all diagnostic tests.
8 This value is calculated from e l) I , where 13 is the value of the coefficient.
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In sum, at the aggregate level there is evidence that the trade reforms during the mid-1980s
increased the growth of imports into the Mexican economy. Also, we found some evidence
for structural break related to NAFTA using the outside sample forecasting method and when
estimating the long run relationship using ARDL models.
The following section analyses the impact of trade reforms by sector. We are interested in
identifying the sectors where trade reforms had the greatest impact on imports. The results
presented in the next section should be taken cautiously due to the relatively small sample
size used.
4.5 Impact of Trade Reforms on Imports at a Disaggregated Level
The aim of this section is to differentiate the effects of two periods of trade reforms on
Mexican imports at a disaggregated level. For this purpose we consider three different
classifications of imports. Classification 1 is related to Farming, Extractive and
Manufacturing sectors; classification 2 refers to Consumer and Capital goods. Classification
3 deals with nine sub-sectors that comprise the manufacturing sector: Food Products,
Beverages and Tobacco; Textiles and Leather Products; Wood Products; Paper Products,
Publishing and Printing; Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic Products; Non-Metallic Mineral
Products; Basic Metals; Machinery and Equipment; and, Other Products.
We are going to use the econometric techniques applied for the aggregate analysis: the OLS
methodology, structural stability analysis, outside sample forecasts, ARDL and ECM.
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i)Ordinary Least Square Estimations
In order to estimate the import model at a disaggregated level, using the OLS, and to avoid
the possibility of spurious results, the ADF test was applied to the different sectors and sub-
sectors under consideration. We use annual data from 1980 to 2000 for the first two
classifications, and data from 1980 to 1999 for the third classification. The data source is the
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geograffa e Informatica (INEGI), the Banco de Mexico, and
the World Development Indicators (2002).
Unit root tests for stationarity are performed on the log levels of the variables aiNd
differences. Table 4.7 (part A) presents the results of the ADF test (one lag) and the Phillips-
Perron unit root test under the assumption of a constant. All the variables are integrated of
order one, I(1), at the 5 per cent or 10 per cent level of significance.
Table 4.7




with Constant and Time Trend
Vanables Log Level I	 Differences'	 Log Level 2 Differences2
Farming Imports -0.91 -4.68*	 -3.75* -4A5*
Extractive Imports -0.45 -3.17*	 -3.50** -3.38**
Manufacturing Imports -0.08 -3.91*	 -5.17* -3.98*
Consumer Goods -0.78 -3.25*	 -3.75* -3.21
Intermediate Goods 0.19 -4.26*	 -5.15* -4.30*
Capital Goods -0.67 -3.24*	 -4.55* -3.39**
Food Products, Beverages and Tobacco3 -0.84 -2.98**	 -2.32 -2.98
Textiles and Leather Products -0.26 -3.14*	 -3.58** -3.20
Wood Products -0.75 -2.76**	 -2.96 -2.61
Paper Products, Publishing and Printing -0.40 -3.09*	 -4.26* -2.81
Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic Products 0.12 -4.02*	 4.45*
Non-Metallic Mineral Products -0.78 -3.46*	 -4.76* -3A3**
Basic Metals -0.73 -5.87*	 -5.36* -6.64*
Machinery and Equipment -0.17 -3.90*	 -5.14* -4.01*
Other Products -0.55 -3.70*	 -3.84* -3.63**
Notes: 'The critical value for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root is -3.02. 2The critical value for rejection of
hypothesis of a unit root is -3.67. 'The Phillips-Perron unit root test was applied for this manufacturing sub-sector. The
asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 5 per cent level. The double asterisk (**) denotes significance at the 10 per cent
level.
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Table 4.7 (part B) also presents the results of the ADF (one lag) and the Phillips-Perron unit
root test with a constant and deterministic time trend for the variables both in levels and first
differences. It can be seen that almost all variables, except imports for the Food, Beverages
and Tobacco sub-sector, and the Wood Products sub-sector, in log levels are stationary. In the
case of first differences, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity can be rejected at the 5 per
cent or 10 per cent level for the imports of five sectors (Farming; Extractive; Manufacturing;
Intermediate Goods; Capital Goods); and, five manufacturing sub-sectors (Chemicals,
Rubber and Plastic Products; Non-Metallic Mineral Products; Basic Metals; Machinery and
Equipment; and, Other Products).
We present regressions using the OIS for the three different classifications of imports. Table
4.8 shows the results for the first classification. Different specifications were estimated in
order to know how each variable behaves when more explanatory variables are included. We
started estimating the simple static model and we ended with a complete dynamic one. Four
factors should be mentioned. First, the shift dummy variable for 1985 is positive and
significant at the 5 per cent confidence level for manufacturing imports (equation 3.8.13). It
suggests, ceteris paribus, that the mid-1980s trade reforms increased manufacturing import
growth by 30 percentage points. Second, the shift dummy variable for 1994 is not significant
at all. Third, price elasticities show the expected sign. They are statistically significant for
farming and manufacturing equations, where the magnitude of the coefficients is relatively
high. Regarding income elasticities they are not significant for any equation. Fourth, the shift
dummy variable for 1991, which was included to capture the change in the way the data were
compiled since that year, is not significant.
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Table 4.8
OLS Estimation for Disaggregated Import Growth: 1980-2000
Dependent variable : m'
Vanable
mi
Eq. Constant ym p m' jib 85 11694 d9I R2
48.1 0.10 -2.78 -1.82 -0.13 0.58
(1.48) (-1.44) (-4.19)* (-0.58)
482 0.08 -1.51 -1.78 -0.46 -0.15 0.77

















g 48.4 0.05 -2.65 -1.93 -0.45 0.14 -0.09 0.82
u.. (0.94) (-1.54) (-5.73)* (-3.66)* (1.71) (-0.52)
485 008 -2.65 -1.96 -0.45 -0.04 0.15 -0.08 0.82
(0.78) (-1.48) (-5.48)* (-3.48)* (-0.33) (1.67) (-0.45)
486 0.01 1.73 -0.14 -0.19 0.20
(0.24) (0.95) (-0.37) (-0.96)




(0.21) (0.83) (-0.43) (0.71) (-0.89)
0.22
488 -0.16 1.31 -0.05 -0.09 0.22 0.320)

















4810 -0.15 0.67 -0.17 -0.10 0.18 0.09 -0.17 0.36
(-1.01) (0.34) (-0.40) (-0 32) (1.04) (0.91) (-0.83)
4811 0.01 2.83 -0.73 0.29 0.66
co
cc
















Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "t"-statistics. The asterisk (*) for the "t" statistics denotes significance
of the coefficient at the 5 per cent level, and the double asterisk (**) denotes significance of the coefficient at the
10 per cent level. See diagnostic test in Table C3 in the Appendix.
Even considering other years related to the first period of trade reforms, 1986 and 1987, we
do not obtain more significant results. Regarding the second period of trade liberalisation we
tested for 1995 and 1996, but none of these years show positive and significant coefficients
(see Table C6 and Table C7 in the Appendix).
The results using OLS for the second classification of imports are presented in Table 4.9.
Four main aspects should be mentioned. First, the shift dummy variable for 1985 is positive
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and significant at the 5 per cent level for capital goods (equations 4.9.13 and 4.9.15) and
significant at the 10 per cent for intermediate goods (equation 4.9.8); while, none of the
coefficients relating to the second period of trade reforms is significant. Second, income
elasticities are significant for capital goods, showing a relatively high magnitude. Third, the
price elasticity shows the expected sign and is significant for almost all equations. This
evidence may suggest that Mexican imports are mainly determined by price. Finally, the
coefficients relating to the shift dummy variable for 1991 are significant for all intermediate
goods equations.
Table 4.9
OLS Estimation for Disaggregated Import Growth: 1980-2000
Dependent variable : mi
ariable Eq. Constant Ym	 P In' 1 1ib85 1ib94 d91 R2
4 9 / -0.00 4.60 -1.33 -0.17 0.69














VI	 c 4 9 3
-0.11 3.04 -1.51 0.19 0.16 -0.25 0.78
g C.; (-0.57) (1.16) (-2.64)* (1.02) (0.75) (-0.97)
4 9.4 0.03 3.16 -1.62 0.28 -0.04 0.77U -0.28
(0.36) (1.12) (-2.92)* (1.90) (-0.35) (-1.05)
4.9.5 -0.19 4.26 -1.21 0.10 0.29 -0.14 -0.29 0.79
(-0.89) (1.44) (-1.84) (0.46) (1.13) (-0.91) (-1.09)
4.9.6 0.06 0.97 -0.84 0.42 0.73









































4.9.10 -0.09 0.28 -0.82 -0.00 0.17 0.05 0.42 0.82
-0.82 0.17 -2.49 * -0.00 1.27 0.61 2.96 *
4.9.11 -0.05 4.72 -0.68 0.02 0.71
(-0.84) (2.49)* (-1.78) (0.12)
4.9.12 -0.03 3.53 -0.98 0.23 -0.05 0.75
-0.50 1.78 -2.34 1.49 -0.27
42 4.9.13 -0.31 -0.52 -0.03 0.32 0.00 0.82o
3
- --).31 * -1.27 -0.21 2.28 * 0.04
(5 4.9.14 -0.03 3.27 -1.02 0.24 0.03 -0.04 0.75
-0.58 1.50 -2.29 * 1.47 0.38 -0.19
4.9.15 -0.36 4.96 -0.33 -0.11 0.39 -0.08 -0.00 0.83
-2.44 * 2.50 * -0.69 -0.54 2.36 * -0.83 -0.03
Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "t"-statistics. The asterisk (*) for the "t" statistics denotes signif cance
of the coefficient at the 5 per cent level, and the double asterisk (**) denotes significance of the coefficient at the 10
per cent level. See diagnostic test in Table C4 in the Appendix.
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Trying different years, 1986 and 1987, for the first period of trade reforms, we do not find
significant effects. Neither 1995 nor 1996 exhibit significant results for the second period of
trade reforms related to NAFTA (see Table C8 and C9 in the Appendix). The price elasticity
is the only variable that remains significant for almost all equations.
The results from OLS estimations for the third classification of imports are reported in Table
4.10. Two main aspects should be highlighted. First, the shift dummy variable for 1985 is
positive and significant at the 5 per cent confidence level for the Machinery and Equipment
sub-sector (equation 4.10.38), suggesting that imports of this manufacturing sub-sector
increased by 35 percentage points as a consequence of the mid-1980s trade reforms.9
Precisely, in this manufacturing sub-sector, the most dynamic, is where the automobile
industry and auto parts industry is classified. Multinational enterprises like General Motors,
Toyota, Ford, VolksWagen increased their activities after the mid-1980s.
None of the coefficients for the second period of trade reforms, 1ib94, is significant.
Second, the price variable is significant at the 5 per cent confidence level, for at least one
equation, in the following manufacturing sub-sectors: Food Products, Beverages and
Tobacco; Wood Products; Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic Products; and, Machinery and
Equipment.
9 Although the Textiles and Leather Products manufacturing sub-sector show positive and significant
coefficients for 1ib85 (equations 4.10.8 and 4.10.10), we do not rely on these results because when 1ib85 is
included the sign for the price elasticity changes to positive, and this is not compatible with the theory.
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Table 4.10
OLS Estimation for Disaggregated Import Growth: 1980-1999
Dependent variable : m'
Variable
n
Eq. Constant Ym	 P In' , 1ib85 1ib94 d9I R2
i
i-18
































































































































































































































































410.23 -0.04 -0.49 -0.06	 0.13 0.28 0.72cc 6-


















4.10.25 -0.04 1.73 -0.49 -0.06	 0.13 0.00 0.28 0.72
(-0.38) (1.04) (-1.37) (-0.26)	 (0.91) (0.02) (1.82)












0.394 10 28 -0.38 2.98 -0.65 -0.25	 0.46 0.66
a= - 1.61 1.01 -1.02 -0.95	 1.80 ** 1.40
C
oz













4 10 30 -0.42 3.61 -0.50 -0.30	 0.53 -0.06 0.36 am
-1.58 1.04 -0.67 -0.99	 1.67	 -0.39	 ( .23
4 10 31 0.01 3.01 -1.28 0.32 0.52
(0.11) (0.87) (-1.82) (0.88)
4 10 32 0.01 2.85 -1.32 0.03 0.32 0.52































4.10 35 -0.14 2.42 -1.23 -0.05 0.18 0.08 0.32 0.55













5 4.10 37 0.03 1.87 -0.93 07/ 0.26 0.65































g 4.10.40 -0.29 -0.27 -0.18 0.42 -0.06 0.27 0.75
-1.71 -0.48 -0.66 1.95 ** -0.56 1.39
4.10.41 -0.01 7.52 -0.92 0.15 0.58
g (-0.12) (1.99) (-1.20) (0.39)
4.10.42 -0.01 6.59 -1.16 0.17 0.13 0.61i
Cr. (-0.14) (1.69) (-1.44) (0.96) (0.32)
15 4.10.43 -0.28 6.77 -0.81 0.00 0.33 0.12 0.63
0 (-0.89) (1.72) (-0.89) (0.01) (0.91) (0.30)
4.10.44 0.00 7.23 -1.06 0.16 -0.09 0.09 0.62
(0.02) (1.69) (-1.23) (0.88) (-0.45) (0.22)
4.10.45 -0.45 8.95 -0.17 -0.17 0.64 -0.30 0.00 0.68
(-1.34) (2.11)* (-0.17) (-0.59) (1.46) (-1.22) (0.00)
Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "t '-statistics. The asterisk (*) for the "t" statistics denotes significance of the
coefficient at the 5 per cent level. See diagnostic test in Table C5 in the Appendix.
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Notice that in four manufacturing sub-sectors (Wood Products; Paper Products, Publishing
and Printing; and, Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic Products) the shift dummy variable for
1991 is significant; which suggest that the change in the way how the data were compiled
mainly affected those sub-sectors.
Similarly as we did for the other two classifications of imports, we consider two alternative
years for each trade liberalisation indicator, 1986 and 1987 for the first period of trade
reforms; and, 1995 and 1996 for the second period (see Table C10 and C11 in the Appendix).
The results, however, do not show significant coefficients related to the alternative years
considered for any of the trade liberalisation indicators.
ii) Structural Stability and Forecasts
Additional to the use of shift dummy variables, as indicators of trade liberalisation, we apply,
alternatively, two techniques for examining whether or not a structural break in the growth of
each type of imports can be identified in 1985 and 1994: structural stability and outside-
sample forecasts.
First, we apply the Chow break point test in order to examine the statistical evidence for
structural stability of the parameters for the effect of the mid-1980s trade reforms. The Chow
test leads us to accept the null hypothesis of structural stability for the Farming sector and the
Wood Products manufacturing sub-sector. Imports of the other sectors and sub-sectors reject






We also calculated the root-mean-square (rms) forecast error and the Theil inequality
coefficient along with its components for these forecasts. These statistics which are helpful in















a) Farming Imports 0.300877 0.604256 0.073364 0.006845 0.919791
b) Extractive Imports 0.245457 0.790667 0.445171 0.027129 0.527700
c) Manufactunng Imports 0.198555 0.4152885 0.090248 0.850437 0.059315
d) Consumer goods 0.119480 0.170755 0.105725 0.372622 0.521653
e) Intermediate goods 0.200585 0.481831 0.096493 0.849572 0.053935
1) Capital goods 0.116684 0.203604 0.376330 0.337757 0.285913
g) Food Products, Beverages and Tobacco 0.139611 0.336156 0.000083 0.077922 0.921995
h) Textiles and Leather Products 0.419418 0.520076 0.008500 0.974283 0.017217
i) Wood Products 0.159861 0.223113 0.349865 0.020220 0.629915
j) Paper Products, Publishing and Printing 0.164707 0.478993 0.001124 0.402019 0.596857
k) Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic Products 0.160355 0.407179 0.084139 0.801863 0.113998
I) Non Metallic Products 0.315012 0.564214 0.070428 0.866452 0.068630
m) Basic Metals 0.456469 0 651005 0.076202 0.866452 0.057346
n) Machinery and Equipment 0.232887 0 440340 0.048187 0.915811 0.036002
o)Other Manufactures 0 265762 0.295594 0.001033 0.687911 0.311056
From the import forecasts evaluation, we observe that the rms forecasts error is relatively
high for the Textile and Leather Products, the Non-Metallic Products, and the Basic Metals
sub-sectors, but the bias proportion is high for the Extractive sector, the Capital goods and the
Wood Products. Therefore, we rely on the forecasts for import categories except for those
which have a relatively high bias.
ARDL and Error Correction Modelling
We supplement our previous results with two other econometric techniques, ARDL and
ECM. We are looking for the existence of a long run relationship between the variables under
consideration, for each type of imports, and for the speed of response of imports to an
external shock.
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First, the calculated F-statistics, which test for the existence of a long run relationship
between the variables included for each import category, are shown in Table 4.12. All import
models were estimated considering 1ib85 and 1ib94 trade liberalisation indicators and the shift
dummy variable for 1991, d91.' 2 The calculated F-statistic exceeds the upper bound of the
critical value band in five import categories (Farming; Intermediate Goods; Wood Products;
Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic Products; and, Basic Metals). Then, according to this test, the
null hypothesis of no long run relationship between, m i, p, ym, 1ib85, 1ib94 and d91 is rejected
for those models.13
Table 4.12





Farming 9.69* 1. Food Products, Beverages and Tobacco 0.25
Extractive 3.10 2. Textiles and Leather Products 1.77
Manufacturing 3.75 3. Wood Products 4.28**
4. Paper Products, Publishing and Printing 3.01
5. Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic Products 6.08*
Consumer Goods 0.97 6. Non-Metallic Mineral Products 3.61
Intermediate Goods 5.03* 7. Basic Metals 4.38**
Capital Goods 2.75 8. Machinery and Equipment 3.50
9. Other Products 3.15
Notes: As the underlying regression contains an intercept but no trend, the bounds for the F- critical value at
the 5 per cent and 10 per cent level are given by 3.79 and 4.85, and 3.18 and 4.12, respectively. The asterisk
(*) denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of no long run relationship at the 5 per cent level and the double
asterisk (**) shows rejection of the null hypothesis at thel0 per cent.
As it is only appropriate to embark on the second stage of the ARDL procedure if the long
run relationship between the variables considered is not spurious, we continue with it for the
five import categories that pass this condition: Farming; Intermediate Goods; Wood Products;
Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic Products; and, Basic Metals.
12 For this test, the shift dummy variable for 1991 takes the value of one since 1991.
13 Where ' denotes the different types of imports.
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The estimation of the long run coefficients and the associated ECM are achieved using
ARDL. The order of the ARDL model is determined by using the Schwartz Bayesian
Criterion (SBC) or is determined by ourselves. The estimates of the long run coefficients and
the ECM associated with these long run estimates are presented in Part A and Part B in Table
4.13, respectively.
Table 4.13
Part A: Lone Run Coefficients
Variable	 Constant	 ym	 P	 1ib85	 1ib94 d9I
Farming














Part B: Error Correction Model
n1





















Notes: I Denotes ARDL selected based on SBC. 2 Denotes ARDL was arbitrarily chosen. The asterisk (*) denotes
significance of the coefficient at the 5 per cent level.
The long run coefficients for the first trade liberalisation indicator, 1ib85, are significant at the
5 per cent level for the Wood Products and the Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic Products
manufacturing sub-sectors; as expected they show a positive sign. Imports of the former sub-
sector increased by 138 percentage points; and, imports of the latter sub-sector rose by 40
percentage points, as a result of trade liberalisation in 1985.
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Political debate is now going on concerning the negative effects that NAFTA, so far, has had
on the Mexican farming sector. This sector has contracted since the 1980s, but especially
since 1994. According to NAFTA's tariff elimination schedule, on 1 st January 2003 the
remaining import tariffs for most of the agricultural products are going to be eliminated
(NAFTA Annex 302.2), but maize" is not going to be duty free imported until 2008.
Mexican farmers argue that they are not able to compete against very low import prices from
the US because US farmers benefit from large subsidies given by their government. The
Mexican government, however, does not offer such subsidies to Mexican farmers because it
is against NAFTA. Given these facts, a re-negotiation of NAFTA is urged in order to
alleviate the trade balance deficit in the farming sector.I5
Regarding the results for the long run income elasticities, the Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic
Products sub-sector is the only one that shows a statistically significant coefficient at the 5
per cent level. The price elasticity coefficients, as expected, show a negative sign and are
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level for imports of the Farming sector, the Wood
Products and the Basic Metals sub-sectors.
From the ECM models (see part B in Table 4.13) it is relevant to remark that all the error
correction terms are highly significant and have the correct negative sign; suggesting that
those import categories converge to equilibrium, once they are shocked.
In sum, through the use of different econometric techniques we show evidence which suggest
that the trade reforms launched during the mid-1980s increased the rate of growth of imports.
14	 •	 •Maize is the main grain that Mexican farmers produce and Mexican population consume.
15 Refer to diverse articles in Mexican newspapers, (i.e. La Jornada and Reforma).
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Independently of other factors (i.e. management of exchange rate), imports reacted earlier
than exports to those trade reforms (see chapter 3). The results for the analysis of the impact
of NAFTA on imports, however, vary by import sectors and manufacturing sub-sectors.
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter has analysed the effects of the two periods of trade reforms, the mid-1980s trade
reforms and those related to NAFTA, on Mexico's imports at the aggregate and at a
disaggregated level. The application of different econometric techniques (i.e. OLS method,
outside forecast, ECM, ARDL, etc.), suggest that there was a positive impact of the mid-
1980s trade reforms on imports. Regarding, the effects of NAFTA on imports, we found
evidence of a very short structural break for most main sectors and manufacturing sub-
sectors. These findings lead us to draw some further conclusions on Mexico's import
performance.
In particular, at the disaggregated level we observe that the performance of imports during
the last two decades has been very unstable, showing volatile growth rates. In spite of this
peculiar performance, there is no substantial evidence of change in the composition of the
manufacturing sub-sectors as a consequence of trade reforms. Even more, trade reforms have
accentuated the demand of imports from those manufacturing sub-sectors that already had a
major share in total imports.
Finally, this country case study provides more empirical evidence for the proposition that
imports react sooner and faster than exports to trade liberalisation, specifically referring to
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the mid-1980s trade reforms (Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall, 2002). From the previous chapter





OLS Estimation for Import Growth: 1970-2000
Dependent variable: Import growth (m)
Regressor
1ib94 1ib95 1ib96





















































































R- 0.81 0.81 0.77 0.81 0.76 0.82
Durbin Watson 1.55 1.54 1.57 1.55 1.55 1.58
Diagnostic Tests
Serial Correlation 0.266 0.274 0.266 0.275 0.241 0.309
Functional Form 0.305 0.259 0.294 0.343 0.427 0.418
Normality 0.566 0.560 0.690 0.584 0.583 0.578
Heteroscedasticit y 0.207 0.179 0.356 0.207 0.192 0.307
Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "t"-s atistics. The asterisk (*) for the "t" statistics denotes
significance of the coefficient at the 5 per cent level. The diagnostic tests show probabilities.
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Table C2
OLS Estimation for Import Growth: 1970-2000
De?endent variable: Import growth (m)
Regressor
1ib94 1ib95 1ib96


































































Durbin Watson 1.60 156	 , 1.60 1	 1.61
Diagnostic Tests
Serial Correlation 0.313 0.299 0.324 0.334
Functional Form 0.722 0.369 0.609 0.804
Normality 0.866 0.779 0.856 0.891
Heteroscedasticity 0.056 0.066 0.066 0.061
Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "t"-statistics The asterisk (*) for the "t" statistics





Dependent variable : m
''..-----------..!..............„."
m '
Eq. Serial correlation Functional Form Normality Heteroscedavticity
opg
C31 0.117 0.280 0.561 0.473
C32 0.139 0.454 0.670 0.427
C33 0.168 0.454 0.728 0.610
C3.4 0.345 0.679 0.706 0.509





C36 0.469 0.089 0.950 0.723
C37 0.613 0.827 0.884 0.409 
C38 0.901 0.031 0.767 0.595
C3.9 0.732 0.073 0.950 0.185





C3 11 0.551 0.144 0.005 0.842
C312 0.888 0.619 0.372 0.781
C3.13 0.271 0.125 0.448 0.723
C3 14 0.969 0.217 0.355 0.898
C3 15 0.187 0.159 0.547 0.798
Note: The diagnostic tests show probabilities.
Table C4
Diagnostic Tests
Dependent variable : m
Test
ms





C4 1 0.732 0.250 0.588 0.946
C4 2 0.380 0.659 0.780 0.936
C43 0.293 0.681 0.941 0.841
C44 0.393 0.560 0.740 0.914





G46 0.376 0.394 0.142 0.910
C4 7 0.499 0.467 0.953 0.774
C48 0.562 0.329 0.142 0.436
C4.9 0.797 0.120 0.931 0.435




C4 11 0.949 0.289 0.682 0.347
C4.12 0.588 0.917 0.934 0.296
C4.13 0.075 0.355 0.896 0.796
('414 0.599 0.614 0.986 0.313
C4.15 0.016 0.389 0.737 0.647




Dependent variable : m
Test
Ing
Eq. Serial correlation Functional Form Normality Heteroscedasticity
C5 I 0.774 0.871 0.338 0.608 
C52 0.064 0.782 0.534 0.514
C.5 3 0.034 0.722 0.747 0.448 
C54 0.074 0.782 0.543 0.494





C56 0.747 0.635 0.001 0.682
C5.7 0.560 0.670 0.001 0.688
C58 0.455 0.018 0.961 0.184
C59 0.617 0.316 0.000 0.849
C5 10 0.223 0.010 0.920 0.168
a
3 ct
C5.11 0.955 0.813 0.830 0.659
C5 12 0.379 0.707 0.987 0.566
C5 13 0.385 0.523 0.895 0.489
C5.14 0.290 0.806 0.935 0.556
C5 15 0.378 0.815 0.895 0.372
u,
i r g
t 6, .c e
2 -‘8, 1 E
ct e i
C5 16 0.272 0.766 0.266 0.419
CS 17 0.684 0.040 0.975 0.272
C5 18 0.588 0.032 0.798 0.384
C5 19 0.694 0.042 0.968 0.271
C5 20 0.651 0.023 0.890 0.284
i ; „ E
I	 2 i
ff,
C5 21 0.869 0.072 0.465 0.659
C5 22 0.936 0.239 0.726 0.607
C5 23 0.636 0.924 0.631 0.292
C524 0.947 0.920 0.864 0.357




,,= 2 t 
i
C5 26 0.873 0.061 0.043 0.682
C5 27 0.572 0.269 0.212 0.758
C528 0.097 0.600 0.540 0.793
C5 29 0.469 0.966 0.188 0.872
C5 ?0 0.102 0.730 0.583 0.928
al 1
C5 31 0.670 0.135 0.893 0.314
C532 0.529 0.197 0.890 0.329
C.5 33 0.316 0.884 0.732 0.933
C5.34 0.385 0.925 0.957 0.814




('536 0.635 0.133 0.007 0.954
C537 0.928 0.891 0.297 0.958
C5.38 0.204 0.082 0.625 0.675
C5.39 0.988 0.244 0.310 0.743




C5.41 0.755 0.775 0.100 0.949
C5 42 0.848 0.656 0.355 0.900
C5.43 0.672 0.063 0.942 0.867
C.5.44 0.846 0.850 0.279 0.605
C5.45 0.349 0.180 0.975 0.340
Note: The diagnostic tests show probabilities
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Table C6
OLS Estimation for Disaggregated Imports Growth: 1980-2000
Dependent variable : m'
mi






C6.I 0.02 -1.66 -1.75 -0.46 0.07 -0.16 0.78
0.26 -0.96 -4.94 * -3.48 * 0.75 (-0.89
C62	 0.04	 -1.92	 -0.45	 0.01	 0.14 -0.09 0.82
0.49	 -534 *	 -3.51 *	 (0.09 (1.45 (-0.51
1111111111111111111111
C6.4 0.03 -1.95 -1.80 -0.47 0.05 0.06 0.79
0.31 -1.07 -4.86 * -3.41 * 0.45 1166 -0.70
111111111111111111
COO 0.06 -1.60 -1.77 -0.46 0.02 0.00 -0.15 0 38
0.52 -0.76 -4.64 * -3.19 * 0,21	 0.03 -0.76
lib94
CO 7 -0.07 1.40 -0.11 0.06 0.12 -0.20 0.28
-067 0.74 -0.27 0.24 0.96 -1.00
C6 8' 	-0.06	 0.74	 -0.23	 0.05	 0.07 0.10 -0.15 0.37
eu
>















CO 13 -0.07 1.72 -0.09 0.08 0.13 0.28
-0.65 0.78 -0.22 0.30 0.96 -0.31 -1.01	 •
lib94
CO 14 -0.05 1.75 -0.85 0.16 0.10 0.26 0.73
0.52 1.00 -2.19 * 0.86 0.85 1.46
to


























•C6.19 -0.07 2.70 -0.75 0.11 0.14 -0.10 0.22 0.74-0.68 1.32 -1.87 0.59 1.10 -0.89 1.19
Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "t"-sta istics. The asterisk (*) for the "t" statistics denotes
significance of the coefficient at the 5 per cent level. The estimation fails Functional Form test.
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Table C7
OLS Estimation for Disaggregated Imports Growth: 1980-2000
Dependent variable : m'





































































































































































































Notes: Values in paren heses correspond to "t"-statistics. The as erisk (*) for the "t" statistics denotes
significance of the coefficient at the 5 per cent level. The estimation fails Functional Form test.
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Table C8
OLS Estimation for Disaggregated Imports Growth: 1980-2000
Dependent variable : m'

























































C8 5 0.03 3.99 -1.61 0.27 -0.15 -0.31 0.78
(045) (1.48) (-3.23)* (1.93) (-1.03) (-1.25)
C8 6 -0.06 4.51 -1.46 0.19 0.13 -0.20 -0.33 0.80
(-0.44) (1.61) (-2.69)* (1.15) (0.80) (-1.24) (-1.29)
11694
C8 7 -0.01 0.39 -0.86 0.09 0.09 0.41 0.78
(-0.17) (0.29) (-3.01)* (0.62) (1.09) (2.92)*
C8 8 0.00 -0.26 -0.99 0.14 0.04 0.07 0.45 0.79




















C8 10 -000 0.17 -0.90 011 0.07 0.78
(-008) (0.12) (-2.94)* (0.69) (0.77) (0.48) (2.87)*
lib96
C8 11 0.05 0.42 -0.93 0.17 -0.01 0.42 0.76
(1.26) (0.26) (-3.18)* (1.20) (-0.12) (2.80)*
C8 12 -002 0.82 -0.82 0.07 0.11 -0.04 0.38 0.78
(-0 25) (0.50) (-2.72)* (0.44) (1.17) (-0.51) (2.59)*
lib94
C8 13 -0.13 3.27 -0.85 0.12 0.13 -0.02 0.75
(-1.40) (1.72) (-1.92) (0.68) (1.04) (-0.11)
C8 14 -0.15 3.77 -0.74 0.09 0.17 -0.05 -0.03 0.76
(-1.18) (1.67) (-1.40) (0.43) (1.08) (-0.43) (-0.18)
lib95
0 C815
-0.02 3.08 -1.02 0.23 -0.01 -0.04 0.73- -o
.- o (-0.39) (1.52) (-2.37)* (1.43) (-0.12) (-0.20)
ejc" 8 C8 16 -0.15 3.67 -0.77 0.10 0.16 -0.06 -0.04 0.76
(-1 20)	 i (1.78) (-1.60) (0.52) (1.17) (-0.60) (-0.21)
lib96
C817 -0.02 3.46 -1.01 0.23 -0.05 -0.05 0.74
(-0.38) (1.59) (-2.35)* (1.42j (-0.45) (-0.28)
C8. /8 -0.15 4.15 -0.76 0.09 0.16 0.09 -0.05 0.77
(-1.25) (1.88) (-1.65) (0.51) (1.22) (-0.80) (-0.27)
Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "t"-statistics. The asterisk (*) for the "t" statistics denotes
significance of the coefficient at the 5 per cent level.
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Table C9
OLS Estimation for Disaggregated Imports Growth: 1980-2000
Dependent variable : m'
NN.yable
m







































































































































































































Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "t"-statistics. The asterisk (*) for the "t" statistics denotes significance
of the coefficient at the 5 per cent level.
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Table C10
OLS Estimation for Disaggregated Imports Growth: 1980-1999
Dependent variable : in'
Variable
a N



































































































































































































































































































C1019' -0.08 1.15 -0.49 0.14 0.14 0.36 0.67
(-0.86) (0.71) (-1.46) (0.70) (1.23) (2.11)
C10.201 410 1.51 -0.41 0.09 0.19 -0.06 0.33 0.68
to
i
(-0.96) (0.84) (-1.10) (0.40) (1.30) (-0.55) (1.81)
2 5
,4 g (0.37) ) (-1.56) ) ) (2.03)*
"0.10
i
C1022' 1.49 -0.40 0.07 0.20 -0.10 0.32 0.701 (-1.05) 1	 (0.90) (-1.18) (0.34) (1.56) (-1.01) (1.83)
g. lib96
C1023' 0.02 1.89 -0.53 0.25 -0.09 0.34 0.65g
(0.46) (1.02) (-1.56) (1.48) (-0.81) (1.93)
C1024' -0.11 2.34 -0.39 0.01 0.22 -0.17 0.29 0.73
(1.25) (1.37) (-1.22) (0.06) (1.83) (-1.56) (1.73)
lib94
C1025 0.02 1.79 -0.58 0.09 0.01 0.30 0.73
(0.28) (1.28) (-2.02)* (0.55) (0.17) (2. .18)*
C1026 0.03 1.40 -0.66 0.13 -0.01 0.05 0.33 0.74
I'
(042) (0.90) (-2.07)* (0.70) (-0.16) (0.65) (2.22)*
.g 1 li695
C10 27 0.02 1.62 -0.61 0.11 0.04 0.32 0.73g 8
(0.54) (1.16) (-2.21)* (0.71) (0.58) (2.30)*
1 1 CIO 28 0.02 1.62 -0.62 0.11 -0.00 0.04 0.32 0.73
5 5 -- (0.34) (1.10) (-2.03)* (0.62) (-0.04) (0.53) (2.18)*
(t lib96
C1029 0.03 2.05 -0.58 0.10 -0.03 0.29 0.73
(084) (1.35) (-2.08)* (0.69) (-0.44) (2.07)*
C1030 0.01 2.13 -0.55 0.08 0.02 -0.04 0.28 0.73
(0.21) (1.33) (-1.84) (0.43) (0.30) (-0.49) (1.91)
lib94
C1031 -0.21 2.48 -0.89 -0.03 0.26 0.37 0.64





















C1032 -0.02 1.89 -1.15 0.09 0.06 0.42 0.59E
(-0.22) (0.59) (-1.85) (0.48) (0.40) (1.35)
.2
CI0.33 -0.21 2.55 -0.87 -0.04 0.27 -0.01 0.37 0.64
1 (-1.21) (0.82) (-1.37) (-0.19) (1.31) (-0.11) (1.22)
lib96
2 C10.34 -0.00 2.73 -1.09 0.09 -0.08 0.37 0.59
(-0.00) _.(0.80) (-1.76) (0.47) (-0.45) (1.18)
C1035 -0.24 3.84 -0.78 -0.08 0.31 -0.17 0.31 0.67
(-1.39) (1.18) (-1.28) (-0.38) (1.64) (-0.95) (1.06)










C10.36 -0.01 3.07 -1.29 0.04 0.00 0.34 0.54
( 0.04) (0.81) (-1.65) (0.22) (0.00) (0.88)
C1037 0.02 1.97 -1.53 0.08 -0.09 0.17 0.42 0.57
(0.10) (0.48) (-1.79) (0.36) (-0.34) (0.76) (1.04)
g lib95
i'
C1038 -0.03 2.71 -1.34 0.04 0.10 0.37 0.55 
ca (-0.25) (0.71) (-1.76) (0.20) (0.54) (0.97)
C10 39 0.00 2.66 -1.38 0.05 -0.05 0.12 0.39 0.55
(0.00) (0.67) (-1.68) (0.25) (-0.19) (0.55) (0.95)
lib96
C1040 0.00 3.84 -1.26 0.04 -0.11 0.30 0.55
(0 01) (0.94) (-1.66) (024) (-0.48) (0.77)
CIO 41 -0 01 3.88 -1.24 0.04 0.02 -0.12 0.29 0.55
(-008) (0.91) (-1.52) (0.18) (0.11) (-0.47) (0.71)
lib94
CIO 42 -0.08 2.35 -0.75 0.14 0.12 0.27 0.69
(-068) (1.11) (-1.60) (0.68) (0.91) (1.33)
C1043 -007 2.14 -0.80 0.16 0.11 0.02 0.28 0.69









(0.03) (0.88) (-2.05)* (1.36) (0.40) (1.35)
CIO45 -0.08 2.33 -0.75 0.14 0.12 0.00 0.27 10.69
(-064) (1.01) (-1.48) (0.64) (0.78) (0.03) (1.26)
.2
4 lib96
CIO 46 0 01 2.46 -0 88 0.24 -0.05 0.26 0.682
(025) (1.04) (-1.97) (1.34) (-0.38) (1.19)
C!047 -0.10 3.10 -0.67 0.10 0.16 -0.09 0.24 0.71
(-0.78) (1.28) (-1.38) (0.50) (1.07) (-0.69) (1.11)
lib94
C1048 -0.07 6.92 -1.10 0.15 0.04 0.13 0.62
(-0.30) (1.72) (-1.26) (0.74) (0.16) (0.32)
.1 CIO 49 '011 7.98 -0.85 0.10 0.14 -0.15 0.06 0.63
(-045) (1.77) (-0.86) (046) (0.45) (-0.60) (0.15)
C lib95
2 C10.50
-0.01 7.41 -1.07 0.17 -0.12 0.10 0.63
r; (-0.09) (1.83) (-1.28) (0.93) (-0.60) (0.24)
-s
0 CI0.51 -0.10 7.64 -0.91 0.11 0.14 -0.17 0.07 0.64
(-0.43) (1.81) (-0.99) (0.50) (0.46) (-0.72) (0.16)
lib96
C1052 -0-00 9.16 -1.02 0.15 -0.31 0.03 0.67
(-0.07) (2.20)* (-1.29) (0.86) (-1.29) (0.08)
C1053 -0.12 9.58 -0.85 0.08 0.16 -0.36 -0.00 0.68
(-0.55) (2.21)* (-0.99) (0.38) (0.61) (-1.38) (-0.00)
Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "1"-statistics. The asterisk (*) for the "t" statistics denotes significance
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(0.06)
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Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "t"-statisUcs. The astensk (") for the "t' statistics denotes significance of the
coefficient at the 5 per cent level. I The estimation fails Functional Form test. The estimation fails normality test.
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Chapter 5
Impact of Trade Reforms on the Trade Balance, the
Balance of Payments and Economic Growth
5.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the impact of trade liberalisation on the balance of trade and the
balance of payments of Mexico. To date, there has been very little published research on this
topic, and none for Mexico. There have been a lot of studies of the effects of liberalisation on
export performance and economic growth, but the monetary consequences of trade reforms
have been ignored. This is an important topic because if liberalisation affects the balance of
payments adversely, it has implications for the credit-worthiness of the country, its ability to
borrow, and the sustainability of growth. This chapter also examines, therefore, whether the
changing trade performance of Mexico has affected its long run economic growth rate
consistent with balance of payments equilibrium.
Theoretically, the effects of trade reforms (by means of tariff and non-tariff changes) on the
trade balance and the current account of the balance of payments are a priori undetermined;
therefore, it is entirely an empirical issue (Ostry and Rose, 1992). 1 Recent cross-section/panel
studies in this field include UNCTAD (1999), Parikh (2000), and Santos-Paulino and
'Also, the effect of tariff changes on the level of output is ambiguous. The authors claim that the effect depends
on the timing and expected duration of the tariff change, on the performance of real wages and exchange rates, on
the values of several elasticities, as well as on institutional factors such as the degree of capital mobility. In other
words, it depends on the characteristics of a specific economy.
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Thirlwall (2002). All these studies find that trade liberalisation deteriorates the balance of
trade and the balance of payments controlling for other factors. For instance, referring to the
most recent and complete study, Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall (2002), considering a group of
twenty-two developing countries for the period 1972-1997, found that trade liberalisation has
worsened the trade balance by over one per cent of GDP and it has deteriorated the current
account of the balance of payments by approximately 0.5 per cent of GDP on average. They
found that the effects of liberalisation on the trade balance and current account of the balance
of payments have been roughly the same across the regions of Africa, Latin America, East
Asia and South Asia. There have been individual case studies for some Latin American
countries (e.g. Khan and Zahler, 1985), but not for Mexico.
In Mexico, as in many other Latin American countries, the drastic reductions in trade
restrictions went much further, in terms of speed and intensity, than the World Bank ever
envisaged (Edwards, 1997). After 1985, when trade liberalisation was initiated in Mexico, the
country experienced two balance of payments crises, one in 1986 and the other in 1994-95.
Although each one had its particular causes, both crises originated in inappropriate
macroeconomic policies —excessive government deficits and lax monetary policies— which
resulted in vulnerable positions of the current and capital accounts 2 on the balance of
payments; and both were preceded by trade reforms.
2 On the capital account liberalisation issue, see for example Singh (2002a).
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This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a descriptive analysis, comparing the
performance of the trade balance and the current account of the balance of payments before
and after trade reforms. A distinction is made between the total trade balance and the non-oil
trade balance, as well as the total current account and the non-oil current account of the
balance of payments. Moreover, a succinct description of the trade balance by sectors and
manufacturing sub-sectors is also presented. Section 3 outlines the model and describes the
econometric techniques to be used in the following section. Section 4 measures the impact of
trade reforms on the trade balance and current account of the balance of payments. Section 5
spells out the relation between the current account of the balance of payments and economic
growth using a balance-of-payments-constrained growth model. In this section, we compare
our results with those given by previous studies (Moreno-Brid; 1998, 2001), and the validity
of the model is tested by assessing how close the estimated growth rate approximates the
actual growth rate. Section 6 concludes.
5.2 Descriptive Analysis
5.2.1 Aggregate Analysis
During the 1960s and early 1970s the agricultural sector was the main provider of foreign
exchange. This sector financed imports required for industrialisation of the country (Fuji,
2000). When the trade surplus of the agricultural sector was insufficient to compensate for the
trade deficit of the manufacturing sector, the government became more dependent on foreign
investment. For a short time, the oil boom alleviated the constraint of the balance of payments.
However, the foreign exchange obtained from oil exports was insufficient to sustain trade
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balance equilibrium. In this sense, the Mexican economy has been subject to the effects of
frequent balance of payments crises. Before trade reforms were launched during the mid-
1980s, import tariffs and non-tariff barriers were used in order to ameliorate the deficits on the
trade balance. In fact, the performance of the trade balance relative to GDP (TB/GDP) has
been very volatile. Table 5.1 shows the TB/GDP ratio from 1979 to 2000.
Table 5.1
Total Trade Balance, Non-Oil Trade Balance, Trade in Services, Total









1979 -1.59 -5.34 - -
1980 -1.37 -6.04 -3.67 -4.67 -9.71
1981 -1.27 -6.02 -4.37 -5.30 -10.39
1982 3.59 -4.81 -7.13 -3.01 -11.95
1983 9.47 -1.28 -6.33 3.94 -7.61
1984 7.51 -1.95 -5.90 2.38 -7.85
1985 3.24 -2.64 -3.79 0.34 -6.43
1986 3.88 -0.99 -6.16 -1.06 -7.15
1987 6.26 0.11 -4.61 3.02 -4.50
1988 1.42 -2.24 -3.95 -1.30 -6.19
1989 0.18 -3.35 -3.93 -2.61 -7.28
1990 -0.34 -4.18 -4.01 -2.84 -8.20
1991 -2.01 -3.96 -2.72 -4.66 -6.68
1992 -4.38 -6.67 -3.27 -6.72 -9.94
1993 -3.34 -5.18 -3.36 -5.80 -8.55
1994 -4.39 -6.16 -3.56 -7.05 -9.72
1995 2.48 -0.47 -4.41 -0.55 -4.88
1996 1.97 -1.54 -4.08 -0.75 -5.62
1997 0.16 -2.67 -3.37 -1.91 -6.04
1998 -1.90 -3.61 -3.40 -3.86 -7.02
1999 -1.16 -3.24 -3.07 -2.92 -6.31
2000 -1.39 -4.24 -2.99 -3.16 -7.23
Note: • Includes transfers, where remittances from workers are accounted for.
Source: Own calculations based on data from World Development Indicators (2002) and Banco de Mexico.
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the country had to import most of the equipment
required for the oil industry; thus the trade deficit was driven by this type of imports. From
1982 to 1989 there was a trade surplus. During the 1990s, the deficit on the trade balance
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averaged 1.3 per cent of GDP. Before NAFTA was set up, the trade deficit relative to output
increased rapidly from 0.18 per cent in 1989 to 3.3 per cent in 1993; and, in 1994, when
NAFTA was implemented, the trade deficit relative to GDP was 4.3 per cent. This fact, among
others, caused a severe contraction of GDP in 1995. During 1995, the ratio of the trade
balance relative to output registered a surplus, but it did not last for long. After 1998, the
deficit on the trade balance relative to GDP increased again.
Table 5.1 also shows the non-oil trade balance relative to GDP. From 1979 to 2000, each year
registers a trade deficit, except in 1987. During this period, the trade deficit wiesage,c1 .4 lyn
cent of GDP. The trade deficits were very high during the first three years of the 1980s: in
1985; from 1989 to 1994, and from 1998 to 2000. It is important to differentiate the total trade
balance from the non-oil trade balance because oil exports are not affected by trade reforms
—but rather by different domestic and international regulations. Thus, in section 5.4, for the
econometric estimations, we only consider the non-oil trade balance.
As with the non-oil trade balance relative to GDP, there is also a deficit on the trade in
services as a share of GDP through all the period (Table 5.1). Although after 1995 it has a
tendency to decrease, partly as a result of Mexico's GDP slowdown, it is still relatively high
compared to the non-oil trade balance. Undoubtedly, deficits on trade in services constrain
even more the current account of the balance of payments.
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In order to have a better understanding of trade in services it is necessary to mention that
officially the liberalisation of trade in services in Mexico started when NAFTA was set up in
1994. The terms of trade in services are established in Chapter 12: Cross-Border Trade in
Services (refer to NAFTA's text). Beyond NAFTA, the creation of the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (OATS) was one of the agreements of the 1986-94 Uruguay Round
negotiations, signed at the Marrakesh ministerial meeting in April 1994, whose results came
into force in January 1995 (WTO). Mainly, trade liberalisation in services is based on
regulatory reforms and its aim is to secure a more transparent and predictable regulatory
environment for services across countries. According to Hoekman and Messerlin (1999)
services are much more regulation-intensive than goods. Table 5.2 shows the classification of
services considered by GATS.
Table 5.2
Liberalisation of Trade in Services by GATS
Business Services and Professional Services
Accountancy services
Advertising services
Architectural and engineering services




Postal and courier, express mail services
Telecommunications











Services auxiliary to all modes of transport
Movement of Persons
Source: WTO (1994a). Available at <URL: http://www.wto.org/englishitratop_e/serv_e/topittop > [Accessed 11
February 20031.
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Besides NAFTA, other free trade agreements include liberalisation of trade in services, for
instance the EU-Mexico Free Trade Agreement came into force in July 2000.3
The last two columns of table 5.1 show the total current account and the non-oil current
account of the balance of payments relative to GDP. From 1979 to 2000, on average the deficit
for the former was 2.3 per cent of GDP and 7.5 per cent for the latter. We focus our attention
on two comparisons between these two different variables at the time of liberalisation. First,
the position of the current account changed from a surplus of 0.34 per cent of GDP in 1985 to
a deficit of 1.06 per cent of GDP in 1986, and then moved again to a surplus of 3.02 per cent
in 1987; while, the non-oil current account increased its deficit from 1985 to 1986, and then it
diminished from 1986 to 1987. Second, from 1993 to 1994 both accounts increased their
deficits.
Turning to other relevant aspects, Mexico has achieved relatively high rates of growth, but in
combination with trade disequilibria and phases of sharp decline. Thus, the trade balance
relative to GDP shows opposite movements in relation to the output growth rate, and this
inverse relationship has hardly changed for the last two decades. Every time that GDP growth
increases, the trade balance relative to GDP decreases, and vice versa. Panel a) in Graph 5.1
shows these variables from 1979 to 2000. This conflicting relationship applies as well for the
non-oil trade balance relative to GDP and output growth rate, see panel b) in Graph 5.1.
3 See Ferreira (2001) for the analysis of liberalisation of trade in services in the EU-Mexico Free Trade




(i.e. fall in the price of oil, dramatic increases in real interest rates, and scarce availability of
credit) caused the so-called debt crisis.4
The second negative growth rate occurred in 1986, when Mexico faced the second crisis of the
1980s. After 1982, the fiscal and monetary policies were adjusted to overcome the debt crisis.
The privatisation of public firms was accelerated in order to alleviate the fiscal deficit (Aspe,
1994). However, the public finances were fragile because the public expenditure was relying
excessively on oil. In fact, the economy was adversely affected when the price of oil fell from
an average of US$25.5 a barrel in 1985 to US$12 in 1986. This, combined with othet advexse,
external conditions, including high real interest rates and lack of international financial credit,
resulted in large net resource transfers to the rest of the world. For instance, the high interest
rates increased Mexico's debt payments; while the lack of external credit meant that little
foreign capital was coming in. This led to devaluation of the real exchange rate in 1986.
Despite the devaluation, imports continued to grow faster than exports, and caused a deficit on
the non-oil current account of the balance of payments relative to GDP of approximately 7 per
cent. The devaluation and higher public sector prices caused other prices in the economy to
rise.
The third negative GDP growth rate occurred in 1995 when the GDP fell 6.5 per cent. The
strong fall in economic growth was preceded by a high deficit on the current account of the
balance of payments relative to GDP because consumption was stimulated by the expansion of
4 See Aspe (1992), Brailovsky (1992), Lustig (1992), and Villareal (2000).
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domestic credit. In 1994, the deficit on the current account was 7 per cent of GDP (see Table
5.1). The 1994-95 balance of payments crisis, popularly known as the Tequila or Peso crisis,
could be briefly explained by the private demand expansion, weak banking system, an
overvalued exchange rate, and by the vulnerability generated by the massive portfolio capital
inflows, especially from 1990 to 1993. Ros and Lustig (2000) argue that the critical problems
resulted from the fact that the liberalisation of trade and the opening of the domestic bond and
stock markets took place in the midst of a persistent real overvaluation of the peso and a high
volatility of capital flows. Also, as the rate of inflation was forced to adjust to similar levels of
Mexico's trade partners (Canada and US) in a very short period of time, the exchange rate was
pegged. Moreover, the country experienced political turmoil and violence throughout 1994:
the armed uprising by the Zapatistas in January (the same day that NAFTA came into effect),
the assassinations of the presidential candidate in March and of the Secretary of the ruling
party in September, and the resignation in November of the Assistant Attorney who was in
charge of investigating the assassination of his brother (Secretary of the Partido
Revolucionario Institucional). In order to maintain the Mexican peso-US dollar rate
unchanged, the Mexican monetary authorities increased domestic credit and encouraged
investors who feared a devaluation to switch from Mexican peso-denominated short term
government debt to debt indexed to the dollar, called Tesobonos (Lustig, 2001). These
decisions were clearly wrong.
It is interesting to note that except for the 1986 balance of payments crisis, the other two crises
coincided with presidential elections. The economic environment was surrounded by
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institutional frictions between the public and private sector in relation to determining the scope
of action of each sector in the economy. These political frictions influenced adversely the
management of economic policy.
5.2.2 Disaggregated Analysis
A disaggregated analysis of the trade balance gives a more comprehensive understanding of
Mexico's trade structure and about the tight links between GDP growth and trade. Table 5.3
shows the performance of the non-oil trade balance by main sectors, from 1980 to 2000. The
agricultural sector has registered a very unstable trade balance pattern, shifting from trade
deficit to surplus, but in most years there has been a deficit. The extractive sector has shown a
more stable performance than the agricultural sector. During the 1980s, it had trade surpluses.
However, after 1993 it experienced trade deficits, except in 1995. The manufacturing sector
has registered systematic trade deficits. Notice that trade deficits during the 1990s were higher
than during the 1980s.
Table 5.3
Trade Balance by Main Sectors, 1980-2000
(Millions of US$)
Year Agriculture Extractive Manufacturing Year Agriculture Extractive Manufacturing
1980 -41.5 21.3 -1,151.8 1991 20.2 15.9 -1,221.7
1981 -78.3 33.9 -1,557.0 1992 -62.2 1.4 -1,838.9
1982 11.2 23.4 -879.4 1993 -10.8 -1.8 -1,589.0
1983 -42.7 31.7 -211.3 1994 -57.7 -0.7 -1,945.8
1984 -34.9 28.8 -370.0 1995 114.4 4.2 -9.8
1985 -16.5 24.8 -633.7 1996 -89.9 -11.7 -10.3
1986 96.7 26.8 -330.0 1997 -28.7 -22.5 -501.9
1987 36.2 26.6 -175.7 1998 -81.4 -27.5 -820.5
1988 -8.6 28.0 -551.3 1999 -46.1 -25.2 -863.6
1989 -20.7 18.1 -852.0 2000 -48.5 -33.7 -1,553.2
1990 7.6 19.0 -1,138.5
Source: Own calculations based on data from Institut° Nacional de Estadfstica, Geograffa e Informdtica (INEGI).
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The performance of the trade balance by type of products is given in Table 5.4. Consumer
goods have shown trade surpluses after the debt crisis and since 1991 the surpluses have
increased noticeably because in 1991 there was a change in the compilation of the data. Since
then, in-bond, maquiladora, products have been included in this classification. Intermediate
goods show trade surpluses from 1980 to 1990, particularly from 1982. The most likely
explanation for this is that oil exports are included in this category, which hides the evolution
of other intermediary goods. After 1991 intermediate goods show continuous trade deficits.
This shift cannot be explained by the performance of the trade balance in maquiladoras
because it has registered surpluses. The most likely explanation is the decrease of intermediate
good exports due to the economic slowdown in the US economy during the early 1990s in
combination with an increasing demand for intermediate goods imports by Mexico. Capital
goods exhibit trade deficits before 1994 and surpluses after 1995. This shift may be the result
of the increase in automobile and auto-parts exports, some of the products favoured by
NAFTA and by deregulation of foreign direct investment (Loria and Fuji 1997; Mzittar et al.,
2002; Dussel, 2002b).5


















1980 -72.3 183.8 -413.4 1991., 388.9 -588.8 -363.9
1981 -100.4 315.3 -601.8 1992 310.8 -1,095.9 -484.8
1982 -10.4 894.0 -355.5 1993 533.8 -1,248.2 -336.8
1983 85.2 1,171.9 -144.7 1994 647.3 -1,716.0 -371.3
1984 105.7 1,075.5 -174.0 1995 1,493.2 -1,035.2 283.9
1985 56.9 776.6 -228.4 1996 1,813.0 -1,469.1 456.2
1986 154.7 360.6 -196.2 1997 1,965.7 -2,096.3 457.5
1987 238.8 521.9 -154.4 1998 2,237.6 -3,229.0 613.1
1988 181.9 100.4 -254.8 1999 2,511.5 -3,488.9 808.6
1989 61.1 27.6 -287.0 2000 2,696.5 -4,406.8 1,043.4
1990 36.9 66.3 -448.6
Note: 'After 1991 maquiladora products were added to the rest of the series.
Source: Own calculations based on data from Institut° Nacional de Estadistica, Geograffa e Informatica (INEGI).
It is also interesting to examine which manufacturing sub-sectors have worsened or improved
after trade reforms. Table 5.5 gives the trade balance for the nine manufacturing sub-sectors
for the period 1980-1999. Three sub-sectors out of nine (Paper Products, Publishing and
Printing; Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic Products; and, Non-Metallic Mineral Products) have
trade deficits throughout the period. The Machinery and Equipment sub-sector had trade
deficits before 1994; and, from 1995 to 1999 it had surpluses. Three sub-sectors (Textiles and
Leather Products; Wood Products; and, Other Products) have shifted from deficits to
surpluses, but after 1995 have had surpluses. The Basic Metals sub-sector is the only one that
has experienced trade surpluses throughout the period.
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Table 5.5





























1980 -33.2 -6.9 -2.3 -46.7 -146.1 -159.2 9.8 -717.2 -4.9
1981 -33.2 -18.6 -2.3 -52.0 -158.8 -191.4 16.9 -1,048.8 -7.2
1982 1.4 -10.0 0.0 -32.7 -123.8 -87.4 17.2 -610.1 -3.3
1983 16.4 12.0 4.9 -18.1 -4.3 -21.8 64.3 -197.3 4.7
1984 26.8 14.7 5.1 -23.4 -5.3 -45.0 53.3 -283.3 3.0
1985 20.2 4.2 1.9 -27.4 -63.7 -44.2 21.9 -426.1 0.2
1986 37.2 16.4 4.4 -24.4 -63.8 -28.8 60.2 -276.9 1.1
1987 71.1 32.9 7.6 -32.1 -59.2 -24.2 85.6 -201.2 0.7
1988 10.8 13.9 8.4 -39.7 -95.7 -60.8 96.5 -417.7 -3.5
1989 -62.2 -15.8 7.2 -55.4 -179.2 -81.1 119.6 -532.6 -12.2
1990 -132.0 -34.6 -0.5 -71.5 -163.1 -117.9 120.0 -722.4 -16.4
1991 -101.2 -18.6 1.3 -99.2 -360.4 -227.1 108.0 -536.7 12.2
1992 -164.2 24.5 -4.3 -127.8 -463.1 -271.6 85.5 -835.0 0.5
1993 -147.2 -62.9 0.3 -142.0 -495.5 -250.6 121.3 -610.0 -2.4
1994 -174.4 -76.0 -9.0 -206.5 -599.7 -3(0.5 i (8.8 -6804 -S.1
1995 -7.3 106.8 22.5 -168.9 -471.5 -266.6 307.1 414.3 53.9
1996 -15.4 144.7 39.2 -166.0 -699.0 -340.7 281.9 689.5 55.6
1997 -21.8 222.1 48.8 -184.7 -946.5 -408.8 295.4 454.8 45.6
1998 -32.4 200.2 42.7 -197.7 -1,049.0 -457.0 221.5 424.4 26.7
1999 -31.3 207.4 36.9 -215.2 -1,177.7 -453.3 156.2 604.0 4.4
Source: Own calculations based on data from Banco de Mexico and Institut° Nacional de Estadistica,
Geograffa e Informdtica (INEGI).
It does not appear from the previous descriptive statistics that either the mid-1980s trade
reforms or NAFTA have led to a positive and permanent improvement in the trade balance,
but it is necessary to test, controlling for other variables.
5.3 The Model and Econometric Techniques
In order to evaluate the impact of trade reforms on the trade balance we estimate a model of
the trade balance over the period 1980-2000. As in the case of exports (Chapter 3) and imports
(Chapter 4) special attention is paid to 1985 and 1986, when trade distortions were modified in
a significant way, and to 1994 when Mexico joined NAFTA. Given the earlier estimates of the
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impact of trade liberalisation on the volume of exports and imports, the a priori expectation of
the effects of trade reforms on the trade balance is uncertain. Also, the trade balance (and
balance of payments) is measured in monetary terms, so the terms of trade also become
important.





where X and M are the value of non-oil exports and imports, respectively. Taking logs of the
variables and differentiating with respect to time, the rate of growth of the trade balance is
defined as:
tb = (px+ x)— (p„, + m) 	 (5.2)
where x and m are the rate of change of the volume of exports and imports, respectively. The
difference between the rate of change of export prices and import prices (p., —p,,,) measures the
rate of change in the terms of trade, tot. Based on equations (3.2) and (4.2), which define the
rate of growth of exports and imports, respectively, we substitute and rearrange terms to obtain
the following equation:
tb = w + 0 1 yus + 02 ym + 03 p + 04 tot + tt	 (5.3)7
6 The trade balance excludes oil.
7 The explanatory variables of the trade balance equation encompass both the absorption and elasticity
approaches to the balance of payments.
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where IV is a constant and T, is the error term. It is expected that 0 1 is positive, 02 is negative,
03 is positive, and 04 is positive. Our model (equation 5.3) is modified with the introduction of
different trade liberalisation indicators. It is extended with the inclusion of export and import
duties, and two shift dummy variables. 8 For the latter, tests showed the most significant
structural breaks to be in 1985 and 1994. Thus, the estimated trade balance model is:
tby= iv + 0 1 yus, + 02 ym, + 03 p, + 04 tot, + 05xd, + 06md, + 07 1ib85, + 081ib94, + T,	 (5.4)
where xd and md are export and import duties, respectively, and 1ib85 and 1ib94 are the shift
dummy variables for each of the episodes of trade liberalisation, respectively. The sign of 0 5 is
negative, 06 is positive, and 0 7 and 08 are undetermined.
As an alternative specification we test the impact of trade liberalisation on the ratio of the
trade balance to GDP. This is the more normal measure of balance of payments fragility. The
complete equation to be estimated is as follows:
GDP
- P + 11i PSI + 12 YMI +1 3 Pt +14 tot, + 15 xd, + 16 Mdt + 17 1ib85, + 18 1ib94, + al
where p is the constant term and a, the error term. The explanatory variables of equation




8 As export duties are available for the period 1980-2000, they were included in the trade balance equations
(although not in the export growth equations).
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Additionally, as trade liberalisation not only affects merchandise trade but also services, we
test for the impact of liberalisation on the rate of change of the current account of the balance
of payments (BP) and on the current account of the balance of payments as a share of GDP.9
The BP model is specified as follows:I°
dBP, BP	 ,
— and — – A. + XI Par + X2 Ymt + X3 Pt + XA tot, + X5 lib94, + Di
BP	 GDP
where X is the constant and 1.) the error term. The variables and the expected signs of the xs
are similar to the variables and coefficients of equation (5.5).
Different econometric techniques to evaluate the impact of trade reforms on the trade balance
and current account of the balance of payments are used. We estimate equations (5.5) and
(5.6) using ordinary least squares. A structural stability test is applied to evaluate if the first
period of trade reforms caused a structural change in the dependent variables. Outside sample
forecasts are needed to test for structural stability relating to NAFTA. Rolling regressions
show the evolution of the constant, and 'income and price elasticities', through different
overlapping periods. Finally, ARDL and ECM models are used to test for long-run
relationships among the variables that explain the trade balance, and to evaluate the speed of
adjustment of the trade balance model after a shock.
9Differently from goods, tariffs and quotas generally are not restraints on trade in services. This makes it difficult
to assess the extent of Mexico's openness to trade in services. However, considering that NAFTA was
implemented in 1994, the shift dummy variable refers to this year.
t° The current account of the balance of payments excludes oil.
(5.6)
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5.4 Impact of Trade Reforms on the Trade Balance and Balance of
Payments
The only major study to have looked at the determinants of Mexico's trade balance is Galindo
and Guerrero (1997), but they pay no attention to the effects of trade reforms on the trade
balance. Using the Johansen cointegration method and quarterly data from 1980 to 1995, they
found that there is a long run relationship between the rate of growth of the trade balance, the
rate of growth of domestic income, the rate of growth of US income and the rate of growth of
the real exchange rate. The estimated domestic income elasticity is -0.75, the US income
elasticity is 0.46 and the real exchange rate elasticity is 1.83." Additionally, the authors argue
that in the long run the nominal exchange rate tends to adjust to the inflation and interest rate
gap between Mexico and US. This being so, the real exchange rate is not the best variable to
offset a deterioration in the trade balance. They claim, however, that the Marshall-Lerner
condition is satisfied.
i) Ordinary Least Square Estimations
Before starting to estimate the trade balance and current account of the balance of payments
models using OLS, we first consider the stationarity of the variables. In previous chapters
(chapters 3 and 4) we tested for stationarity of the majority of the series. Here, we only test for
stationarity of the rate of change of the trade balance, the ratio of the trade balance to GDP, the
rate of change of the current account of the balance of payments, the ratio of the current
account of the balance of payments to GDP, and the terms of trade. Unit root tests for
II Galindo and Guerrero (1997) used US income in nominal terms to estimate the foreign income elasticity. They
do not give any argument for doing so; and, they do not make clear if the domestic income variable is in real or
nominal terms.
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stationarity are performed on the levels of the variables. Table 5.6 (Part A) presents the results
of the ADF test (one lag) under the assumption of a constant. The rate of change of the trade
balance, the rate of change of the current account of the balance of payments, the ratio of the
trade balance to GDP, and the terms of trade are 1(0). The ratio of the current account of the
balance of payments to GDP is not stationary. Table 5.6 (Part B) also shows the results of the
ADF test (one lag) with a constant plus a deterministic time trend. Only the rate of change of
the trade balance and the rate of change of the current account are 1(0). These results imply
that we are not able to use the OLS method for the ratio of the current account of the balance
of payments to GDP, otherwise the results will be spurious.
Table 5.6








Variables	 Log Level I	 Log Level 2






Notes: 'The ADF critical value -3.04. 2The ADF critical value is -3.67. The asterisk (*) and double
asterisk (**) imply significance at the 5 per cent and 10 per cent level, respectively.
We first estimated a set of regressions using the OLS method considering the rate of growth of
the non-oil trade balance as the dependent variable. The results are shown in Table 5.7.
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Table 5.7
OLS Estimation for the Trade Balance: 1980-2000
Dependent variable: Trade Balance Rate of Growth (tb)
Regressor
Equations
5.7.1 5.7.2 5.7.3 5.7.4
0.11 0.27 0.11 0.29Constant (1.26) (2.60)* (1.22) (2.71)*
-3.20 -4.42 -3.36 -4.30









0.46 0.03 0.41 0.07
P (1.55) (0.11) (1.19) (0.23)
0.03 -0.10 -0.02 -0.02tot









R2 072 0.79 0.72 0.81
Durbin Watson 1.90 2.94 1.90 2.47
Diagnostic Tests
Serial Correlation 0.915 0.366 0.932 0.321
Functional Form 0.800 0.965 0.989 0.835
Normality 0.058 0.960 0.038 0.961
Heteroscedasticity 0.388 0.031 0.337 0.061
Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "t"-statistics. The asterisk (*) for he "t" statistics
denotes significance of the coefficient at the 5 per cent level. The diagnostic tests show
probabilities. Export and import duties were included in the estimations, both of them show
expected signs but none of them is significant. As the sample is not very large, we decided to
exclude them to have more degrees of freedom.
Three points should be highlighted. First, the shift dummy variable for 1985, 1ib85, has a
negative sign and is significant at the 5 per cent confidence level (equations 5.7.2 and 5.7.4). It
influenced negatively the tb by between 14 and 18 percentage points. Second, the shift
dummy variable for 1994, 1ib94, is not statistically significant. Third, the coefficient of ym
has the expected sign and is significant in all the equations. However, yus is not
statistically significant and shifts from a positive to negative sign when both shift dummy
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variables are included. I2 Although p is positive, it is not significant. The terms of trade
variable (tot) is not statistically significant in any of the equations.
According to the estimated results, each period of trade liberalisation (1ib85 and 1ib94) had
different effects on the trade balance. Trade reforms related to 1985 worsened the rate of
change of the trade balance, but there is not a significant effect from NAFTA. The negative
effect of the mid-1980s trade liberalisation on the trade balance is consistent with our earlier
findings: imports reacted faster than exports to trade liberalisation. The significant impact of
trade liberalisation on import growth was in 1985 (see chapter 4), while export growth
increased in 1986 (see chapter 3). However, it is largely domestic income growth that drives
the performance of the trade balance.I3
Considering the ratio of the trade balance to GDP (TB/GDP) as the dependent variable, no
significant coefficients that represent the trade liberalisation indicators were obtained. None of
the coefficients of 1ib85 and 1ib94 are significant. Table 5.8 shows the results. In this case, the
coefficients of ym and yus have the expected sign. For instance, considering equation 5.8.2, if
ym increases by one per cent, it leads to a deterioration of 0.32 in the ratio of the trade
balance to GDP; which is a strong effect. When both income coefficients are significant
(equations 5.8.1 and 5.8.2), yus is always higher than ym. The coefficient of p is negative and
12 As this is an unexpected result, because US is the main trade partner of Mexico, we tried different
specifications of our model. We find that when the constant is excluded from the tb equation, both income
elasticities, yin and yus, are statistically significant either at the 5 or 10 percent level; however, no dummy
variable is significant. These results are in Table Cl in the Appendix.
13 Tables C2 and C3 in the Appendix show different estimations of the trade balance equation, which consider
alternative years for each period of trade reforms (lib86 and 1ib87; 1ib95 and lib96).
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is not significant; while tot is positive but not significant. In general, if we consider the R2,
which is lower than 50 per cent, these results are rather weak.
Table 5.8
OLS Estimation for the Trade Balance /GDP: 1980-2000
Dependent variable: Trade Balance/GDP
Regressor
Equations

















































R2 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48
Durbin Watson 1.23 1.27 1.24 1.19
Diagnostic Tests
Serial Correlation 0.076 0.108 0.096 0.078
Functional Form 0.929 0.726 0.993 0.896
Normality 0.781 0.687 0.680 0.671
Heteroscedasticity 0.764 0.783 0.806 0.685
Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "t"-statistics. The asterisk (*) for the "t" statistics denotes
significance of the coefficient at the 5 per cent level and the double asterisk (**) denotes significance of
the coefficient at the 10 per cent level. The diagnostic tests show probabilities.
The effects of liberalisation on the non-oil current account of the balance of payments are not
picked up by the OLS estimations, according to the results given in Table 5.9. The shift
dummy variable, 1ib94, considers liberalisation in trade of goods and services. The 1ib94
coefficient is not statistically significant. The domestic income elasticity is the only coefficient
that is statistically significant through all the equations. However, we should consider that
many of the flows within the current account (i.e. interest payments) have more to do with
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financial liberalisation than with trade liberalisation in goods and services. From the
descriptive analysis (section 5.2) we know that the invisible account of the balance of
payments has not compensated trade deficits. Additionally, transfers included in the current
account (i.e. workers' remittances) are not directly linked with any trade reforms.
Table 5.9
OLS Estimation for the Balance of Payments: 1980-2000
































Durbin Watson 2.13 2.14
Dia nostic Tests
Serial Correlation 0.751 0.747
Functional Fonn 0.677 0.798
Normality 0.117 0.084
Heteroscedasticity 0.104 0.092
Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "t"-statistics. The asterisk (*) for the "t" statistics
denotes significance of the coefficient at the 5 per cent level. The diagnostic tests show
probabilities.
We now supplement the above analysis with additional econometric techniques to test for the
effect of trade reforms on the trade balance and current account of the balance of payments.
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ii) Structural Stability, Rolling Regressions and Forecasts
As we did for the export and import analysis, we apply structural stability, rolling regressions
and outside-sample forecasts. First, to find out if there is evidence for structural stability of the
rate of growth of the trade balance we applied the Chow breakpoint test. The Chow breakpoint
test rejects the null hypothesis of structural stability in the trade balance for 1985 at the 10 per
cent level of significance (the F-calculated, 2.48, is higher than the F-statistic, 2.43). This is
further support of a structural break in the trade balance model, related to the mid-1980s trade
reforms.
Second, we estimated rolling regressions to look for parameter variation in the basic trade
balance model (equation 5.3), but focusing our attention on the change in the constant. The
Ke-SlaS, lic-C1% Z, S'ampke sim of fourteen yews, we shown in Table 5.10. The positive constant
has decreased over the seven time periods. This predominant downward tendency suggests a
worsening of the trade balance linked to the trade liberalisation reforms. After the period
2984- i997, the domestic income elasticity decreases and is not significant any more. We have
to consider that the rate of growth of GDP improved from one year to the other, it changed
from -4.2 per cent in 1983 to 3.6 per cent in 1984; while the non-oil trade deficit worsened
from 1983 (1,912 millions of US$) to 1984 (3,417 millions of US$). The foreign income
coefficient is negative in four rolling regressions and is never significant. Also, the price
coefficient does not follow a stable tendency, it increases through time and is only significant
in the last four regressions. The terms of trade coefficient moves erratically and is not





the current account related to trade reforms (see Table D2 and Graph D1 in the Appendix).
The non-oil current account outside-sample forecast shows that NAFTA represents a
deterioration on the current account (Graph D2 in the Appendix).
iii) ARDL and ECM models
Using two econometric techniques, ARDL and ECM models, we will try to corroborate the
existence of a long run relationship among the variables that explain the rate of growth of the
trade balance performance. Furthermore, we will investigate the speed of adjustment of the
trade balance after it is affected by a shock.
First, we test for the existence of a long run relationship between the variables under
investigation in the trade balance model using the F-test (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997). In this
case, the calculated F statistic is 11.6. Comparing it with the interval of the critical values of
the F-test (2.85 to 4.04), it is above the upper critical value, allowing us to reject the null
hypothesis of no long relationship between the variables.
We then estimated the long run coefficients and the ECM. We use one lag length, and the
order of the ARDL model is (1,0,0,0). The long run coefficients and the ECM derived from
the ARDL approach for the trade balance are:14
LTB = -29.08 - 1.27LYM + 2.73 LY US + 1.23 LP -0.28 1ib85 -0.11 1ib94	 (5.7)
I-statistic (-3.94)* (1.21)	 (3.12)*	 (3.64)*	 (-2.00)*	 (-0.97)
tb = -23.93 - 1.04 ym + 2.25 yus + 1.05 p - 0.23 1ib85 -0.09 1ib94 - 0.82 ecm .1
	
(5.8)
I-statistic (-2.11)* (-1.04)	 (2.38)*	 (4.79)*	 (-2.01)*	 (-0.94)	 (-534)*
14 The terms of trade variable (TOT) is not included because it does not show a significant coefficient, and the
rest of the variables perform better without it.
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where the L preceding each variable in equation (5.7) stands for the log of the variable; and
lower case letters in equation (5.8) represent growth rates for the first three variables.15
From the equation that represents the long run coefficients, the trade liberalisation indicator
related to the first period of trade reforms, 1ib85, is significantly negative. This means that the
trade balance deteriorated as a result of trade liberalisation by approximately 23 per cent.16
However, there is no significant impact of the second shift dummy variable, 1ib94, on the trade
balance. The income and real exchange rate elasticities show the expected sign, and are
statistically significant, except for the domestic income. The ECM shows the short run
coefficients of the variables and the error correction term. The latter tells us that about 82 per
cent of the discrepancy between the actual and the equilibrium value of the rate of growth of
the trade balance is corrected within a year. 17
From the previous empirical analysis, it is possible to say that the mid-1980s trade reforms
worsened the trade balance. Regarding the second episode of trade reforms, related to
NAFTA, the results cannot be considered as conclusive but they are certainly suggestive of a
negative structural change in the trade balance from 1994 to 1995, but after 1996 there is
evidence of a positive structural change. Although there is no definitive conclusion concerning
" When we substitute the rate of growth of the trade balance (tb) for the ratio of the trade balance to GDP (TBY),
all the coefficients are lower than the coefficients using tb as the dependent variable. Moreover, the real exchange
rate and 1ib85 coefficients are statistically significant at the 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively.
TBY = -2.31 — 0.11LYM + 0.23 LY US + 0.09 LP -0.02 lib85 - 0.00 1ib94	 Long Run Model	 (5.7')
hstausur (-3 94)	 (-1 33)	 (3.22)	 (3.48)•	 (-I 94) ••	 (-0 94)
TBY = -1.95 - 0.09 ym + 0.19 yus + 0.07 p - 0.01 1ib85 -0.00 1ib94 - 0.84 ecm	 ECM	 (5.8')
I-stanstr (-3 54)	 (-1 20)	 (1.20)	 (4481*	 (-1 97)•• 	(-0 92)	 (-5 70)*
16 This value is calculated from e l , where 13 is the value of the coefficient.
17 There is a long run relationship between the variables under investigation in the current account of the balance
of payments model. The calculated F statistic is 13.24, which is higher compared with the interval values of the
F-test. The ARDL and ECM models for the current account do not show a significant coefficient related to 1ib94,
but income and price elasticities have the expected sign and are statistically significant. The results are presented
in Table C5 in the Appendix.
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the effect of trade liberalisation on the current account of the balance of payments, as well as
for the trade balance, there is evidence for an unfavourable structural break during 1994 and
1995, afterwards the results are indicative of a positive effect.
5.5 Interaction between the Balance of Payments and Economic Growth
5.5.1 Theoretical Framework
The purpose of this section is to examine the interaction of the trade balance and economic
growth by considering the balance-of-payments-constrained growth model, first formulated by
Thirlwall (1979). Particularly, we are interested in whether Thirlwall's model is a good
predictor of Mexico's long run growth rate, given that trade liberalisation is likely to affect the
income elasticity of demand for imports.
Thirlwall's model says that the ultimate constraint on growth in an open economy is the
balance of payments, and that a country's growth rate can be approximated by the inverse of
the income elasticity of demand for imports times the rate of growth of exports. The balance-
of-payments-constrained growth model is derived from two main equations:
X= (Pd /PfE)" ZE
	
(5.9)
M = (Pd/PjE)w 11'
	
(5.10)
where variables X, M, Z and Y are exports, imports, world income and domestic income,
respectively; (Pd/Pf ) is the ratio of domestic prices to foreign prices, and E is the nominal
exchange rate measured as the domestic price of foreign currency. The parameters ri(<0) and E
(>0) are the price and income elasticity of exports, respectively; IV (>0) and it (>0) are the
190
price and income elasticity of imports, respectively. Taking logs of (5.9) and (5.10) and
differentiating with respect to time gives:
x = ri (pd - pf - e) + E Z
	
(5.11)
m = lif (Pd- e - pf) + 'Try	 (5.12)
where the lower case letters are the growth of the variables. Assuming long run equilibrium on
the current account and that the rate of change of relative prices is constant over time




or, combining equation (5.11) and (5.13), gives another definition:
y:, = (1/7c) x	 (5.14)
Equation (5.14) is a dynamic version of Harrod's static foreign trade multiplier result (Harrod,
1933) that output in an open economy is determined by exports relative to the propensity to
import.
The rate of growth of exports divided by the income elasticity for imports sets a rate of growth
which cannot be exceeded in the long run without ever-increasing capital inflows. To allow
for capital flows, Thirlwall and Hussain (1982) extended the original model as follows:
18 McCombie and Thirlwall (1994) suggest that empirical evidence supports that in the long term relative price
fluctuations measured in a common currency are minimal. However, McCombie (1997) emphasises that "the
approach does not argue that relative prices have no effect on trade flows, only that over the long run their impact
is quantitatively small".
18 It can also be shown that this result holds if the Marshall-Lerner condition is just satisfied (i.e. tv + Tl = 1).








2	 4	 (I — e)(Pd + X)
Yb - Yb =	 g
(5.17)
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where 0 and (1-0) represent the shares of exports and capital flows as a proportion of total
receipts, respectively; and f is the rate of growth of nominal capital inflows. 0 = PdXIR and
(1-0) = FIR, where F is the value of nominal capital flows measured in domestic currency and
R is total overseas receipts. Assuming no initial disequilibrium and no capital flows (i.e. 0 =1),
equation 5.15 yields equation 5.14. In case that there is initial disequilibrium but f = 0, the
balance-of-payments constrained growth rate is reduced to:
4 •	 3yb is less than yb , assuming that pd is positive. Subtracting equation (5.16) from (5.14) we see
the absolute reduction in the level of the growth rate:
If, initially, capital inflows finance the current account deficit and the growth rate is not lower
than without initial disequilibrium, there must be a positive rate of growth of capital inflows to
compensate. This rate is defined by setting equation (5.15) equal to (5.14) and solving for f:
f= pd + x	 (5.18)
As there is a limit to the ratio of the current account deficit to GDP and the ratio of
international debt to GDP, McCombie and Thirlwall (1999) and Moreno-Brid (1998)
reformulate the model to allow for the influence of external debt accumulation. Assuming a
given long term ratio of the external debt to GDP and constant terms of trade, McCombie and
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where is the export/import ratio at nominal prices. If the current account is zero (XJM =1),
then equation (5.19) reduces to equation (5.14).
The implication of the extended model is that capital flows cannot permit an individual
country to increase its growth rate above y, or yi  by very much or for very long (McCombie
and Thirlwall, 1999).
S52. ONerNktvi of the IkMante-of-Payments-Constrained Growth Model Applied to
Mexico
There has been a tot of interest in the performance of the relationship between Mexico's GDP
growth and its trade sector during recent decades. In particular, several studies have focused
on the analysis of the balance of payments constraint to Mexico's long run economic growth;
most of them have considered Thirlwall's model. Warman (1994), Moreno-Brid (1998, 1999,
2001 and 2002a), Lopez and Cruz (2000) and Ocegueda (2000), by using different
econometric techniques, all confirm Thirlwall's 'Law' for the Mexican economy. Loria and
Fuji (1997) arrive at a similar conclusion that Mexico's economic growth is constrained by the
balance of payments, but they follow a descriptive approach rather than an econometric one.
Warman (1994) estimates the basic (equations 5.13 and 5.14) and extended (equation 5.15)
balance-of-payments-constrained growth models over the period 1961-1990. She estimates
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price and income elasticities of the import and export demand functions using OLS. Her
estimations, either considering the static or dynamic specification of the import and export
equations, show that the price elasticities of exports and imports do not satisfy the Marshall-
Lerner condition. The specification used to estimate the income elasticity of demand for
imports, however, does not include any variable which captures the impact of the mid-1980s
trade reforms on imports. Considering the original model, she finds that the average predicted
growth rates for the period 1961-1990, ranging from 4.9 to 5.7 per cent, are very close to the
average actual growth rate of 5.1 per cent. When the sample was divided into two sub-periods,
before and after the debt crisis (1961-1981 and 1982-1990), she finds that the extended model
—which includes capital flows— approximates better to the actual growth rate. The results
highlight the importance of export capacity and the income elasticity of demand for imports as
determinants of long run economic growth. Moreover, the results imply that in the long run
prices measured in a common currency stay fairly stable.
Loria and Fuji (1997) descriptively analyse the balance of payment constraint on Mexico's
economic growth. They claim that the insufficient generation of foreign currency in relation to
the growing demand from the manufacturing sector is the main constraint on Mexico's
economic growth; this restriction has been intensified as a result of the macroeconomic
reforms undertaken during the 1980s (i.e. adjustment and stabilisation programs implemented
after the debt crisis; deregulation of the economy –trade and financial opening and
privatisation of public firms). The authors describe the tendencies in the trade balance of the
agricultural, mining and manufacturing sectors for the period 1980-1994; and they also
analyse the shifts from trade surplus to deficit, and vice versa, for about 26 selected
agricultural and manufacturing sub-sectors. In spite of the change in the composition of
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exports in favour of manufactured goods, the authors conclude that the country's trade
composition constrains its economic growth.
Lopez and Cruz (2000), using the Johansen cointegration method, test Thirlwall's Law for
four Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico) for the period 1965-
1996.20 They focus on three issues. First, they validate Thirlwall's Law through the existence
of cointegration vectors between domestic output and exports for each country. The Granger
causality relationship between domestic output and exports was tested; their findings suggest
that causality runs from exports to output for all countries., except for Mexic.Q. 21 'Clv..‘j also
report the "equilibrium" (defined as "the inverse of the [long run] elasticity of exports with
respect to output") and the estimated long run income elasticities of demand for imports
(estimated by the cointegrating vector in the VAR for output and imports). The latter elasticity
is higher than the former for all the economies, except for Brazil. The difference is wider for
Mexico, and according to their results, Lopez and Cruz claim that a growth rate of exports of 1
per cent was associated with a GDP growth rate of 2.2 per cent. In order to maintain foreign
trade equilibrium, TE should be 0.45 instead of 1.3. Second, after showing graphically that the
real exchange rate has changed in Latin America economies, they argue that such variations
affect domestic output in the long run. They support this argument because they found for
each country a stable long run relationship between domestic output and the real exchange
rate. However, as initially pointed out by Holland et al. (2002), Lopez and Cruz are assuming
a straightforward relationship between the real exchange rate and domestic output, but it is not
20 For Colombia, the period is 1968-1996. For most of the estimations, the authors use different time periods,
even for the same country.
21 For the case of Mexico, this is a contradictory result compared with those obtained by Thornton (1996),
Abdulsanner and Manuchehr (2000) and Alguacil et al. (2002). In general, they found that exports stimulated
Mexico's economic growth. See in more detail in Chapter 6.
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so. Beyond the fulfilment of the Marshall-Lerner condition, changes in the domestic currency
—appreciation or depreciation— affect the domestic output through private investment,
consumption and debt position in foreign currency.22 Hence, their criticism of Thirlwall's
assumption about the stability of the terms of trade or the real exchange rate in the long run is
rather weak. Finally, they tested whether the Marshall-Lerner condition holds for the group of
countries in their study by estimating a VAR which includes the trade balance, domestic and
foreign income, and the real exchange rate. Their findings suggest that a higher exchange rate
worsens the trade balance for the Brazilian and Mexican economies. The authors disregard,
however, the effects of trade liberalisation in these Latin American countries.
Ocegueda (2000) also estimates the original balance-of-payments-constrained growth model
over the period 1960-1997, applying the Engel and Granger method. He confirms the
predictive power of the simple specification of Thirlwall's Law for the Mexican case.
Ocegueda considers 1982 as the turning point for economic policy making arguing that after
the debt crises all the macroeconomic variables were affected by the structural adjustment
policies including trade liberalisation. After comparing estimates of GDP growth between two
periods (1960-1982 and 1983-1997) he concludes that the balance of payments equilibrium
growth rate worsened after 1982. He derives the conclusion by arguing that the income
elasticity for imports (it) increased from 1.05 for the period 1960-1982 to 4.91 for the 1983-
1997 period (the it for the second period is very high, about 2 percentage points higher than
the one estimated by Moreno-Brid for a similar period). The import equation for the second
22 In their conclusions, Lopez and Cruz (2000) recognise that even when the Marshall-Lerner condition holds, a
higher real exchange rate is associated with a lower level of domestic output, e.g. this is the case for Argentina's
economy. They explain this inverse relation by saying that "...this negative association is probably the result of a
harmful impact of a higher real exchange rate on domestic demand." Therefore, implicitly the authors take into
account the indirect relationship between domestic output and the real exchange rate.
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sub-sample includes the ratio of licensed imports to total imports as a variable to account for
trade liberalisation.
Moreno-Brid in various papers (1998, 1999, 2001 and 2002a) has also thoroughly examined
the balance of payments equilibrium growth rate for the Mexican economy. Two main
conclusions emerge. First, the results support the extended version of Thirlwall's model (based
on an alternative concept of long run equilibrium defined as a constant ratio of the current
account deficit to domestic income; see Moreno-Brid, 2001) as a better predictor of Mexico's
long run economic growth rather than the original model. Second, the income e)asticity of
demand for imports has increased as a result of trade liberalisation, which can explain
Mexico's economic growth slowdown since the mid-1980s.
Moreno-Brid (2001), in his most complete work, estimates the original and extended balance-
of-payments-constrained growth model from 1967 to 1999. The predicted growth rate of the
extended model is 4.4 per cent, which is very close to the actual growth rate of 3.8 per cent.
He applies the Johansen cointegration method to estimate the import equation.
The estimated income elasticity of demand for imports for that period is 1.7. 23 He includes the
index of the production-weighted coverage of import licences —which takes into account the
effects of trade liberalisation— in the import demand specification used to estimate 7E. The
23 In earlier studies, Moreno-Brid (1998 and 1999) estimates implicitly the income elasticity of demand for
imports. In other words, he divides the average annual growth rate of imports by the annual GDP growth rate.




























value of the variable lies between zero and one (it equals zero when all licence requirements
on imports have been eliminated, and it equals one when they are compulsory on every
importable good or service). When the sample is divided into sub-periods (1968-1983 and
1982-1997; or, 1969-1984 and 1983-1998; or, 1970-1985 and 1984-1999) he finds that as the
income elasticity of demand for imports increases, the actual growth rate decreases from one
period to the other. For instance, for the first two sub-periods (1968-1983 and 1982-1997) it
increases from 1.57 to 3.54, and the actual growth rate slows from 5.5 per cent to 1.6 per cent.
In any case, one of his main conclusions is that It has constrained Mexico's economic growth.
Table 5.11 summarises Moreno-Brid's (2001) results.
Table 5.11








1967-1999 4.78 4.40 3.87 8.47 1.77
1968-1983 5.85 5.46 5.52 9.17 1.57
1969-1984 5.54 5.29 5.34 8.47 1.53
1970-1985 5.62 5.17 5.05 8.66 1.54
1982-1997 2.19 2.86 1.65 7.74 3.54
1983-1998 2.76 3.26 2.63 8.59 3.11
1984-1999 2.91 3.70 2.79 9.14 3.14
Source: Moreno-Brid (2001), from Table 4.7.
5.5.3 Effect of Trade Liberalisation on Mexico's Economic Growth
We turn now to our own estimates of the impact of trade reforms on Mexico's economic
growth using Thirlwall's model. The effect of trade reforms on Mexico's GDP is measured by
changes in the income elasticity of demand for imports and the rate of growth of exports. As
the former has increased over time, according to previous studies, this means a negative effect
of trade liberalisation on economic growth, unless offset by a faster rate of growth of exports.
Thus, we estimate the long run elasticity of demand for imports using the ARDL technique,
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for fourteen sub-periods. 2 4 We find an increase in the long run income elasticity of demand for
imports. The results are presented in Table 5.12. In spite of considering different sub-periods,
our results are consistent with the elasticities that Moreno-Brid (2001) estimated (see Table C4
in the Appendix).
Table 5.12
















Source: Own estimations based on data from World Development Indicators (2002).
Notice that there is a remarkable jump in it from the period 1981-1995 to the period 1982-
1996, which must be due to the increase in the rate of growth of imports in 1996 (the annual
rate of growth of imports in 1995 was -15 per cent, but in 1996 was 23 per cent).
We consider the full sample and two different sub-periods to estimate the balance-of-
payments-constrained growth model (equation 5.14), taking the mid-1980s trade reforms as a
break point, and using different income elasticities of import demand. Table 5.13 shows the
results. In each period, the estimated Harrod foreign trade multiplier is higher than the actual
24 The specification of the import equation is very similar to equation (4.2) in Chapter 4; where imports depend
on domestic income and the real exchange rate. In this case, import duties are included as a trade liberalisation
indicator.
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growth rate of GDP (y); for the first sub-period (1973-1985 or 1973-1986), the difference is
higher than for the second sub-period (1986-1999 or 1987-1999).25
Table 5.13
















1973-1999 4.4 3.6 9.8 2.2 -1.40
1973-1985 6.9 5.0 9.0 1.3 -0.55
1973-1986 5.8 4.3 8.7 1.5 -2.62
1986-1999 2.9 2.8 9.2 3.1 -2.19
1987-1999 3.2 2.8 10.5 3.2 -0.10
Notes: • Figures are in real terms at 1995 US dollars. b The terms of trade are calculated as the ratio of
Mexico's export price index to its import price index, where all prices are expressed in US dollars.
Source: Own calculations based on data from World Development Indicators (2002) and Banco de
Mexico.
Another point to notice is that in spite of having an increasing rate of growth of exports, it has
increased as well, in part as a result of trade liberalisation (Moreno-Brid, 2001; Ocegueda,
2000), which has led to a reduction in the actual rate of growth of GDP.
The adverse effect of relative prices movements may be one explanation of the shortfall of the
actual rate of growth. For instance, the sub-periods which include 1986 (1973-1986 or 1986-
1999) have on average a faster deterioration than the other two sub-periods (1973-1985 or
1987-1999), see last column in Table 5.13. This is because in 1986 the negative change in the
terms of trade was approximately 29.4 per cent. Also, the significant price elasticity of
demand for imports (see Chapter 4), may have an adverse effect on the actual rate of growth.
25 The estimations of the balance of payments equilibrium growth rates differ from those reported by Moreno-
Brid (2001), because our rates of growth of exports are higher than the ones he presented. The only explanation
for this is that the figures which he shows are in real (1980) Mexican pesos, while ours are in real (1995) US
dollars (the terms of trade varied during the 1980s).
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A formal test of whether the actual growth of a country can be predicted from its balance of
payments equilibrium growth rate was proposed by McCombie (1989). The test consists of
estimating the hypothetical income elasticity of demand that equates the actual and the balance
of payments equilibrium growth rates (i.e. n'E- x/y), and to compare n' with the estimated it. If
it' does not differ significantly from it, nor will actual GDP growth and yb2 differ significantly.
Thus the hypothesis to be tested is whether or not IT = . This was undertaken by estimating the t-
statistic from the standard error of it for the null hypothesis that it = it ' , and evaluating whether
or not the null hypothesis is rejected at the 95 per cent confidence level. The results are
reported in Table 5.14. The balance of payments equilibrium growth rate is not refuted for the
full sample or for the two post mid-1980s trade reform sub-periods. For the other two sub-
periods, 1973-1985 and 1973-1986, there is a statistically significant difference between it and
it ' , although the discrepancies are not very large.
Table 5.14
Testing for whether it and n' are significantly different
(Selected sub-periods)
Period it IC
Absolute value of the
t statistic a
1973-1999 2.2 2.7 1.51
1973-1985 1.3 1.8 2.93*
1973-1986 1.5 2.0 2.57*
1986-1999 3.1 3.2 0.17
1987-1999 3.2 3.7 0.94
Notes: • The 1-statistic is based on the null hypothesis that it = It'. The asterisk (*) denotes that it differs
significantly from tc" at the 5 per cent confidence level.
Source: Own calculations based on data from World Development Indicators (2002) and Banco de Mexico.
The analysis concludes with several findings. Even without considering the influence of
capital flows on the balance of payments —which certainly would yield better approximations
between the actual and estimated growth rates— it is shown that after the mid-1980s trade
reforms the equilibrium long run rate of economic growth (yb2 ) has declined considerably,
201
from 6.9 per cent to 2.9 per cent (considering 1973-1985 and 1986-1999) or, alternatively,
from 5.8 per cent to 3.2 per cent (1973-1986 and 1987-1999). The slowdown of Mexico's
economic growth can be linked to an increase in the long run elasticity of import demand,
which has not been compensated by a sustained expansion of exports. Also, the causes of the
slowdown in the economy reflect the high dependence of the under-developed industrial sector
on foreign trade. Trade liberalisation has reinforced such performance, promoting and
facilitating access to a wide variety of imported goods. It is necessary to remember, however,
that trade liberalisation was preceded by many other macroeconomic reforms (i.e.
transformations in the scope and scale of the State's intervention in economic affairs), which
altered Mexico's growth performance.
5.6 Conclusions
The chapter has analysed the impact of trade liberalisation on Mexico's trade balance and
current account of the balance of payments, and has used a balance-of-payments-constrained
growth model to evaluate Mexico's long term growth especially after the mid-1980s trade
reforms. This is an area not previously researched for Mexico, but it is an important issue
because trade liberalisation in goods and services may hamper Mexico's long run economic
growth if imports grow faster than exports. We tried to disentangle the effects of the first
episode of trade reforms, which officially was initiated in 1985, from the second period of
trade liberalisation, related to NAFTA, when trade liberalisation in services was formally
included.
The trade reforms launched during the mid-1980s worsened the position of the trade balance
by between 14 and 18 percentage points in 1985. Although the effect is fairly small, it is
202
negative, showing that trade liberalisation, among other factors, contributed to a deterioration
in the position of Mexico's trade sector. Regarding the effects of trade liberalisation related to
NAFTA on the rate of growth of the trade balance, a negative impact is shown during the two
years immediately after NAFTA was instituted. The effects of liberalisation on the current
account of the balance of payments are not significant. Harrison and Hanson (1999) have
argued that the fact of not seeing considerable trade liberalisation effects is because trade
reforms were initiated in conjunction with real exchange depreciation, and also because
Mexican firms maintained output by cutting profit margins and wages. However, the analysis
here controls for changes in the real exchange rate.
Finally, our analysis was extended to compare the performance of Mexico's long run
economic growth before and after trade reforms; and, we also compare our results with
previous studies (Moreno-Brid, 2001). The findings corroborate that the long run income
elasticity of demand for imports has increased over time; the change is most likely linked to
trade reforms. The increase in the income elasticity of demand for imports, which has not been
compensated by a higher rate of growth of exports, has contributed to the slowdown of




OLS Estimation for the Trade Balance: 1980-2000
Dependent variable: the Trade Balance Rate of Growth (tb)
Regressor
Equations












































R2 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.70
Durbin Watson 1.95 2.01 1.92 2.02
Diagnostic Tests
Serial Correlation 0.970 0.955 0.931 0.940
Functional Form 0.662 0.469 0.766 0.401
Normality 0.015 0.055 0.011 0.070
Heteroscedasticity 0.611 0.578 0.602 0.580
Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "t"-statistics. The asterisk (*) for the "t" statistics
denotes significance of the coefficient at the 5 per cent level and the double asterisk (**)




OLS Estimation for the Trade Balance: 1980-2000
Dependent variable: Trade Balance Rate of Growth (tb)
Regressor
1ib94 1ib95 1ib96





















































































R2 0.74 0.74 0.72 0.74 0.74 0.75
Durbin Watson 2.18 2.18 1.93 2.18 1.94 2.13
Diagnostic Tests
Serial Correlation 0.648 0.641 0.969 0.635 0.983 0.676
Functional Form 0.778 0.776 0.875 0.835 0.840 0.817
Normalitv 0.288 0.287 0.030 0.284 0.034 0.248
Heteroscedasticitv 0.264 0.266 0.317 0.251 0.268 0.212
Notes: Values in parenthesis correspond to "1"-statistics. The asterisk (*) for the "t" statistics denotes significance
of the coefficient at the 5 per cent level. The diagnostic tests show probabilities.
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Table D3
OLS Estimation for the Trade Balance: 1980-2000
Dependent variable: Trade Balance Rate of Growth (tb)
jib 94 1ib95 1ib96
Regressor D2.1 D2.2 D2.3 D2.4
0.25 0.26 0.22 0.27
Constant (1.69) (1.61) (1.51) (1.97)
-4.30 -4.31 -3.90 -4.74
Ym (-2.80)* (-2.71)* (-2.71)* (-3.20)*
-1.61 -1.61 -0.86 -1.56
yus (-0.61) (-0.59) (-0.36) (-0.71)
0.08 0.07 0.21 0.16
P (0.18) (0.17) (0.57) (0.47)
tot
0.16 0.20 0.21 0.36
(0.44) (0.47) (0.47) (0.86)
-0.11 -0.12 -0.09 -0.12
1ib87 (-1.20) (-1.12) (-0.98) (-1.35)
-0.01 -0.01 0.02
1ib94, 1ib95, 1ib96 (-0.22) (-0.20) (0.27)
R2 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.77
Durbin Watson 2.14 2.15 2.14 2.22
Diagnostic Tests
Serial Correlation 0.734 0.719 0.748 0.609
Functional Form 0.829 0.707 0.908 0.286
Normality 0.268 0.228 0.173 0.204
Heteroscedasticitv 0.247 0.282 0.266 0.366
Notes: Values in parentheses correspond to "t"-statistics. The asterisk (*) for the "t" statistics
denotes significance of the coefficient at the 5 per cent level. The diagnostic tests show probabilities.
Table D4




Regressor 1981-94 1982-95 1983-96 1984-97 1985-98 1986-99 1987-00
Constant 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05















yus 0.82 0.65 0.72 0.86 0.40 0.71 0.51















tot 0.53 0.30 0.29 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.33
(1.99) (1.14) (1.09) (073) (081) (0.87) (1.11)
























Source: Moreno-Brid (2001), from Table 4.4.
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Chapter 6
Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on
Exports and Imports
6.1 Introduction
In order to have a better understanding of the relationship between liberalisation and trade
structure, it should be taken into account not only the impact of trade liberalisation on
exports, imports and the trade balance but also the role played by foreign direct
investment (FDI) deregulation and the existence of linkages betweRAN FBI, expo-As and
imports. FDI inflows have increased dramatically over the past decade throughout the
world. Most of this increase has occurred in the industrial countries, while in the
developing countries, it has been heavily concentrated among a small number of
countries. Among continents, Latin America and the Caribbean has been the second
largest recipient of EDI, surpassed only by Southeast Asian countries. In 2001, Latin
America and the Caribbean countries received approximately 41.6 per cent of total FDI
inflows to developing countries (UNCTAD, 2002a). Although most of the countries in
this region have attracted FDI, it has mainly been concentrated in four countries:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. From 1995 to 2001, these countries received
approximately 80 per cent of FDI inflows to the region (ECLAC, 2002).
In particular, Mexico has been successful in attracting FDI inflows, simultaneously as its
trade has increased. In 2001, it was the largest FDI recipient in Latin America (UNCTAD,
2002a); and, at the same time, it became the second largest trading developing country in
the world (WTO, 2001), where nearly two thirds of the country's exports were from
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foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) I (UNCTAD, 2002a). Thus, FDI and trade
appear to be not merely complementary, but increasingly inseparable as two sides of the
coin of the process of economic integration (Ruggiero, 1996).
The rapid increase in FDI has occurred in the context of reductions in barriers to foreign
investment. In fact, since the late 1980s, in the expectation that FDI will promote
economic development by raising exports and employment, and through knowledge
spillovers —because MNCs are associated with more competitive technology, better
management techniques and better skills in the international market— the Mexican
government has been lowering entry barriers to attract investments from MNCs. 2 As shalt
become apparent from our analysis, the increment of FDI in the 1990s has facilitated the
enlargement and empowerment of MNCs, and also the integration of a few selected
industries into the North American market.
Specifically, MNCs looked for four principal benefits in Latin America during the 1990s:
increased access to natural resources, greater access to markets for manufactures, new
access to markets for services, and improved efficiency of their international systems of
integrated production (Mortimore, 2000). 3 Particularly in Mexico, the aim was to
As considered by Markusen (1995), MNCs are firms engaged in FDI —defined as investment in which the
firm acquires a substantial controlling interest in a foreign firm or sets up a subsidiary in a foreign country.
BlomstrOm and Kokko (2003) argue that investment incentives aiming to increase the potential for
spillovers may be inefficient unless they are complemented with measures to improve the local learning
capability and to maintain a competitive local business environment.
3 There is a vast literature which discusses the determinants of FDI into developing countries. For instance,
UNCTAD (1996) highlights that the most important factors determining the surge of FDI into developing
countries have been privatization, the globalisation of production, and increased economic and financial
integration. De Mello (1997) suggests that country-specific institutional determinants of FDI, trade and
policy regimes, combined with the existing factor endowments of the host country, determine FDI flows.
Besides these factors, Chankraborty and Basu (2002) argue that the degree of political stability, the nature
of government policy, investment regimes, the openness of the host country and the size of the market are
possible determinants of FD1 flows. BlomstrOm (2002) points out that there are strong economic
fundamentals to attract FDI, such as the various incentives offered by the government, market
characteristics, relative production costs and resource availability. Gleason et al. (1999) claim that
privatisation has been a primary force in spurring significant FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean. See
Ramirez, (2002) for the particular case of Mexico.
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restructure the existing MNCs' operations and to convert them into an export platform, as
has been the case in the automobile industry. In other words, it is recognised that the main
motivation for foreign investors to locate operations in Mexico is to take advantage of
Mexico's location in order to serve the whole North American market rather than to serve
the domestic market by itself (Agosin and Prieto, 1993; Twomey, 1996; FitzGerald, 1999;
Graham and Wada, 2000; Sargent and Matthews, 2001). Additionally, the cheap labour in
Mexico is another determinant that attracts US FDI flows to the country (Love and Lage-
Hidalgo, 2000). 4 These factors explain why Mexico is among the world's largest
recipients of FDI inflows and that, on average, more than 60 per cent of Mexico's EDT
inflows come from the US.
The effects of FDI can be far reaching, with evidence suggesting that EDT impacts
significantly on efficiency, employment, factor prices and trade. 5 For the particular case
of Mexico, diverse studies have focused on the impact of FDI on labour productivity
(BlomstrOm and Persson, 1983; Blomstriim, 1988), wages (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997),
and growth (Ramirez, 2000; Griffiths and Sapsford, 2003). However, and despite the
important growth experienced by both FDI and trade, the effects of FDI on exports and
imports have not been extensively explored. Although the question of causality linkage
between FDI and exports has been investigated very recently (Alguacil et al, 2002), the
causality linkage between FDI and imports, considering the post-NAFTA period, has not
been studied at all.
4 Cimoli and Correa (2002), argue that Mexico and the Central American countries have greatly globalisetl
their manufacturing and assembly activities based on cheap labour.
5 See Markusen (1995) for a survey of the literature. Additionally, he presents six macro facts from studies
that use aggregated data and six micro facts used from studies that use industry and firm-level data to
support the tied relationships between the theory and empirical evidence.
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The aim of this chapter is to examine the process of liberalisation of FDI, as well as the
relationship between FDI inflows, exports and imports in Mexico; specifically, the
direction of causality between FDI and exports on the one hand and FDI and imports on
the other. We will try to investigate how the deregulation of FDI and trade has facilitated
intra-firm trade, which presumably allows greater freedom to MNCs to locate in the
country, which subsequently may have an impact on the volume of trade —exports and
imports.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section two examines the
liberalisation process of FDI as a result of the modifications in the legislation that
regulates FDI in Mexico, which will allow us to have a better understanding of the FDI
figures registered during the 1990s; it also presents a descriptive analysis of the
performance of FDI in Mexico during the last three decades, focusing on the post-1994
figures at a disaggregated level. Section three reviews some theoretical arguments
concerning the relationship between FDI and trade. Section four reviews the empirical
literature related to the analysis of FDI and trade. As China has recently experienced a
rapid increase in FDI inflows and trade, it is not surprising that many of the empirical
studies refer to this country. Section five describes the methodology and the data used for
the Granger causality analysis between FDI and exports, and between FDI and imports.
The results are discussed in section six. Finally, the concluding section contains a critical
evaluation of the results from the perspective of the interests of Mexico's trade and
development.
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6.2 Performance of FDI in Mexico
i. FDI liberalisation
Mexico has for some time been a large recipient of FDI inflows, which became possible
through the liberalisation of foreign investment and other market-oriented reforms which
the country adopted in the mid-1980s. 6 The deregulation of the Foreign Investment Law
(F1L) has gradually reduced the range of activities reserved for the State or Mexican
citizens. In particular, the reforms of 1989 and 1993 attempted to make the FIL
compatible with NAFTA. 7 Additionally, amendments to the FIL in 1995, 1996, 1998,
1999 and 2000 have led to a major participation of FDI in Mexican economic activity.
From the evolution of the FIL the most relevant issues must be pointed out. Mexico's first
formal statute to regulate, systematise and codify the rules and legal principles on
investment was the Law to Promote Mexican Investment and to Regulate Foreign
Investment of 1973. In this Law, foreign investors were required to seek authorisation
from officials; FDI was prohibited in services; financial restrictions included limits on the
repatriation of capital; and, foreign firms did not have access to the national financial
market. In 1989, the Law had a major relaxation, which was part of a set of market-
orientated reforms designed to open the economy to greater foreign participation,
specifically from the US. 8 Additionally, "In October 1989, a new framework agreement
was signed to start global conversations to facilitate trade and investment" (Aspe, 1993).9
6 Refer to Trevino et al. (2002a) and Trevino et al. (2002b). In these studies the authors analyse the effects
of market-oriented reforms on FDI inflows into Latin American countries.
7 Graham and Wada (2000) argue that the reforms to the Fit. in 1989 were not related to NAFTA. We
disagree with them, because, as we will show later, the reforms in 1989 and 1993 were orientated to achieve
a far-reaching trade and investment agreement, such as NAFTA.
8 1t is useful to remember that in mid-1989, Mexico signed the so-called Brady Plan, to reduce its medium
and long term debt. Also, in 1989, the IMF signed an Extended Fund Facility, and the World Bank and the
Inter-American Development Bank increased their lending substantially (Lustig, 2001).
9 Aspe was the Minister of Finance from 1988 to 1994. He mentions that in 1987 Mexico and the US signed
a framework agreement to set up principles and procedures for resolving controversies on trade and
investment. Later on, 11 June 1990, President Salinas (1988-1994) decided to instruct his Ministers to start
working on a free trade agreement with the US.
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Particularly, in the case of the car industry, under the pressure of MNCs, the domestic
content rules were relaxed in 1989 by means of two decrees (Decreto para el Fomento del
Sector Auntomotriz and Decreto para el Fomento y Modernizacion de la Industria
Manufacturera de Vehiculos de Autotransporte).1°
A new F1L was enacted in December 1993, which derogated the Law to Promote Mexican
Investment and to Regulate Foreign Investment of 1989. The FIL of 1993 further reduced
the number of activities in which foreign participation was forbidden or restricted. It
divided restrictions on foreign investment into four categories: (i) activities that are
reserved for the Mexican State and in which neither foreign nor Mexican private
investment may participate (i.e. minting coins, printing of bank notes, electricity, oil); (ii)
activities that are reserved exclusively for Mexican nationals and Mexican companies that
exclude foreigners; (iii) activities in which foreign investment may participate up to a
prescribed percentage (10 per cent, 25 per cent, 30 per cent or 49 per cent, depending on
the activity); and (iv) activities in which foreign participation may exceed 49 per cent with
prior approval from the Mexican Foreign Investment Commission —the official
institution in charge of promoting foreign investment. Investment in any activity which
does not fall within the above categories is not restricted (FIL: Ley de Inversion
Extranjera, 1993).
The FIL of 1993 included the necessary adjustments to make it compatible with the
NAFTA. NAFTA's investment provisions are meant to contribute to a less discriminatory
investment environment among its members, but they also reflect the protectionist
demands of several powerful industries." NAFTA includes in Chapter 11 the investment
'° 
See Moreno-Brid (1994) for a detailed analysis of the automobile industry in Mexico.
ii
See Gestrin and Rugman (1994) for a detailed analysis of NAFTA's investment provisions.
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provisions which are aimed at creating greater investment opportunities between Canada,
Mexico and the US. This chapter outlines the basic rules for the treatment of FDI and the
resolution of disputes between investors and States. Chapter 14 includes investment issues
related to financial services. In essence, NAFTA guarantees favourable conditions for
investors within the region "each Party shall accord to investors of another Party
treatment no less favourable than that it accords ... to its own investors..." (Article
1102). 12 Even more, FDI from Canada and the US has preferential treatment (Article
1103), which means that higher FDI amounts are allowed for NAFTA member countries
than for any others. On the other side, however, NAFTA provides preferences for FDI in
automobiles (Annex 300 A: Trade and Investment in the Automotive Sector) 13 and
apparel (Annex 300 B: Textile and Apparel Goods).
Let us consider the auto industry to show how the Mexican authorities have modified the
regulations in order to facilitate US MNCs entry. The maquila program in combination
with the Mexican national automobile policy —had the main aim to adapt the automobile
industry to a new strategy based on the liberalisation of the domestic market (Moreno-
Brid, 1994)— reduced costs in the assembly of labour-intensive auto parts, which
facilitated the implementation of export-oriented plants. 14 Later, the Mexican government
facilitated, by means of NAFTA, the establishment of new corporate strategies of US auto
MNCs in Mexico. The Mexican authorities permitted the assembly of "export models"
that incorporated higher levels of imported components —70 per cent as compared to 40
per cent for models sold in the national market— (Mortimore, 2000). Hence, behind the
13 According to Mortimore (2000) the links between FDI and trade of auto MNCs operating in Mexico
became one of Mexico's principal means of integration into the international economy.
14 For instance, in 1998 automobile exports relative to the production of the 4 biggest auto MNCs was 68
per cent (see Table El in the Appendix).
12 See Eden (1996) for an analysis of the effects of the norm of national treatment.
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huge increase of FDI in the Mexican automobile industry, there were the legal terms
which hindered integration of this industry with the local sectors.
As Arestis and Paliginis (1996) analyse, the creation of NAFTA has effectively removed
the ability of the Mexican State to intervene and protect the indigenous industry. In the
end, as these authors argue, whether a country will benefit from the operation of MNCs
depends on the national control exercised over them, the value-added in MNCs products
and the linkages of MNCs with the domestic investment. All these three conditions have
been absent from the operation of MNCs in Mexico. Additionally, Mexico's trade-
investment policies are relatively constrained by the Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures (TRIMs), which is one of the agreements of the 1986-94 Uruguay
Round negotiations, signed at the Marrakesh ministerial meeting in April 1994, whose
results came into force in January 1995 (WTO, 1994d). This agreement is based on the
assumption that certain investment measures restrict and distort trade. Therefore, it
prohibits countries from using trade-related investment measures (e.g. local content
requirements, trade balancing requirements, etc.), which are considered inconsistent with
the provisions of GATT 1994 on national treatment (Article III) and those forbidding the
use of quantitative restrictions (Article XI). 15 The phasing-out period for developed
countries was two years from 1 January 1995; developing countries had a transition
period of 5 years; and, least developed countries had seven years.16
Continuing with the liberalisation process of the FrL, it is relevant to mention that one of
the most extensive amendments to the FIL was realised in January 1999, when the
majority of financial services were liberalised. The government allowed 100 per cent of
15 Refer to GATT 1994 (WTO, 1994b).
16 In 2001, Mexico requested and obtained an extension for the elimination of its WTO- inconsistent TRIMs
in the automotive sector.
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FDI in the financial sector, particularly in banks; as well, railroad services and gas
distribution were entirely deregulated.I7
In addition to the changes in the FIL, it is important to highlight that in 1994 the Mexican
government changed the definition of FDI data, with the intention of equalising it with
that of the IMF and OECD. Before 1994, FDI included notified and authorised FDI to the
National Foreign Investment Registry Office, which did not necessarily coincide with
actual or realised investment (i.e. firms could have asked for authorisation of FDI without
actually investing). Since 1994, FDI refers to realised new investment which includes: 1)
amounts reported to the National Foreign Investment Registry Office; 2) provision of
capital for new companies; 3) foreign investor trust-funds; 4) transfers of stock from
nationals to foreigners, 5) imports of capital assets (fixed assets) by maquiladora firms; 6)
ploughing back of profits by FDI firms; and, 7) the amounts involved in accounts between
companies (debts and loans between parent companies). Prior to 1994, FDI data were
only available for the first three categories (INEGI and Secretaria de Economia).
The modifications and amendments to the legal investment framework in Mexico were
orientated towards trade and investment integration mainly between the US and Mexico
(BlomstrOm and Kokko, 1997). Therefore, the arguments which pretend to isolate the
institutional changes after the mid-1980s from those made to achieve NAFTA are short-
sighted. As we mentioned before, the argument of Graham and Wada (2000) that the
reforms of the F1L were not related to NAFTA is groundless.
17 For instance, activities like transport for passengers and management of coach stations were ruled by the
following schedule: after 18 1" December 1995 FD1 was restricted to participate below 49 per cent; after 1ft
January 2001 total FDI could reach 51 per cent of the total investment; and, from 1 5' January 2004 FD1 can
be 100 per cent of total investment without approval of the National Commission on Foreign Investment.
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Beyond the amendments to the FIL, and the preferences for the North American
investment given by the NAFTA agreement, it is necessary to mention that in order to
promote foreign investment and to diversify the origin of FDI, the Mexican government
has subscribed to several bilateral foreign investment agreements, mainly with European
or Latin American countries. Mexico has bilateral investment treaties with Spain (1997),
Switzerland (1998), Argentina (1998), the Netherlands (2000), Denmark (2000), France
(2001), Finland (2001), and Portugal (2001); and has unfinished agreements with:
Austria, Belgium and Luxemburg, Cuba, Germany, Greece, Italy, South Korea, Sweden,
and Uruguay (Secretaria de Economia).
ii. FDI performance
The above analysis of FDI liberalisation gives a better understanding of the FDI figures,
especially those from the 1990s. Over recent decades, the performance of FDI in Mexico
has changed noticeably. During the 1970s, FDI relative to GDP was more or less stable,
averaging 0.80 per cent of GDP, but it has increased over time, especially during the
1990s. FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP rose from 0.94 per cent in 1980 to 1.1 per
cent in 1993; and, from 1994 to 2000 it rose, on average, 2.7 percentage points (see Graph
6.1), although the high post-1994 figures cannot all be attributed to NAFTA because of
the change in the definition of FDI in 1994. 18 This significant detail has not been
identified by previous studies which have analysed FDI in Mexico and presented
econometric results (e.g. Cuadros et al., 2001; Alguacil et al., 2002; Griffiths and
Sapsford, 2003).
18 We compared FDI inflows to Mexico from five different data sources: two local (Secretaria de Economia
and INE01) and three international (UNCTAD, World Bank and IMF). The Mexican sources mention that
due to the modification in the components included in FDI definition, no comparison before and after 1994
is accurate. As international data sources regularly collect published and unpublished national official FDI
data directly from central banks, statistical offices or national authorities, the remarkable increment of FDI




However, the US Department of Commerce has changed the methodology and
presentation for US direct investment abroad in 1977, 1982 and 1994. These changes may
or may not apply to direct investment in Mexico. For instance, Graham and Wada (2000)
claim that the drop in the US ED! to Mexico in 1982 is due to a recalibration of the data
and not an actual withdrawal of foreign investors. In general, given the changes in either
the way to compile or present FDI data by local and international sources it would be
necessary to take any econometric results with extreme caution, independently of the data
source selected.
Mortimore (2000) suggests a very persuasive hypothesis related to the increase of US ED!
in Latin America (mainly allocated in the apparel industry), including Mexico (where the
majority of FDI is allocated in the automobile industry), during the 1990s. He claims that
US investors were trying to win back North American market shares from Asian MNCs.
Beyond this aim of US MNCs, he also mentions that a particular characteristic of the FDI
orientated to those sectors "tends to result in export platforms which possess little contact
with the host economy, thereby truncating or limiting the national industrialization
process" (Mortimore, 2000). In fact, MNCs in Latin America attempt to gain efficiency
by setting up new operations or restructuring their existing operations; but they do not
invest to develop new technologies, which is an activity more common in developed
countries.20
By focusing on the sectoral destination of FDI flows into Mexico, it can be discerned that
they have been primarily channelled to the manufacturing sector (see Table 6.1).
20 Since 2000, MNCs have closed subsidiaries in Mexico, especially maqudadora firms (Authers and Silver,
2003; Zuniga and Valdez, 2002; Zuriiga and Amador, 2002) because they find greater comparative
advantages in other countries (e.g. China). In Mortimore's words "...if local exchange rate appreciated, or
wage and social security costs increased substantially, or transportation or infrastructure problems arose in
any particular site, the headquarter corporation could adapt by closing local assembly line and adding
another one in a more convenient location."
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Table 6.1
Foreign Direct Investment by Sectors, 1994-2000, (Millions of US$) 
Sectors 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1994-2001
Value Share (%)
Total 10,640 8,325 7,702 12,112 7,986 12,767 15,318 25,221 74,850 100.0
Agriculture 11 11 32 10 29 81 88 5 266 0.4
Extractive 98 79 84 130 42 127 181 33 775 1.0
Manufacturing 6,187 4,849 4,706 7,281 5,022 8,732 8,824 4,791 50,392 67.3
Electricity and Water 15 2 1 5 27 140 117 248 554 0.7
Construction 259 26 26 110 83 129 168 72 874 1.2
Commerce 1,251 1,008 725 1,899 937 1,156 2,165 1,533 10,675 14.3
Transport and
Communication 719 876 428 686 374 256 2,458 2,864 3,745 5.0
Financial Services 941 1,066 1,214 1,087 708 714 4,586 13,571 23,889 31.9
Other Services 1,158 407 486 903 763 1,432 1,647 2,104 8,901 11.9
Source: Secretarfa de Economia.
From 1994 to 2001 this sector accounted for 67.3 per cent of total PD! inflows. Recently,
the deregulation of services in transport and telecommunications has attracted huge FDI
inflows. 2I For instance, in 1999 this sector received only 256 millions of US$, and the
following year it registered 2,458 millions of US$. The financial services sector has also
expanded significantly; the average share during 1994-2001 was 32 per cent of total PD!.
In 2001, particularly as a result of the liberalisation of the financial sector by the changes
in the FIL in 1999, Mexico received the largest foreign investment ever made. The
acquisition of Banco Nacional de Mexico (BANAtviEx was the biggest commercial bank in
Mexico) by Citicorp, the US financial group, represented more than 50 per cent of the
FDI in 2001 (UNCTAD, 2002a). 22 The other sectors have a relatively low proportion of
FDI. For instance, the agriculture sector has the lowest share of FDI, only 0.4 per cent.
Table 6.2 shows the participation of FDI, on average from 1994 to 2001, in the
manufacturing sub-sectors. The Machinery and Equipment sub-sector has received the
highest share of PD!, 48 per cent (automobiles and auto-parts are included in this sub-
21 Also, the increase of FDI includes major privatisations, such as TELMEX (Telefotios de Mexico).
22 Since 1994, the amendments to the FIL have attracted investments by a large number of financial groups
including Citicorp (Citibank) of the US; Bank Bilbao-Vizcaya and Bank Santander of Spain; and, Bank of
Montreal of Canada. In spite of new investments and their consequent benefits (i.e. modernisation of the
banking sector), the availability of credit is still very limited due to the restricted monetary policy, which is
focused on controlling the inflation to make it comparable to the other two NAFTA members.
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sector); followed by the Food Products, Beverages and Tobacco sub-sector with 19 per
cent.23 The Wood Products sub-sector has the lowest FDI share, 0.4 per cent.
Table 6.2
Participation of FDI in the Manufacturing Sub-Sectors, 1994-2001
Sector FDI'' Firms with FDI
(%) Number	 eic
Food Products, Beverages and Tobacco 18.9 577 8.0
Textiles and Leather Products 3.8 1,034 14.4
Wood Products 0.4 214 3.0
Paper Products, Printing and Publishing 2.0 393 5.5
Chemical Substances 12.9 1,169 16.3
Non Metallic Products 1.3 192 2.7
Basic Metals 5.1 157 2.2
Machinery and Equipment 47.9 2,818 39.3
Other Manutactures 7.8 625 8.7
Note Original data in US$
Source Ov‘n calculations based on data from Secretaria de Economia.
Table 6.2 also shows the number of firms in the manufacturing sub-sectors which receive
FDI and the percentage that it represents. The majority of the firms with FDI are in three
sub-sectors: the Machinery and Equipment (2,818 firms), the Chemical Substances (1,169
firms), and the Textiles and Leather Products (1,034 firms). 24 In spite of the relatively
large number of firms in the Textile and Leather Products sub-sector, 14.4 per cent of all
the firms w ith FDI in the Manufacturing sector, it only accounts for 3.8 per cent of FDI
inflows.25
Finally, it is relevant to mention the contribution that FDI makes to Mexican exports. For
instance, in 2000 the top 35 MNCs, most of them from the US, exported 30 per cent of
total Mexican exports (see Table E2 in the Appendix). Further, and perhaps a more
relevant result den ved from FDI inflows, from 1995 to 2000, Mexico occupied top
23 Mattar et al. (2002) mention that FDI has a strong presence in the Food, Beverages and Tobacco sub-
sector, as a result of purchases of national enterpnses and from added investment by MNCs already
established in Mexico e PepsiCo., Nestle' and Coca-Cola).
24 In fact, this is the main reason that explains why most of the studies that refer to FDI in Mexico focus on
the particular development of two industnes: automobiles (Dussel. 2000a; Mortimore, 2000; Máttar et al.,
2002) and electronics (Dussel, 2000b).
25 The apparel indu, try. included in this manufacturing sub sector, also shows the dilemmas and
opportunities represented by the economic integration of Mexico with the US, which has been accelerated
by NAFTA (Gereffi, 2000)
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ranking positions in the 'top 20 export winners list', according to technology category
(UNCTAD, 2002a). It ranked second in medium-technology manufactures; third in low-
technology manufactures; and, sixth in high-technology manufactures. Also, we should
not ignore the intra-industry trade figures, which have been at high levels since the 1980s.
Intra-industry trade rose from 62.5 per cent of total manufacturing trade during the period
1988-1991 to over 73.4 per cent in 1996-2000 (OECD, 2002).
However, the story of FDI in Mexico is not quite as rosy as these figures suggest. At least
there is one caveat, but rather important. It is well recognised that MNCs allocated in the
manufacturing sector are weakly linked with domestic industry; the local input content in
assembling is very low (Arestis and Paliginis, 1996; Dussel, 2000b; Ruiz-Napoles, 2000;
Mattar et al. 2002; UNCTAD, 2002). In fact, it is relevant to notice that a significant
proportion of FDI in Mexico, 15.4 per cent of total FDI in the period 1994-2000, was
allocated to in-bond foreign assembly plants (maquiladora)26 where MNCs affiliates are
relatively 'footloose' (Buitelaar and Padilla, 2000). Some other characteristics of these
firms are selective employment policies, unskilled labour, relatively low salaries, and non-
union orientation; but most important, dependence on US economic activity for their
operation has increased Mexico's dependence on the US (Arestis and Palangitis, 1996).27
26 Griffiths and Sapsford (2003) report from Gerber (2001) that "maquila investment has accounted on
average for 27 per cent of US FDI into Mexico for the period 1994 to 2000".
27 A second FDI caveat has been left out because it is related to the effects of FDI in the capital account of
the balance of payments (by no means less important). Notwithstanding that FDI is less volatile than other
flows, FDI investment could easily produce a liquidity crisis. The risk increases when unfettered FDI yields
time-inconsistent foreign exchange outflows and inflows (Singh 2001 and 2002a). In this regard, Singh
suggests that in order to avoid financial fragility embodied in FDI, the government would need to regulate
the amount and timing of FDI; by doing this economic development will be promoted.
225
6.3 Theory of FDI linkages with Exports and Imports
Before analysing two main linkages between FDI and trade, we should mention three
different ways of how FDI may work in the economy. First, FDI inflows lead to an
increase in capital supply available for investment in the host country, which increases
productive capacity. Second, FDI inflows constitute a good source of current account
financing and balance of payments relief, particularly if it is export-oriented and saving-
enhancing. Third, as FDI involves the transfer of technologies and entrepreneurial skills,
it affects both the quality and quantity of factors, resulting in changes in factor
productivity and cost comparative advantage between products —the MNCs facilitate
transfer of technologies and quicker flows of information, improving the productivity of
the resources and diminishing their production costs— (Dunning, 1993; Sun, 2001). A
"dynamic change in comparative advantage", as referred by Kojima (1973, 1975, and
1982), %kill certainly modify the structure of international trade.
Regarding the relationships between FDI inflows and trade, there are two possible
linkages. One refers to whether FDI could be considered as a substitute for, or a
complement to, international trade (Kojima, 1975). The presumption is that FDI and trade
(more specifically exports) are alternative means of penetrating foreign markets. That is, a
decision faced by any MNC is servicing foreign markets either by exporting goods or by
exporting capital (FDI), and then producing locally. According to theory, whether FDI
promotes or substitutes for trade depends on the type of FDI stimulated: 'vertical' or
'horizontal'. If FDI is 'vertical', where MNCs geographically split stages of production,
this is likely to stimulate trade. Whereas, if FDI is 'horizontal', where MNCs produce
final goods in multiple locations, this is likely to substitute for trade (Markusen, 1997).
Additionally, Markusen shows theoretically that trade and investment liberalisation are in
a sense complements, because FDI provides the iecipient country with inputs without
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which the country cannot exploit its abundant factors in certain industries. However, as
mentioned before, FDI will not foster the economy —productivity, employment, trade—
unless it is complemented with measures to improve the local business environment
(Blosmtriim and Kokko, 2003).
Kojima (1973, 1975 and 1982) refers to the transfer of "superior" production functions
which replace "inferior" ones in the host country, through transferring training of labour
and management and marketing know-how. By doing this, FDI is seen to be a "tutor" in
developing countries. In addition, Kojima (1975) proposes that FDI into industries in
which the host country has a comparative advantage, tends to improve the productivity of
the host economy and therefore stimulates more exports. He is assuming that the smaller
is the technological difference between the headquarter and the host country industry, the
easier it is to transfer and improve the technology in the latter. This i-i-iemis t.kyal.
intensive technology is easier to transfer (e.g. textile industry).
The second relationship is related to the causal linkages between FDI and trade. The
causality between FDI and exports could run in either direction. Initially, firms trade in
the foreign market, and after learning more about the economic, social, political, ruling
conditions of their trading partners they may establish a subsidiary in the host country
(Liu et al, 2001) or they may embark on joint ventures with local enterprises. This implies
FDI inflows, and, after some period, MNCs may start to export (UNCTAD, 1996; Rob
and Vettas, 2003). The role of MNCs in expanding exports in host countries derives from
the additional capital, new technology and better management and marketing strategies
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that they can bring with them (UNCTAD, 2002a). 28 Thus, there may be a bi-directional
causal link: exports stimulate FDI and FDI promotes exports. 29 Likewise with FDI and
exports there are two possible bi-directional links between FDI and imports. First, if
imports are evidence that a market exists for a commodity, the host country might attract
FDI to produce that product locally. In other words, a rise in imports in the host country
justifies investment and production by MNCs; thus, imports stimulate FDI inflows.
Second, as soon as MNCs establish in the host country, they import certain types of
supplies (basic components and intermediate goods produced by the headquarters) to
satisfy the quality standards required by the international market; therefore, FDI inflows
increase the demand for imports.
6.4 Empirical Literature on the Relationship between FDI, Exports
and Imports
Most of the empirical studies focus on the Granger causality between FDI and exports
(and, exports and economic growth), trying to support the export-led growth model
launched in most developing countries during the 1980s, and the positive effects of FDI
on exports. As a result of the outstanding performance of China's trade and FDI inflows
during recent decades, this country has attracted a lot of attention (Liu et al., 2002; Liu et
al., 2001; Sun, 2001; Zhang and Song, 2000; among others).
For instance, Liu et al. (2002) investigate the causal links between trade, FDI and
economic growth in China, from 1981.1 to 1997.4. The study, conducted using the
VARECM framework, shows bi-directional causal links between FDI, exports and
28 Sharma (2000) argues that the role of FDI in exports depends on the motive behind such investment. If it
is to by-pass trade barriers in the host country, then it is unlikely that such FDI would result in more exports.
However, if FDI is motivated by the country's comparative advantage, then it may contribute to export
growth.
9 This is consistent with Vernon's (1966) product cycle hypothesis.
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economic growth, and a uni-directional causal link from these three variables to imports.
Liu et al. (2001) examine the causal linkages between trade (exports and imports) and
FDI in China. The study is based on a panel of bilateral data for China and 19
home/country regions over the period 1984-1998. They found three main results: there is
a uni-directional causal link from the growth of China's imports to the growth of the
inward FDI stock; there exists a uni-directional causal link from the growth in the inward
FDI stock in China to the growth of China's exports; and, there is a uni-directional causal
link from the growth of China's exports to imports. The causation from inward FDI to
China's export growth reflects China's FDI policy, which encourages MNCs to export
their products. Similarly, Sun (2001) presents empirical evidence of the positive and
significant relationship between FDI and exports across provinces and regions of China
for the period 1984-1997, applying the TSCS method. The empirical analysis provides
statistical evidence for a positive and significant relationship between FDI inflows and
exports; however, the impact of FDI on exports from China varies across regions
according to regional economic conditions, the degree of economic openness, and the
different market orientations of FDI. Zhang and Song (2000) find evidence of a link
between FDI and exports in China, using panel data at the provincial level for the period
1986-1997. Their results support the view that increased levels of FDI positively affect
provincial manufacturing export performance. Specifically, they found that a 1 per cent
change in the level of FDI in the previous year is associated with 0.29 per cent increase in
exports in the following year.
Apart from the studies that refer to China, a few other analyses focus on the relationship
between FDI inflows and trade (Alguacil and Orts, 2001; Bhalla, 1998; Cuadros et al.,
2001; de Mello and Fukasaku, 2000; Sharma, 2000; Weresa, 2001). The empirical
evidence shows mixed results related to the existence of a direct relationship between FDI
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inflows and exports. Bhalla (1998) explores and compares the contributions of exports
and FDI to growth, and the trade and FDI linkages in China and India. The study reviews
trade and investment policies and the economic liberalisation process in each country.
From the statistical analysis, the author concludes that there is no positive correlation
between FDI and exports in India, whereas this correlation exists in China. Sharma (2000)
found similar results for the case of India; FDI appears to have had no statistically
significant impact on exports during the period 1970-1998. 3° This result was obtained by
estimating the determinants of export performance in India in a simultaneous equation
framework. Cuadros et al. (2001) examined the relationship between FDI inflows and
exports in three Latin American countries —Argentina, Brazil and Mexico— using a
vector autoregressive model and quarterly data, during the period 1975-1997. The
findings support evidence of a long run uni-directional causal link from EDT to exports in
Mexico and Argentina, and short run uni-directional causal link from EDT to exports in
Mexico and Brazi1.31
A more comprehensive study for the Latin American countries is presented by de Mello
and Fukasaku (2000). They examined Granger causality between EDT inflows and foreign
trade (exports, imports and the trade balance) in a selected group of Latin American
countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay
and Venezuela) and Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), using bivariate vector error correction models and
annual data during the period 1970-1994. Among many other results, the authors report
very interesting relationships. Regarding the findings for the Latin America countries,
30 Lal I (1999) gives an explanation for this result, arguing that FDI inflows in India have gone into domestic
market oriented ventures or into infrastructure rather than to export-oriented activities.
31 It is important to mention that they do not distinguish between oil and non-oil exports; a distinction
required for the case of Mexico.
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exports seem to Granger cause FDI inflows in Argentina; there is a bi-directional link
between FDI inflows and exports for Chile; imports precede FDI in Argentina, Ecuador
and Peru; and, there is a bi-directional link between FDI inflows and the trade balance in
Chile. 32 In the case of the Southeast Asian countries, PD! inflows Granger cause exports
in Malaysia; exports are found to Granger cause FDI in Indonesia; a bi-directional
causality between exports and FDI was obtained for Singapore and Thailand; imports
Granger cause FDI in Singapore and Thailand; and, there is a bi-directional causation
between FDI and imports in Indonesia. Overall, the authors claim that the empirical
analysis suggests a stronger association between FDI inflows and foreign trade in
Southeast Asia than in Latin America.
As Spain has increasingly received FDI inflows since its entry into the European Union,
Alguacil and Orts (2001) specifically investigate the linkage between FDI inflows and
imports for this country. The authors adopted an aggregated time series model, using
quarterly data for the period 1970-1992. The results support a uni-directional Granger
causality relationship going from FDI inflows to imports. In a different country study,
Weresa (2001) found that Poland's foreign trade with the European Union in the 1990s
was driven by FDI inflows, mainly by its contribution to export creation. Although she
does not test for Granger causality between trade and FDI inflows, from the statistical
figures she concludes that FDI inflows have increased Polish exports and imports.
For the case of Mexico, studies have considered different approaches to analyse the
effects of FDI inflows on Mexico's trade. Mattar et al. (2002) analyse the performance of
FDI in Mexico within the context of the macroeconomic reforms in the 1980s. Through
32 De Mello and Fukasaku (2000) found that exports seem to cause FDI, and a bi-directional Granger
causality between imports and FDI in Mexico, but only for a shorter period (1970-1984).
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all the analysis a comparison is made between Mexico and a selected group of other Latin
American countries. Their statistical findings suggest that although the market-orientated
reforms have encouraged FDI in selected sectors, they have not led to a rise in fixed
capital formation in the economy as a whole. This has caused a strong segmentation
between large export-orientated companies with strong links to foreign capital and smaller
indigenous firms focusing on domestic demand. 33 They claim that the high import content
in Mexican exports shows disrupted domestic chains of production, derived from the
displacement and elimination of firms that previously produced for the domestic market
but were unable to compete with the MNCs entry.34
Alguacil et al. (2002), in a very concise paper, analyse the existence of Granger causality
between exports, FDI and domestic performance for the exclusive case of Mexico during
the period 1980.1-1999.4 using a five-variable VAR model (non-oil exports, industrial
production index, foreign direct investment, foreign income and the real exchange rate).
They do not consider, however, the relationship between FDI and imports. Their results
confirm the export-led growth hypothesis for Mexico. This evidence is consistent with the
findings of Abdulsanner and Manuchehr (2000) and Thornton (1996), even though in both
studies total exports are used instead of non-oil exports. Additionally, Alguacil et al. show
evidence of a Granger causal relationship from FDI to exports, and from FDI to GDP
growth. They claim that these results provide insight into the role played by FDI in the
33 It is worth mentioning that the industrial structure of Mexico is very peculiar, more than 98 per cent of
manufacturing industries are classified as "micro" and "small" size, from 1 to 10 employees and from 16 to
100 employees, respectively (INEGI, 1999).
34 Regarding some of the effects of trade and financial liberalisation on the Mexican production system,
Cimoli and Correa (2002) describe very well what has been happening, although not limited to Mexico but
to other Latin American countries as well, by saying that "[m]any production activities have been seriously
disrupted by trade liberalisation and by the massive inflow of imports, ..., which have rapidly proceeded
toward the de-vertical isation of their production organisation technologies, substituting domestically-
produced intermediate inputs by cheaper (and sometimes better), imported ones, reorganising themselves
more as assembly-type operations based on a much higher unit import content. ...The share of large firms
—either local subsidiaries of [MNCs] or domestically-owned conglomerates—in GDP has significantly
increased during the adjustment process, while countless [small and medium enterprises] have been forced
to exit the market altogether." (p.13).
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effectiveness of the export policy followed by Mexico. However, they neither mention nor
take into account the change in the definition of PD! in 1994.
The study presented in this chapter differs from Alguacil et al. in two main respects. First,
the period of analysis is longer, 1970-2000, including eleven more years; using annual,
rather than quarterly data. Second, we examine the Granger causality between FDI and
imports, an issue not yet studied for the case of Mexico.
6.5 Methodology
As stated before, we are going to analyse the relationship between 1) FDI inflows and
exports,35 and 2) FDI inflows and imports, using the Granger causality test. In a bivariate
framework, the variable x is said to cause the variable y in the Granger sense if the
forecast for y improves when lagged variables for x are taken into account in the equation,
ceteris paribus (Charemza and Deadman, 1997). In other words, the standard Granger
causality procedure is based on past changes in one variable explaining actual change in
another variable.
Testing causality, in the Granger sense, involves using an F-test (or Wald test). The
appropriate formulation of a Granger-type test of causality (which must be applied to
stationary series) is:
X t	 130+ 13 1 X t.1 +	 + 13, X t j + 0 1 FDI t., +	 + Oj FDI t _j + (6.1)
FDI t = 50 + S I FDI t +	 + 8J FDI ti + y i X t +	 + y, X tj + (6.2)
M t = (po+	 M t_ i +	 + (p, M t _j +	 t	 +	 +	 FDI t_j (6.3)
FDI t = (pa +	 FDI t _ I +	 + xv, FDI t j+ 41 M t	 +	 +	 M t_i +r, (6.4)
j= 1, 2, ..., N
35 We consider non-oil exports in our analysis.
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where X is exports, FDI is foreign direct investment inflows, M is imports; pi, vt„ at, and
rt are error terms with zero mean. In equation 6.1, the null hypothesis `FDI does not
Granger cause X' (O, =	 = Oi = 0) is tested using a standard F-test (Wald test). It is
rejected if the Os are jointly significantly different from zero. Similarly, in equation (6.2)
the null hypothesis 'X does not Granger cause FDI' =...= =0) is rejected if the is are
jointly significantly different from zero. The same procedure applies for equations 6.3 and
6.4.
Considering an ARDL model developed by Pesaran and Shin (1997), an error correction
model for each of the four equations is derived:
Ay, =	 + EA, AYH +	 Xt_i + E pt_i + et	 (6.5)
where pt _ i is the lagged error correction term obtained from the residuals in each equation
(equations 6.1 to 6.4) and Et is the random disturbance term. From equation (6.5) the null
hypothesis that `x does not Granger cause y' would be rejected if the lagged coefficients
of the fl„,'s are jointly significantly different from zero, using a standard F-test (Wald test).
In case of cointegration between x and y, changes in one variable towards its long run
equilibrium value may be a result of variations in the other variable. As well, the causality
between x and y could be identified if the error term (p t_ i ) is statistically significant.
Notice that the Granger test results only indicate that the changes in x must come before
the changes in y (Murkherjee et al, 1998). A statistically significant coefficient of p t_ i (n)
shows how the short run coefficients of the endogenous variable adjust towards the long
run equilibrium in reaction to changes in the exogenous variables. Empirical studies test
causality through the error term and it is used as a test for weak exogeneity
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(i.e. Kwan et al., 1996). 36 A variable is strongly exogenous if it is weakly exogenous
through the error correction term and if the lagged values are jointly significant. Granger
causality is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish weak exogeneity.
In order to obtain consistent results derived from the Granger causality procedure three
steps are followed. The first step is to test the order of integration of the variables. The
second step is to test for cointegration using the Johansen maximum likelihood approach.
Finally, the third step is to carry out the Granger causality tests.
6.6 Empirical Analysis
The tests are carried out on annual data from 1970 to 2000. The data source is the World
Development Indicators (2002). All variables are in real terms and are expressed in US
dollars. Before we apply the Granger causality tests outlined in the previous section, it is
necessary to determine the order of integration of the variables. The ADF test is used for
this purpose. Table 6.3 (part A) reports the ADF (one lag) test for the log levels of the
variables and first differences under the assumption of a constant and (part B) under the
assumption of a constant and deterministic time trend. The ADF test results for unit roots
confirm that all variables are integrated of order one in levels but integrated of order zero
in first differences at the 5 per cent level of significance.
36 According to Charemza and Deadman, (1997), a variable z is said to be weakly exogenous for the
parameters of interest ( 0:1)) if knowledge of (Pis not required for inference on the changes of z; z is strongly
exogenous if it is weakly exogenous for (1) and z should not be Granger caused by w.
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Table 6.3
Unit Root Test for Stationarity
PART A	 PART B
with Constant Only,
sample period 1970-2000
with Constant and Time Trend,
sample period 1970-2000















Notes: 'The critical value for rejection of hypothesis of a unit root is -2.96. 'The critical value for rejection of hypothesis
of a unit root is -3 57 for M and FDI, and 3.59 for X. The asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 5 per cent level.
Subsequently, on the basis of the above unit-root tests, a cointegration test is performed.
The Johansen Full Information Maximum Likelihood (ML) method is a powerful
cointegration test to check for the number of cointegrating vectors, particularly when a
bivariate model is considered. 37 Table 6.4 shows the Johansen's cointegration test results.
Table 6.4
Johansen's Cointegration Test Statistics
a) Variables in Cointegrating Vector: LFDI -LX
Trace Test Maximum eigenvalue test
Null Alternative Critical ValueStatistic Critical ValueStatistic
Hypothesis Hypothesis 95%	 90% 95% 90%
Maximum lag in VAR =4
r=0 r-21 28.16	 20.18	 17.88 20.53 15.87 13.81
rs1 r22 7.63	 9.16	 7.53 7.63 9.16 7.53
Maximum lag in VAR =3
r=0 r21 25.15	 20.18	 17.88 18.93 15.87 13.81
rs7 r22 6.21	 9.16	 7.53 6.21 9.16 7.53
Maximum lag in VAR =2
r=0 r>I 28.50	 20.18	 17.88 15.24 15.87 13.81
rS1 r-22 13.25	 9.16	 7.53 13.25 9.16 7.53
Maximum lag in VAR =1
r=0 r21 14.26	 20.18	 17.88 12.30 15.87 13.81
rs7 r->-) 1.95	 9.16	 7.53 1.95 9.16 7.53
b) Variables in Cointegrating Vector: LFDI-LM
Trace Test Maximum eigenvalue test
Null Alternative Statistic	 Critical Value Statistic	 Critical Value
Hypothesis Hypothesis 95%	 90% 95% 90%
Maximum lag in VAR =4
r=0 721 23.28	 20.18	 17.88 18.44 15.87 13.81
rs3 r2 4.83	 9.16	 7.53 4.83 9.16 7.53
Maximum lag in VAR =3
r=0 r21 25.20	 20.18	 17.88 21.68 15.87 13.81
r<7 r22 3.52	 9.16	 7.53 3.52 9.16 7.53
Maximum lag in VAR =2
r=0 rkl 23.18	 20.18	 17.88 20.60 15.87 13.81
rq r2 2.58	 9.16	 7.53 2.58 9.16 7.53
Maximum lag in VAR =1
r=0 r>1 13.20	 20.18	 17.88 8.82 15.87 13.81
r< r22 4.37	 9.16	 7.53 4.37 9.16 7.53
37 Alternatively, using Engel and Granger (1987) cointegrating test procedure the variables show to be
cointegrated. These results are not shown.
2) ALFDI on ALM a 0.98* [8.36]	 (3,0)	 34.00*	 -1.18
ALM on ALFDI 0.85* [4.21]
	
(4.2)	 17.24*	 -0.30**	 41.09*
LIv14-*LFDI
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In panel a), it is observed that when three and four lags are used in the procedure, the null
hypothesis that LFDI and LX are not cointegrated (r = 0) is rejected using either the
maximum eigenvalue test or the trace test at the 5 per cent level of significance. In other
words, it indicates that there exists a unique cointegration vector among the variables
involved. Similarly, for panel b) there is cointegration between LFDI and LM, when four,
three and two lags are considered. Granger (1988) shows that if two variables are
cointegrated, there should be a causal relationship between them in at least one direction.
Since the existence of cointegration between the variables is confirmed, the next step is to
test for the causal relationships between FDI inflows, exports and imports. The literature
offers different statistical methods to determine the optimal lags in Granger causality
tests. The Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
were used to determine the optimal lag-lengths in the ARDL and error correction models.
Table 6.5 shows the results, which point to some patterns for the Granger causal links
between FDI inflows, exports and imports in Mexico.
Table 6.5
Granger Causality Tests for FDI, Exports and Imports based on Error
Correction Models, 1970-2000
Regression	 Long Run	 Order of lags Wald test Error Term	 Joint
	
Causality
Elasticities	 in ECM	 significance
Ry. and fl,, 
1) ALFDI on AIX 0•74* [6.78]	 (3,3)	 25.26*	 -1.14*	 72.74*	 LX --LFDI
ALX on ALFDI 0.83* [2.86]
	
(1,0)	 2.61	 0.12
Notes: a A shift dummy, d94 (which takes the value of 0 prior to 1994, and 1 afterwards), was included in the
ARDL model. The asterisk (*) and double asterisk (**) denote significance at the 5 and 10 per cent level,
respectively. The numbers in brackets are the t-statistics.
From the first set of regressions there is evidence of uni-directional Granger causality
from LX to LFDI at the 5 per cent level of significance, either considering the Wald test
or the error term. This is an interesting result, because it suggests that the performance of
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exports stimulate more FDI inflows to the country. Also note that in addition to a
significant error correction term, the joint significance of the lagged variables indicates
that LX is strongly exogenous.
The second set of results shows bi-directional causality between LM and LFDI at the 5
per cent of significance using the Wald test. The joint significance of the lagged variables
in combination with the significant error correction term indicates that LFDI is strongly
exogenous. The results clearly support the link between FDI and imports, where most of
the inputs required by MNCs are imported.
6.7 Conclusions
This chapter has examined the performance of FDI inflows in Mexico during the last three
decades, and its relationship with exports and imports. The modifications in the legal
framework that regulated FDI in Mexico started in 1989, which were orientated towards
the facilitation of FDI inflows into the country. It is widely recognised that NAFTA's
investment provisions led to modification of the Foreign Investment Law to reconcile it
with the agreement. The analysis of the investment provisions by NAFTA and other
allowances from the Mexican authorities to foreign investors showed that MNCs have
been greatly benefited, as they have obtained bigger proportions of the international and
domestic market by displacing indigenous firms.
The Mexican experience shows that investment liberalisation has combined with trade
liberalisation to stimulate FDI and trade at the same time. The results from the Granger
causality tests indicate that there is uni-directional causality from exports to ED!, and
there is bi-directional causality between FDI inflows and Mexican imports. The
development of exports, within a liberalised trade and financial context, encourages FDI
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inflows to the country; and, at the same time FDI demands more imports. Therefore, the
inter-relationships among these variables have generated the expansion on Mexico's trade
and inward FDI.
As discussed in the literature, the Mexican government has followed the export-led
growth model as a development strategy (Thornton, 1996; Abdulnasser and Manuchehr,
2000; Balassa, 1983; Alguacil et al., 2002), where exports are highly promoted (see
Chapter 2), and simultaneously imports are demanded mainly to provide inputs for
domestic and export products, and to incorporate technology to foster economic
development. Although there has been an upgrading of the type of Mexican exports, by
means of MNCs' entry, it has not been enough to raise Mexico's sustainable growth rate.
During the early 1970s, the country exported commodities; it became a uni-product
exporter (oil) at the end of the 1970s-beginning of the 1980s; after the mid-1980s Mexico
has been exporting manufactures; however, the domestic input content is very low. The
shift from primary products to "a first generation" of manufactures does not represent
more sophisticated activities (UNCTAD, 2002a). Therefore, the FDI-export-led growth
model has widened the gap between the export and non-export orientated sectors, and
stimulated exports and imports. This has led to an acute limitation of the national
industrialisation process, ending in fragile balance of payments positions (see Chapter 5).
Thus, the orientation and allocation of FDI plays a major role in the position of Mexico's
trade balance. If Mexico is really committed to embarking on a process of sustainable
long run economic growth it is imperative that the Mexican government works towards
the integration of the domestic industry. By doing this, some of the dilemmas presented




Structure and Export Propensities of the Mexican Automobile
Industry, 1998 (Thousands of units and percentage)
Vehicle
Assembler
Production % Exports %	 Exports/ Production
(%)
Chrysler 360.6 25.3 301.1 31.0 83.5
Ford 213.7 15.0 174 8 18.0 81.8
General Motors 314.2 22.0 198.8 20.5 63.3
Volkswagen and Nissan 539.5 37.8 297 3 30.6 55.1
Total 1,427.6 100 972 0 100 68.1
Source: Mortimore (2000).
Table E2
Mexican Exports by the 35 leading Foreign Affiliates, 2000
(Million of dollars and percentage)




1 IBM Mexico IBM United States Electronics 9 630 5.3
2 Datmler Chrysler Mexico Daimler Chrysler Germany Automotive 6 941 3.8
3 General Motors de Mexico General Motors United States Automotive 6 732 3.7
4 Volkswagen Mexico Volkswagen Germany Automotive 5 182 2.9
5 Ford Mexico Ford Motor United States Automotive 3 471 1.9
6 Nissan Mexico Nissan Motor Japan Automotive 2 720 1.5
7 Lear Corporation Mexico Lear United States Automotive 1 878 1.0
8 Visteon Mexico Visteon United States Automotive 1 676 0.9
9 Panamencan Beverage Inc Coca-Cola United States Beverages 1 624 0.9
10 Sony Mexico Sony Japan Electronics 1 621 0.9
11 General Electric Mexico General Electric United States Electrical Apparatus 1 157 0.6
12 Alcoa Alcoa United States Metals 1 070 0.6
13 Thomson Thomson Industries United States Electronics 1 037 0.6
14 LG Electronics Mexico LG Electronics Rep Korea Electronics 1 037 0.6
15 Sanyo Manufactunng Mexico Sanyo Electric Japan Electronics 837 0.5
16 Grupo Kodak Mexico Eastman Kodak United States Photographic 739 0.4
17 Grupo Modelo Anheuser-Busch United States Beverages 694 0.4
18 Kemet de Mexico Kemet United States Electronics 692 0.4
19 Favesa Lear United States Automotive 684 0.4
20 Samsung Mexico Samsung Electronics Rep. Korea Electronics 678 0.4
21 United Technologies Mexico United Technologies United States Automotive 655 0.4
22 SIA Electrenica de Baja California Sanyo Electnc Japan Electronics 622 0.3
23 Industna John Deere John Deere Australia Machinery 449 0.2
24 Mabe General Electric United States Machinery 431 0.2
25 Siemens Siemens Genrmany Electrical Machines 403 0.2
26 Carplastic Visteon United States Automotive 381 0.2
27 Black & Decker Mexico Black & Decker United States Tools 351 0.2
28 Xerox Xerox United States Office machines 295 0.2
29 BASF Mexico BASF Germany Chemicals 270 0.1
30 DUPont Mexico Dupont, E.I. De Nemorus United States Chemicals 251 0.1
31 Electronica Clarion Clarion Japan Electronics 236 0.1
32 Hewlett-Packard Mexico Hewlett-Packard United States Electronics 228 0.1
33 Mexinox Mexinox United States United States Metals 208 0.1
34 Procter & Gamble Procter & Gamble United States Chemical 152 0.1
35 Nestle Mexico Nestle Switzerland Food 122 0.1
Total 55 154 30.6
Total Exports of Mexico 180 392 100.0




7.1 Summary of the Results
In this thesis we have examined the impact of trade liberalisation on Mexico's exports,
imports and the balance of payments by applying different time series econometric
techniques. Special attention has been paid to disentangling the effects between two
periods of trade reforms, those related to the mid-1980s and those linked to NAFTA. This
study is the first of its kind to approach this issue in a rigorous and systematic way. The
analysis provided is of particular relevance for policy purposes given the accelerated
process of trade integration between Mexico and the US. The major conclusions from the
research are set out below.
Firstly, with regard to export performance we find that at both the aggregate and
disaggregated level, trade reforms of the mid-1980s had a positive impact on export
growth. Export growth increased between 12 and 15 percentage points in 1986. However,
no positive effect of NAFTA is discernable. Exports react positively to real exchange rate
depreciation, through a significant price elasticity. Regarding the foreign demand, it was
found that the income elasticity is always statistically significant at the aggregate level,
but not for all the manufacturing sub-sectors. The outstanding export performance of the
1990s was mainly due to the impressive performance of the US economy and not due to
the liberalisation involved in NAFTA. The chapter also examines the changes in the
structure of exports. It is remarkable that from 1980 to 2000 the share of manufacturing
exports rose from 60 per cent to 90 per cent of total exports. Within the manufacturing
sector, the Machinery and Equipment sub-sector has the highest export participation,
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rising from a share of 22 per cent in 1980 to 74 per cent in 2000. We argue that trade
liberalisation has promoted the specialisation of a few industries by easing intra-firm
trade.
Secondly, with regard to imports, the findings show a positive impact on the rate of
growth of imports as a result of the mid-1980s trade reforms; import growth increased 12
percentage points in 1985. However, the econometric analysis gives mixed results relating
to the effects of NAFTA on imports. The results obtained from using OLS show no
significant coefficients related to the trade liberalisation indicators, neither import duties
nor shift dummies. On the other hand, the outside-sample forecasts show some evidence
of a structural break in 1994. The different estimations also show that imports react
negatively to real exchange depreciation; the price elasticities of demand for imports are
relatively high and, in general, are statistically significant. Also, the income elasticities are
relatively high, but they are not always significant.
Comparing the results for exports and imports we find that the reductions in trade barriers
have positively affected the performance of export and import growth by a similar
magnitude. However, imports responded earlier than exports to trade liberalisation. While
the effects of the mid-1980s trade reforms impacted import growth in 1985, export growth
reacted in 1986. However, NAFTA does not show any significant impact on either
exports or imports. The probable reason for this is that the major trade liberalisation took
place during the mid-1980s, and NAFTA merely represented Mexico's free trade and
financial commitment with the international market.
Thirdly, with regard to the trade balance and the balance of payments, our results show
that the effects of the mid-1980s trade liberalisation episode worsened the trade balance.
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Since the deterioration of the trade balance limits the foreign exchange availability and
the sustainability of economic growth, we evaluate how trade liberalisation has interacted
with the performance of Mexico's GDP growth through Thirlwall's balance of payments
constrained growth model. The estimation of Thirlwall's model requires estimates of the
income elasticity of import demand, which capture the influence of trade reforms. The
results of the model, using McCombie's test (1989), confirmed the hypothesis that the
slowdown in Mexico's economic growth since 1985 has resulted from an upward shift in
the income elasticity of demand for imports and an insufficient increase in the rate of
growth of exports. The sustainable growth rate pre-1985 and post-1985 was 5.8 per cent
and 3.2 per cent, respectively. Thus, trade reforms have resulted in making the balance of
payments constraint on Mexico's long run growth even more binding, which supports the
findings of Moreno-Brid (2001, 1999 and 1998).
Fourthly, with regard to foreign direct investment (FDI), we were particularly interested
in whether there are causal links between FDI, exports and imports. The results show a
uni-directional link from exports to FDI. A likely explanation for this result is that FDI
has been located in the financial services sector; and privatisation of either governmental
firms or business owned by Mexican entrepreneurs (e.g. Telefonos de Mexico, TELMEX;
Banco Nacional de Mexico, BANAIAEX) has absorbed a significant proportion of EDT
inflows. These FDI inflows do not necessarily optimise export performance, at least in a
direct way. The second result refers to a bi-directional link between FDI and imports,
which is a plausible result according to the characteristics of Mexico's trade where intra-
firm trade by MNCs accounts for over 50 per cent of Mexico's trade volume. In other
words, the Mexican productive structure is increasingly dominated by foreign investors.
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Overall, the unilateral liberalisation of trade during the mid-1980s was so far-reaching
that the deregulation included in NAFTA represented just the multilateral negotiations
that locked-in Mexico's trade and foreign investment policy. There is no evidence that
NAFTA has improved the performance of exports. The euphoric statements about
NAFTA, related to the crucial benefits that free trade was going to work as a lever for
growth, seem to be extremely exaggerated. NAFTA, however, has been successful in
allowing an easy access to MNCs, most of them from the US, to the country; where their
production has a high import content, and minimum backward and forward linkages to the
domestic economy. But, it is the performance of the US economy that mainly determines
the volume of Mexican exports. Even more, our study confirms that the economic activity
of Mexico is highly dependent on imports because the liberalisation of trade, coupled with
FDI liberalisation, has contributed to a contraction of domestic industry (Cimoli and
Correa, 2002; Mattar et al., 2002).
7.2 Policy Implications
Our analysis of the effects of trade liberalisation in Mexico has several policy
implications. From the figures analysed, export growth and import growth have a very
similar performance. The export performance has not been enough to provide the foreign
exchange requirements of the country to afford the imports demanded for economic
development, when on average the sustainable growth rate post-1985 has fallen to 3.2 per
cent. Even more, considering the private and public foreign debt —which in 2002
represented approximately 23.3 per cent of GDP— the country needs a more dynamic
non-oil export performance which should be linked to the domestic economy, and its
import content needs to be reduced. Currently, 30 per cent of Mexico's export earnings go
to repay foreign debt.
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More attention should be paid to the monetary effects of trade and financial liberalisation
on the balance of payments. We claim that the deterioration of the trade balance as a
result of trade liberalisation has adverse consequences for the economy. Notwithstanding
the magnitude of the rate of growth of exports or the leadership of Mexico's position in
the list of leading exporters, what really matters is the position of the balance of
payments. A greater deficit on the balance of payments undermines the sustainability of
growth, the credit-worthiness of the country and its ability to borrow.
Trade policy-makers still have room for manoeuvre. Trade policies must be orientated
towards the promotion of the production of exports that contain high value-added, and
preferably to those exports with high income and price elasticities of demand.
Simultaneously, industrial policies should be orientated towards the production of the
import content required for exports. In other words, the constraint on growth will continue
unless the production structure and the pattern of trade in Mexico are changed to increase
export expansion relative to imports.
The results of this study question those euphoric statements by various administrations
which claimed that once NAFTA was signed, Mexico was going to embark on a path of
faster, sustainable economic growth, and it was going to be able, through trade
liberalisation, to reach comparable macroeconomic indicators to its trading partners. With
the analysis presented in this thesis, a posteriori we confirm Rodrik's (1992) warning
"claims on behalf of liberalization should be modest lest policy-makers become
disillusioned once again" (p.103). Rodrik cautioned about the danger of over-selling trade
liberalisation as a panacea for economic problems, which at the time was considered as
the answer to the 'lost decade': the 1980s. The point made by Rodrik is still valid today.
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In this regard, Mexico's participation in two future major free trade agreements, the Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), I which will come into effect in 2005, and the Plan
Puebla Panama (PPP) 2 —financed by the Inter-American Development Bank— should be
analysed carefully. Both agreements represent the most challenging international treaties
to analyse. Although officially each of them involves different aims, they are based on the
assumption that free trade and investment within the area will guarantee sustainable
development.
Reasonable economists would agree that free trade is neither sufficient to increase exports
with backward-forward linkages to the domestic economy nor guarantees a better position
of the balance of payments of any country. Trade liberalisation must be coupled with
governmental policies that co-ordinate the industrial and trade policy.
Finally, the results presented in this thesis show evidence which is against orthodox
doctrine, suggesting that there are solid arguments for government intervention to oversee
the process of liberalisation and industrial policy if the principal aim is to promote the
country's economic development. This endorses the view in the quotation below:
The Cambridge development economist Ajit Singh tells the story of when
he first went to Cambridge as a student of Kaldor that Kaldor taught him
three things: first, developing countries must industrialise; second, they can
industrialise only by protection, and third, anyone who says otherwise is
being dishonest! (Thirlwall, 2003a, p. 124).
I The participating countries in the FTAA are: Antigua, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay,
and Venezuela.
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